摘要：This paper aims to evaluate whether the provision of non-audit services (NASs) affects external auditor independence in an environment characterised by low legal protection of minority investors and a high concentration of ownership and control. Audit reports and costs of services are analysed over 3 years for 154 Brazilian companies. The binary variable proxy for independence indicates a qualified auditor's report and, as an alternative specification, the issuing of a going concern opinion. Logit models were employed with control variables to identify aspects related to other sources of threats to independence, management influence, and the effort and risk of auditing services. The results indicate that the provision of NASs does not affect auditor independence. This evidence is robust in terms of the alternative specification of the independence proxy and the observation of a subset of companies considered qualifiable. Only when summed to audit fees is there evidence of a negative impact on independence, signalling that the client’s economic dependence might be more relevant than NAS with respect to auditor independence. This result is robust to both independence proxies and the subset of qualifiable companies. In general, other sources of threats do not seem related to independence. This study provides evidence of a market in which auditor independence is expected to be compromised, given controlling shareholders’ influence on company management.
