期刊名称：International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology
印刷版ISSN：2347-6710
电子版ISSN：2319-8753
出版年度：2016
卷号：5
期号：12
页码：20873
DOI：10.15680/IJIRSET.2016.0512128
出版社：S&S Publications
摘要：The leakage resilient cryptography is used to overcome SCA attacks, were external details such aspower consumption, time taken to generate the key can be acquired by the attacker in order to get the parts of the secretkey and then compute the leakage function to aggregate the secret key. This can be overcome using the concept of keyupdating. Thus key updating makes it impossible for the attacker to guess the exact key that is being generated. Thispaper is focused on the actual risk of SCA lies within the ability to mount attacks over small components of theimportant thing and to aggregate understanding over different encryptions. The risk of SCA may also be thwarted byaltering the secret key at every run. Certainly, many contributions in the domain of leakage resilient cryptography triedto acquire this intention. However, the proposed options had been computationally intensive and weren't designed toclear up the drawback of the current cryptographic schemes. In this paper, we advise a established framework oflightweight key updating that can preserve the present cryptographic requisites and overview the minimal requisites forheuristic SCA-protection. Then, we endorse a whole approach to safeguard the implementation of any general mode ofadvanced Encryption standard. Our resolution maintains the same degree of SCA-safety (and commonly better) as thestate of the art, at a negligible subject overhead even as doubling the throughput of the first-class earlier work.
关键词：Side Channel Assaults; Cryptographic schemes; Key Distribution Center; Encryption and Decryption.
