期刊名称：Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
印刷版ISSN：1955-611X
出版年度：2017
出版社：Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
摘要：We provide an analytical approach to the problem of influence maximization in a social networkwhen two players compete by means of dynamic targeting strategies. We formulate the problemas a two-player zero-sum stochastic game. We prove the existence of the uniform value if theplayers are sufficiently patient, both players can guarantee the same mean-average opinion withoutknowing the exact discount factor. Further, we put forward some elements for the characterizationof equilibrium strategies. In general, players must implement a trade-off between a forward-lookingperspective, according to which they shall aim at maximizing the future spread of their opinion inthe network, and a backward-looking perspective, according to which they shall aim at counteractingtheir opponent’s previous actions. When the influence potential of players is small, an equilibriumstrategy is to systematically target the agent with the largest eigenvector centrality.
关键词：Social Network; Dyamic games; Targeting; Stochastic games
