摘要：The main goal of this paper is to explore the continuity and discontinuity in how different philosophical systems understand the concept of substance. At the beginning of the paper, I draw a distinction between formal criteria for what it means to be a substance and the question of what satisfies those criteria. I then analyze Aristotle’s, medieval and modern views on substance in order to show that, in spite of other considerable differences among them, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Descartes, Locke and Hume all identify the same criteria for being the substenc. The differences between them, I then claim, lie in the way they answer the question of what satisfies the criteria. The most radical conclusion, as will be clear, is drawn by Hume, who famously believes that there is nothing that really satisfies traditional formal criteria for substantiality. In the last part of the paper, I analyze Kant’s idealist view and show that it is his only within his philosophical system that we can find a complete break with the philosophical tradition and quite differing criteria for substantiality. It will be shown that, for Kant, substance is no longer something that should be the basis for the properties of objects that exist independently of us, but the way in which human cognitive powers understand some key aspects of the phenomenological domain of the knowable. The upshot of this discussion is that the history of the idea of substance can be divided on the period before and after Kant, where it is Kant, rather than Descartes, the one who truly diverges from the traditional philosophical pardigms about substance.
