期刊名称：Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
印刷版ISSN：1955-611X
出版年度：2017
出版社：Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
摘要：We study bidding behavior by rms in beauty-contest auctions, i.e. auctions in whichthe winning bid is the one which gets closest to some function (average) of all submittedbids. Using a dataset on public procurement beauty-contest auctions, we show that rms' observed bidding behavior departs from equilibrium and can be predicted by asophistication index, which captures the rms' accumulated capacity of bidding close tooptimality in the past. We show that our empirical evidence is consistent with a CognitiveHierarchy model of bidders' behavior. We also investigate whether and how rms learnto bid strategically through experience.
关键词：cognitive hierarchy; auctions; beauty-contest; public procurement
