The French Navy and the Seven Years' War.
Fowler, William M., Jr.
The French Navy and the Seven Years' War, by Jonathan Dull. France Overseas: Studies in Empire and Decolonization. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2005. xiii, 445 pp. $35.00 US (cloth).
It was the world's first world war. From 1754 to 1763 the fleets and armies of England and France, the eighteenth century's two superpowers, fought on nearly every continent and ocean. These great powers collided in North America, the Baltic, the Mediterranean, the southern Netherlands, India, and Africa. At the end of the war, territory greater in expanse than all of Western Europe changed hands. More than one million men died, and England emerged with an empire from which it would draw the resources to fuel its industrial revolution and transform the world.
Most histories of this war are written from an Anglo triumphalist point of view. Frederick the Great is celebrated as a strategic genius who fends off the "Three Furies", Austria, France, and Russia. The Royal Navy is victorious, while General Wolfe achieves apotheosis at Quebec. Dull's work is a welcome counterpoise to these simplistic interpretations. It is also a book that sets the Seven Years' War in the context of the eighteenth-century geopolitical struggle between France and England. Ironically, the vast scale of this conflict gave an advantage to England, the smaller power. While France's large armies dominated the European theatre, the French navy suffered neglect and decline. England had fewer manpower resources, but its sea power provided mobility and security. Beyond Europe, the English could strike where they pleased.
Dull's research is prodigious. More than one third of this volume is devoted to scholarly apparatus, including appendices that details French and English naval forces of the period, footnotes citing an array of archival sources, and a substantial bibliography of printed works.
Organizing his book chronologically, Dull launches his inquiry with the "Uneasy" years between the end of the War of Austrian Succession and the beginning of the Seven Years' War. Despite some chronic problems of supply, these were good years for the French navy. Under able administrators, the navy built new ships, and the fleet grew stronger. Had peace lasted longer, the French would have enjoyed more time to prepare for war.
Neither England nor France was expecting war so soon. A series of events in North America precipitated a conflict that soon escalated from minor frontier engagements to a world war. Initially, the war went well for France. In the Mediterranean, a French fleet drove an English force under Byng away from Minorca thereby allowing them to take the island. In North America, the French virtually annihilated a British army on the banks of the Monongahela, and, in the year following, Montcalm seized the advantage in Canada and captured the fortress of Oswego on Lake Ontario.
Unfortunately, France's early victories at sea and on land masked fundamental weaknesses. Although large, the French army was neither modern nor wellled, and the navy, always a stepchild to the land forces, was chronically short of cash. Indeed, France's entire financial infrastructure was a mess. Bills piled up as loan after loan went unpaid. The turning point came in 1758, "A Year of Desperation," according to Dull, when a weakened French navy could no longer protect sea lanes linking France with its colonies. As a result, Louisbourg fell, opening the path for Wolfe to take Quebec. When Quebec fell, Canada was lost. In the same year, Admiral Hawke chased the French fleet under Conflans into Quiberon Bay.
Quiberon Bay was a devastating blow to the French navy. The entry of Spain into the conflict brought a brief spasm of hope, but any chance of its navy providing a counterweight to the English evaporated quickly. Should there be any doubt about English supremacy in 1762, a combined force descended on the Spanish at Havana and took the city. A nearby French squadron refused to risk coming to the aid of their Spanish allies. The Spanish surrendered and scuttled their fleet.
Dull's remarkable skill at capturing the movement of fleets and armies is matched by his penetrating analysis of diplomatic maneuverings. Duplicity is the theme. Almost from the moment the war began, secret missions were dispatched to end the conflict. France, particularly, wanted a cessation of hostilities. Its ally, Spain, was less inclined and yearned for the return of Gibraltar. The rail of Havana, however, made the prospect of victory dim. To compensate Spain, France offered it Louisiana and arranged for the return of Havana. With Spain reconciled, and England's new king George III anxious to end the expense of war, the warring parties signed a final peace on 10 February, 1763.
For France, as Dull explains, "the peace would not be brilliant, [but] it would not be as bad as one might expect" (p. 243). Indeed, by permitting the French to keep the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon to support their fishing industry, England set the stage for a resurgence of French naval power. Less than two decades after the end of the Seven Years' War, this revitalized navy played a central role in reversing the fortunes of England and helping to establish the American Republic.
Dull's book is a monument to careful scholarship. With clear, concise prose, he navigates deftly through a complex tale of war, diplomacy, and politics. His book is the definitive work on this topic.
William M. Fowler, Jr.
Northeastern University
