期刊名称：GI_FORUM - Journal for Geographic Information Science
电子版ISSN：2308-1708
出版年度：2015
页码：571-574
DOI：10.1553/giscience2015s571
出版社：ÖAW Verlag, Wien
摘要：This paper elaborates on the effect of predictive memory on cognitive agents that are actingin selfish routing games. Selfish routing describes a situation, where agents are moving in anetwork with defined latency functions, and act in a strictly selfish manner. Under certainsituations – i.e. specific definition of the network, associated latency functions, and agentsacting strictly selfish – the Braess Paradox occurs. The Braess Paradox contradicts humanintuition by the fact that adding a new low-latency edge to a given network does not reduceoverall latency. By incorporating cognitive agents in the game theoretical approach, agentscould overcome their strictly selfish behaviour, which in turn reduces overall latency. Byincorporating a kind of predictive memory, each agent can learn from a number of personalexperiences and alter their present behaviour accordingly, which can reduce overall latency.
