期刊名称：CEMFI Working Papers / Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros, Madrid
出版年度：2017
卷号：2017
出版社：Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros, Madrid
摘要：This paper shows that the concession model discourages firms from acquiring information about thefuture profitability of a project. Uniformed contractors carry out good and bad projects because theyare profitable in expected terms even though it would have been optimal to invest in screening themout according to their value. White elephants are identified as avoidable negative net present-valueprojects that are nevertheless undertaken. Institutional arrangements that limit the losses that firmscan bear exacerbate this distortion. We characterize the optimal concession contract which fostersthe acquisition of information and achieves the first best by conditioning the duration of theconcession to the realization of the demand and includes payments for not carrying out someprojects.
关键词：Concession contracts; information acquisition; flexible-term concessions.
