摘要：While corporate diversification is a fundamental issue both in the management literature and in corporate policy, the question that remains is whether it destroys or enhances firm value. This empirical study of the corporate diversification–value relationship for Pakistani firms looks at the role of asymmetric information and insider trading over a 10-year sample period, 2005–14. Using the industrial entropy index and purchase ratio to capture corporate diversification and insider trading, respectively, the study provides empirical evidence that questions the agency theory-based explanation of the corporate diversification–value relationship. Our results show that, in cases of asymmetric information, insiders increase the purchase of their firms’ shares in the open market when diversification is high. This contradicts the corporate diversification–value destruction stance of agency theory as well as the idea that outside investors’ undervaluation occurs due to information asymmetries. These results have strategic implications for corporate diversification strategies and are relevant to firm managers, regulators and shareholders.
关键词：Corporate diversification; agency effect; information asymmetry; insider trading; Pakistan.
