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  • 标题:Micro- and Macro-Level Validation in Agent-Based Simulation: Reproduction of Human-Like Behaviors and Thinking in a Sequential Bargaining Game
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Keiki Takadama ; Tetsuro Kawai ; Yuhsuke Koyama
  • 期刊名称:Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
  • 印刷版ISSN:1460-7425
  • 出版年度:2008
  • 卷号:11
  • 期号:2
  • 页码:1-17
  • 出版社:University of Surrey, Department of Sociology
  • 摘要:This paper addresses both micro- and macro-level validation in agent-based simulation (ABS) to explore validated agents that can reproduce not only human-like behaviors externally but also human-like thinking internally. For this purpose, we employ the sequential bargaining game, which can investigate a change in humans' behaviors and thinking longer than the ultimatum game (i.e., one-time bargaining game), and compare simulation results of Q-learning agents employing any type of the three types of action selections (i.e., the ε-greedy, roulette, and Boltzmann distribution selections) in the game. Intensive simulations have revealed the following implications: (1) Q-learning agents with any type of three action selections can reproduce human-like behaviors but not human-like thinking, which means that they are validated from the macro-level viewpoint but not from the micro-level viewpoint; and (2) Q-learning agents employing Boltzmann distribution selection with changing the random parameter can reproduce both human-like behaviors and thinking, which means that they are validated from both micro- and macro-level viewpoints.
  • 关键词:Micro;and Macro-Level Validation; Agent-Based Simulation; Agent Modeling; Sequential Bargaining Game; Reinforcement Learning
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