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  • 标题:Learning in network games
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Jaromír Kovářík ; Friederike Mengel ; José Gabriel Romero
  • 期刊名称:Quantitative Economics
  • 电子版ISSN:1759-7331
  • 出版年度:2018
  • 卷号:9
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:85-139
  • DOI:10.3982/QE688
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
  • 摘要:

    We report the findings of experiments designed to study how people learn in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to, e.g., random matching) more rules differ in terms of their information requirements. Our experimental design enables us to observe both which actions participants choose and which information they consult before making their choices. We use these data to estimate learning types using finite mixture models. Monitoring information requests turns out to be crucial, as estimates based on choices alone show substantial biases. We also find that learning depends on network position. Participants in more complex environments (with more network neighbors) tend to resort to simpler rules compared to those with only one network neighbor.

  • 关键词:Experiments ; game theory ; heterogeneity ; learning ; finite mixture models ; networks ; C72 ; C90 ; C91 ; D85
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