出版社：National University of Political Science and Public Administration, Bucharest
摘要：It is commonplace in contemporary political philosophy to argue that people’sequal moral standing grounds their entitlements to equal citizenship. Butmany philosophers deny that equal moral standing has anything to do with ourright to have equal suffrage. In this paper, I will defend the idea that equalmoral standing provides moral grounds to equal suffrage, by refuting severalrepresentative challenges to it. By meeting Ronald Dworkin’s and DavidEstlund’s challenges, I argue that theories of egalitarian distributive justicecannot consistently endorse both equal vote and an ideal of moral equality thatapplies exclusively to distributive equality, but has nothing to do with equal vote.Thus, the positions taken on the issue of equal vote, I will show, indeed haveimportant consequences for the structure of theories of egalitarian distributivejustice. Then, by refuting Steven Wall’s argument for a plural voting system, Iwill argue that the importance of people’s interest in being equal authors of apolity is constitutive to our understanding of equal citizenship. I will argue thatthis shows the implausibility of any theory of egalitarian distributive justice thatopts for a principled rejection of equal vote. I conclude that equal moral standingindeed provides an important moral ground for regulating the voting system. Tothe extent that a theory of egalitarian distributive justice has to be grounded onthe idea of equal moral standing, which seems to be true for most such theories,it follows that, contrary to many theorists, justice indeed needs equal vote.
