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  • 标题:Evaluation of Payoff Matrices for Non-Cooperative Games via Processing Binary Expert Estimations
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Vadim Romanuke
  • 期刊名称:Information Technology and Management Science
  • 印刷版ISSN:2255-9086
  • 电子版ISSN:2255-9094
  • 出版年度:2016
  • 卷号:19
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:10-15
  • DOI:10.1515/itms-2016-0004
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Walter de Gruyter GmbH
  • 摘要:A problem of evaluating the non-cooperative game model is considered in the paper. The evaluation is understood in the sense of obtaining the game payoff matrices whose entries are single-point values. Experts participating in the estimation procedure make their judgments on all the game situations for every player. A form of expert estimations is suggested. The form is of binary type, wherein the expert’s judgment is either 1 or 0. This type is the easiest to be implemented in social networks. For most social networks, 1 can be a “like” (the currently evaluated situation is advantageous), and 0 is a “dislike” (disadvantageous). A method of processing expert estimations is substantiated. Two requirements are provided for obtaining disambiguous payoff averages along with the clustered payoff matrices.
  • 关键词:Estimation procedure ; expert’s binary judgment ; non-cooperative game ; payoff averages ; payoff matrice evaluation
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