期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, University of York
出版年度：2016
卷号：2016
出版社：University of York
摘要：Following Jansen et al. (2012), we examine an unconventional Cournot model of the European Union natural gas market with three major suppliers Russian Gazprom, Norwegian Statoil, and Algerian Sonatrach. To reect Russia's other strategic consideration besides profit, we incorporate a relative market share into Gazprom's objective function. We prove that when Gazprom pursues the control of market share along with profit, it will be good news for consumers but bad news for its pure profit maximising rivals. We further show that by seeking a proper market share, Gazprom can achieve the same profit of a Stackelberg leader in a simultaneous move model as in the standard sequential move leader-follower model. Compared with Jansen et al.'s, our approach makes the analysis considerably simpler and more transparent.
关键词：Natural gas market; Cournot model; Stackelberg leader's advantage; Non-profit incentive; Relative market share; European Union
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