期刊名称：Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
印刷版ISSN：1955-611X
出版年度：2017
出版社：Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
摘要：This article reconsiders the issue of Bayesian aggregation by pointing at a conict thatmay arise between two logically independent dominance criteria, Pareto dominanceand statewise dominance, that are commonly imposed on social preferences. Wepropose a weaker dominance axiom that restricts statewise dominance to Paretodominant alternatives and Pareto dominance to statewise dominant alternatives. Theassociated aggregation rule is a convex combination of two components, the rst beinga weighted sum of the individuals' subjective expected utility (SEU) functional, thesecond being a social SEU functional, with associated social utility function andsocial belief. Such representation establishes the existence of a trade o betweenadherence to the Pareto principle and compliance with statewise dominance. Wethen investigate what are the consequences of adding to our assumptions either of thetwo dominance criteria in their full force and obtain that each of them is equivalentto discarding the other, unless there is essentially a common prior probability.
关键词：Pareto dominance; Monotonicity; Preference aggregation; Social choice;Subjective expected utility
