期刊名称：Agathos : an International Review of the Humanities and Social Sciences
印刷版ISSN：2069-1025
电子版ISSN：2069-1025
出版年度：2017
卷号：8
期号：1
页码：21-31
出版社：Fundatia Culturala Poezia, Iasi
摘要：In the following pages we try to make a comparative analysis regarding the way in which Kant and Blaga approached the concept of “experience”. For Kant, when he takes into account the knowledge issue, experience means empirical knowledge which consists in “the synthetic chaining of the phenomena in a conscience”. At the same time though, in the transcendental analysis of the experience, which is not reducible to the knowledge issue, Kant distinguishes between “the theoretical experience”, characteristic of the scientific knowledge, and “the moral experience”, based on an unconditional law, having the free will as a principle. It is not supposed to be a neat separation between the two: on the one hand, the theoretical experience is not self-conclusive, referring, in extreme, to the sphere or pure rationality (postulated as limit of the theoretical processes); on the other hand, the moral law, as an act of the pure rationality, pretends to be accomplished in the sensitive world itself. Lucian Blaga stays partially faithful to Kant when stating that experience refers to “an ensemble of sensitive data made available for the intellect”. But, due to the fact that Blaga makes the difference between two types of knowledge, the paradisiacal one (in a Kantian meaning) and the luciferical one, the concept of experience will be slightly different according to this distinction. Moreover, Lucian Blaga is preoccupied to differentiate “the experience functions” in the particular sciences from those in philosophy.
