期刊名称：Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
印刷版ISSN：1830-3420
电子版ISSN：1830-3439
出版年度：2018
出版社：European Central Bank
摘要：Recent debate has focused on the introduction of a central stabilisation capacity as a completingelement of the Economic and Monetary Union. Its main objective would be to contribute cushioningcountry-specific economic shocks, especially when national fiscal stabilisers are run down. Thereare two main potential objections to such schemes proposed so far: first, they may lead to moralhazard, i.e. weaken the incentives for sound fiscal policies and structural reforms. Second, they maygenerate permanent transfers among countries. Here we present a scheme that is relatively free frommoral hazard, because the transfers are based on changes in world trade in the various sectors. Thesechanges can be considered as largely exogenous, hence independent from an individualgovernment’s policy; therefore, the scheme is better protected against manipulation. Our schemeworks as follows: if a sector is hit by a bad shock at the world market level, then a country with aneconomic structure that is skewed towards this sector receives a (one-time) transfer from the othercountries. The scheme is designed such that the transfers add up to zero each period, hence obviatingthe need for a borrowing capacity. We show that the transfers generated by our scheme tend to becountercyclical and larger when economies are less diversified. In addition, since transfers are basedon temporary changes in world trade, the danger of permanent transfers from one set of countries tothe other countries is effectively ruled out. Finally, we show that transfers are quite robust torevisions in the underlying export data.
关键词：EMU; central fiscal capacity; exports; moral hazard.
