期刊名称：Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
印刷版ISSN：1955-611X
出版年度：2018
出版社：Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
摘要：We consider a model of competitive opinion formation in which three persuaders characterizedby (possibly unequal) persuasion impacts try to inuence opinions in a society of individualsembedded in a social network. Two of the persuaders have the extreme and opposite opinions,and the third one has the centrist opinion. Each persuader chooses one individual to target, i.e., heforms a link with the chosen individual in order to spread his own \point of view" in the society andto get the average long run opinion as close as possible to his own opinion. We examine the opinionconvergence and consensus reaching in the society. We study the existence and characterization ofpure strategy Nash equilibria in the game played by the persuaders with equal impacts. This characterizationdepends on inuenceability and centrality (intermediacy) of the targets. We discussthe e ect of the centrist persuader on the consensus and symmetric equilibria, compared to theframework with only two persuaders having the extreme opinions. When the persuasion impactsare unequal with one persuader having a suciently large impact, the game has only equilibria inmixed strategies.
