摘要：The paper argues against the current view according to which there is a clear dichotomy between causation and explanation. The first is usually conceived as an extensional relation connecting particulars individuated non-intentionally, while the second would concern only rational, intensional links between true propositions (facts). Close examination of the particularistic strategy employed to account for the way causal explanation depends ontologically on causation shows that it fails in at least two cases: (i) explanations involving negative facts and (ii) explanations by stative predications. This also reveals that the usual assumption of token-states as a new type of particular causes designated by the nominalization of the sentential expression of stative facts is not independently motivated. Moreover it goes against the plausible distinction between enabling conditions and triggering causes. The paper closes with the claim that facts can be genuine causes and effects.
其他摘要：The paper argues against the current view according to which there is a clear dichotomy between causation and explanation. The first is usually conceived as an extensional relation connecting particulars individuated non-intentionally, while the second would concern only rational, intensional links between true propositions (facts). Close examination of the particularistic strategy employed to account for the way causal explanation depends ontologically on causation shows that it fails in at least two cases: (i) explanations involving negative facts and (ii) explanations by stative predications. This also reveals that the usual assumption of token-states as a new type of particular causes designated by the nominalization of the sentential expression of stative facts is not independently motivated. Moreover it goes against the plausible distinction between enabling conditions and triggering causes. The paper closes with the claim that facts can be genuine causes and effects.
