摘要：: This article connects the “agency model” with the fundamental right to the prevention of occupational accidents, from the point of view of Law and Economics. Based on an approach to the necessary effectiveness of social rights related to the reduction of labour inherent risks, prevention is affirmed as a human and fundamental right, while it is shown that accidents still occur frequently in Brazil and all the world, what demonstrates a disrespectful reality to the precautionary principle. The study also deals with the social costs of occupational accidents and the current economic incentives to the prevention choice, facing microeconomic concepts and costs with prevention and repair notions, as well as benefits with the adoption of preventive measures. Finally, the agency problem is presented, showing the relation between the “agent” employer and the “agent” employee facing the society, while presents the contribution of this model to stimulate the choice for prevention, attributing the obligation of monitoring the employee to the employer, which is who can run it more efficiently.
