Japanese Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) has provided the deposit insurance since 1971. The Deposit Insurance Act allowed the DIC to protect the full values of deposit, only when its depositor has less than 10 million yen in deposits. However, the law was amended in 1996, and the DIC was authorized to protect not only all depositors, but also all creditors. Although some argued that depositors' bank runs and financial panics did not occur due to this blanket insurance, other economists criticized that the moral hazard of depositors became serious due to this blanket insurance and proposed its abolishment. This paper considers whether the abolishment of the blanket insurance is appropriate for current Japanese economic conditions, by studying the details of deposit insurance systems of the United States, Korea, and Germany. This paper finds that (1) the effective coverage provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (i.e., the U.S. deposit insurance) is larger than what is considered in Japan, (2) the United States and Korea started the limited protection scheme after the banking problems were almost solved, and (3) Germany still provides the blanket insurance, but does not suffer from the moral hazard problem.