Foreign Policy, Inc.: Privatizing America's National Interest.

Long, David E.

Foreign Policy, Inc.: Privatizing America's National Interest, by Lawrence Davidson. University Press of Kentucky, 2009. 184 pages. $27.50, hardcover.

This is a fascinating book. Its tone is one of despondent intellectualism backed by impeccable research. The main thesis is that a combination of domestic factors is highly detrimental to U.S. foreign-policy interests. They include political parochialism (or localism), which has spawned public apathy and lack of interest in foreign affairs; political factionalism; media manipulation; and, most important, special single-issue interest groups and lobbies. It is the author's view that in today's global political and security environment, the negative influence of these factors has greatly increased.

The author relies mainly on descriptive narrative to make his case. The first chapter addresses the popular disregard for foreign policy among most Americans, stemming from public apathy toward the U.S. political process in general. For example, he notes that the United States ranks 139th out of 172 democratic countries in voter turnout (p. 21). Even when there is public interest, it is predominately focused on local issues. Localism makes it easier for the political establishment and the mainstream media to assess the national mood and thereby influence the creation of a broad consensus of support for specific responses to foreign-policy issues without having to resort to a more probing national debate.

The main thrust of book, however, is on the role of private political factions, what the author terms "factocracy." He notes in Chapter 2 that the founding fathers were averse to factions and that James Madison, who believed that factionalism and special interests were a product of human nature and could not be removed without destroying political liberty, sought to rein them in through representative government and the American system of checks and balances. But he goes on to say that, in modern times, that may not be sufficient (p. 25).

The remainder of the book then lays out how factionalism and special interests, present since the birth of the nation, have grown more powerful in recent times. Chapter 3 is basically a history of the role of factionalism and how special-interest groups have influenced foreign-policy formulation throughout U.S. history, and Chapter 4 seeks to demonstrate how in more recent times they have dangerously expanded in power and influence. The next two chapters are case studies of two of what the author considers to be particularly dangerous foreign-policy interest groups: the Cuba lobby and the Israel lobby. He characterizes these as examples of the ethnic "privatizing" of the national interest.

In the final chapter, he concludes that national interests are all too often defined by the private interests of powerful lobbies (pp. 145-146), a reality that he believes is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. Depressing as this conclusion and indeed the tone of the whole book are, however, they do portray how lobbies and major interest groups have harmed U.S. foreign-policy formulation throughout the history of the nation.

Those interested in acquiring a greater understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. foreign policy process should look elsewhere. The book's strength is in its descriptive narrative, not its analysis of foreign-policy decision-making. Indeed, the discussion of Madison's aversion to political factions and special interest groups and the efforts of the founding fathers to safeguard against their undue influence over public policy support the soundness of the U.S. foreign-policy process more than they do the author's call for structural changes needed to overcome the process's inadequacies.

The first goal of democracy is not to guarantee good government, but to guarantee freedom through public participation in the political process. The role of democratic government, therefore, is to carry out the public will. But it is also charged with pursuing the national interest. And, as the founding fathers anticipated, the public will is not always synonymous with the national interest, nor is the national interest the sum total of public special interests. Thus U.S. governments, which are responsible both for carrying out the public will and for pursuing and protecting the national interest, are perpetually faced with the conundrum of balancing the two. Should policy makers wittingly or unwittingly fail to place the public will over that public good, they risk being removed in free democratic elections.

From that perspective, the author's case studies of the Cuba and Israel lobbies do not tell the whole story. He emphasizes their power, influence and financial resources and the susceptibility of politicians to lobbying. Yet, without winning the support of a substantial portion of the electorate, no lobby can win the day. The key to understanding the influence of special interest groups and lobbies on foreign policy is to discover the policy makers' cost/benefit calculations. The two overriding factors required for influencing foreign policy are: 1) that the political benefits of a lobby's foreign-policy position outweigh the domestic political costs; and 2) that at worst, the foreign-policy costs of adopting an ill-conceived special-interest position will not outweigh the domestic political benefits. For the idealist, that might seem like a cynical formula, but in the experience of this reviewer it is reality.

In applying this formula to the author's case studies of the Cuba and Israel lobbies, one can conclude that, despite the obvious damage both lobbies have caused to U.S. foreign-policy interests, local and national domestic political interests have outweighed that damage in the minds of successive U.S. administrations, both Democratic and Republican. It should be added that one reason for placing domestic interests over foreign-policy interests in both cases is that neither the Cuba lobby nor the Israel lobby has had an effective counterlobby to balance it.

That is not to say, however, that these political cost/benefit conclusions are permanent. With the end of the Cold War and the exit of Fidel Castro, the power of the Cuba lobby has already diminished. When his brother Raul leaves the scene, it is quite likely that the Cuba lobby will also leave the scene.

The staying power of the Israel lobby is far greater, but it is also not absolute. The uncritical nature of U.S. support to Israel has led to more criticism over the last decade than has been witnessed since the lobby first began seeking to persuade Americans to support the creation of a homeland in British Palestine for the victimized European Jewish Diaspora in the wake of World War II. Significantly, much of the latter-day criticism of the Israel lobby comes from within the American Jewish community as well as from the U.S. population in general, suggesting that even the Israel lobby may not be invulnerable.

David E. Long, FSO (ret.), specialist in the Middle East, the Gulf and anti-terrorism