期刊名称：Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
印刷版ISSN：1955-611X
出版年度：2018
出版社：Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
摘要：We provide a bargaining foundation for the concept of ratio equilibrium in publicgood economies. We de ne a bargaining game of alternating o ers in which playersbargain to determine their cost shares of public good production and a level of publicgood. We study the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium without delay of thebargaining game. We demonstrate that when the players are perfectly patient, theyare indi erent between the equilibrium o ers of all players. We also show that everystationary subgame perfect equilibrium without delay in which the ratios o ered byall players are the same leads to a ratio equilibrium. In addition, we demonstrate thatall equilibrium ratios are o ered by the players at some stationary subgame perfectequilibrium without delay. We use these results to discuss the case when the assumptionof perfectly patient players is relaxed and the cost of delay vanishes.
关键词：ratio equilibrium; public good economy; bargaining game; stationary subgame;perfect equilibrium
