摘要：In this paper we will try to point out differencies between Quine’s and Gibson’s interpretation of the naturalized epistemology project. Namely, although his claim is that genetic approach which Quine advocated is the best strategy there is to investigate the relation between evidence and theory, and that externalizing of empiricism that it requires is one of Quine’s major philosophical contributions, apart from the fact that they would be in conflict with some strongly held intuitions, we think that assumptions on which Gibson’s project is based would have to be essentially different from Quine’s. In other words, contrary to Quine’s position within which we have possibility of staying on more moderate, and in our opinion, more plausible bihavioristic line of approach, we will try to show that one of the consequences of Gibson’s interpretation is that in Gibson’s case, that possibility is ruled out. On the other hand, this should enable us to draw some more radical conclusions about the nature of Quine’s epistemological project. [Project of the Serbian Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, Grant no. 179041: Dinamički sistemi u prirodi i društvu: filozofski i empirijski aspekti]
