期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, University of York
出版年度：2011
卷号：2011
出版社：University of York
摘要：We analyze a decentralized trading process in a basic labor market where heterogeneous firms and workers meet directly and randomly, and negotiate salaries with each other over time. Firms and workers may not have a complete picture of the entire market and can thus behave myopically in the process. Our main result establishes that, starting from an arbitrary initial market state, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic (firm-worker) pair improvements, or bilateral trades, leading to a stable matching between firms and workers with a scheme of competitive salary offers. An important implication of this result is that a general random process where every possible bilateral trade is chosen with a positive probability converges with probability one to a competitive equilibrium of the market.
关键词：Decentralized market; job matching; random path; competitive salary; stability
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