期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, University of York
出版年度：2013
卷号：2013
出版社：University of York
摘要：In this paper we reconsider Jansen et al.'s (2012) Cournot model of the European Union natural gas market with three major suppliers Russian Gazprom, Norwegian Statoil, and Algerian Sonatrach. To reflect Russia’s geopolitical consideration, we incorporate a relative market share to Gazprom’s objective function. Compared with Jansen et al.’s use of standard market share, our study shows that the introduction of relative market share makes it not only possible to derive the same results in a more general environment, but also permits us to obtain clear-cut quantitative analysis results for equilibrium solution, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Our analysis also demonstrates for this modiï¬ ed Cournot model that by seeking a proper market share, Gazprom can achieve the same profits of a Stackelberg leader in a simultaneous move model as in the classical sequential move leader-follower model. When Gazprom pursues the control of market share besides proï¬ ts, it will be good news for the EU’s consumers but bad news for its rivals.
关键词：Natural gas market; Cournot model; Stackelberg leader’s advantage; Nonproï¬ t incentives; Relative market share; European Union
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