The resettlement of Syrian refugees: the positions and roles of the federation of Canadian municipalities and its members.

Garcea, Joseph

Introduction

City governments as well as other municipal governments have a long-standing interest in immigrant and refugee settlement. Their interest results from the positive and negative implications that such settlement has for them as governments and for their communities (FCM 2011). The central objective of this article is to provide an overview of the policy positions and roles of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) and its members, but particularly members that comprise the Big City Mayors' Caucus (BCMC), in the resettlement of Syrian refugees from the fall of 2015 until the fall of 2016 (FCM 2015d). More specifically, the purpose of the article is to provide an overview of the following: the positions of the FCM and its members that comprise the BCMC on the resettlement of Syrian refugees in Canada; the major categories of roles performed by members of the BCMC; and the importance of the positions of the FCM and the actual roles of its members that comprise the BCMC. Succinctly stated, the FCM is a national umbrella organization consisting of nearly 2,000 municipalities wherein approximately 91% of Canada's population lived, and the BCMC is a constituent sub-group of the FCM consisting of twenty two of the largest cities in Canada (FCM 2017).

Background and Context of the Positions of the FCM and its members

A full understanding and appreciation of the positions and roles of the FCM and those of some of its members, but particularly of members that comprise the BCMC, on the resettlement of the first wave of Syrian refugees, requires an understanding of at least two important matters: first, the events that led to Canada's commitment to accept at least 25,000 refugees by the end of 2015, and even more thereafter; and second, the number, categories, and destinations of Syrian refugees arriving in Canada between the latter part of 2015 and the early part of 2016.

Canada's large commitment to resettle Syrian refugees was borne not only out of the armed conflict in Syria but also out of the partisan political conflict among the major parties in Canada within the context of the federal election of 2015. During that election campaign the resettlement of Syrian refugees became one of the most prominent issues, particularly after the drowning death on 2 September 2015 of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old boy with relatives in Canada who had intended to sponsor him and his family for resettlement in this country. That tragic incident captured the attention of the Canadian public and politicians regarding the plight of Syrian refugees in ways that nothing else had to that point. The incident prompted an extensive debate on the nature and scope of Canada's response to the resettlement of Syrian refugees (Mackinnon 2015). Part of that debate centered on the issue of how many refugees Canada would accept for resettlement and how quickly it could resettle them. The Liberal party promised that if it formed the government it would resettle 25,000 Government Assisted Refugees (GARs) by the end of 2015--a far larger commitment than the other parties made.

After winning the election held on November 4, 2015, the Liberal majority government, led by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, declared in its first Throne Speech that it would proceed to fulfill that particular election promise (Canada 2015). The declaration was made despite differences of opinion, and in some instances even strong concerns, expressed by governmental and non-governmental actors both during and after the election regarding the capacity and prudence of processing and resettling so many refugees in such a short timeframe. The capacity issue focused both on the ability of the federal government to process and transport the refugees into the country, and on the ability of settlement agencies, sponsors and other public organizations (e.g., schools) to facilitate the resettlement of so many refugees in such a short period. The prudence issue focused on increasing concerns that non-bonafide refugees might take advantage of the resettlement process, and either bona fide or non-bona fide refugees might pose security risks to Canada. The security risk issue became particularly pronounced in the debates that ensued after the terrorist bombings in France and Belgium shortly after the Liberal government assumed power. At that time there was an increase in the number and volume of voices of those who wanted the federal government either to rescind or at least pull back both on the target number and target date for resettling the 25,000 Syrian GARs by the end of 2015. As shall be explained in a subsequent section of this article, this included the voices of the FCM president, Louie Raymond, and some influential mayors of the largest cities who were members of the BCMC. Nevertheless, despite expressing those concerns, both the FCM and the BCMC remained committed to the overarching goal of Canada resettling a substantial number of refugees despite some of the challenges that would have to be overcome in doing so by governmental and non-governmental agencies and groups, including cities and other municipalities.

Categories, Number and Initial Destination of Syrian Refugees

The three categories of Syrian refugees resettled between November 2015 and December 2016 were Government Assisted Refugees (GARs), Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs), and Blended Visa-Office Referred Refugees (BVORRs). The fundamental difference between these three types of refugees is whether they are sponsored by the government as is the case with GARs, community groups as is the case with PSRs, or co-sponsored by the government and community groups as is the case with BVORRs (Canada 2017a).

Although it took two months longer than initially projected, the federal government achieved the target of resettling 25,000 Syrian refugees. Indeed, by the end of February 2016 it had resettled more than 28,000 Syrian refugees. However, contrary to the commitment it had made during the election of 2015 and affirmed in its Throne Speech in November of that year (Canada 2015), only 15,000 of those 28,000 refugees, were GARs. The remaining 13,000 were a combination of PSRs and BVORRs (Zilio 2016a).

In March 2016 the federal government confirmed that, as it had previously indicated, its target for the total number of Syrian refugees to be admitted by the end of 2016 would be in the range of 35,000 to 50,000, and that of those, 25,000 would be GARS. At that time it also indicated that the target for the total number of immigrants that would be admitted in 2016 was 300,000, including 55,800 refugees of whom 18,000 would be PSRs and the other 37,800 would be GARs and BVORRs. Moreover it indicated that a substantial proportion of the 55,800 would consist of the requisite number of Syrian refugees needed to meet not only its own commitment on the total number of 25,000 Syrian GARs but also the commitments of community organizations for Syrian PSRs (Zilio 2016b).

In keeping with that commitment, during the last ten months of 2016 more than 14,671 Syrian refugees were admitted into Canada. Consequently, as Table 1 reveals, the total number of Syrian refugees admitted into Canada from November 2015 to December 2016 was 39,671.

Achieving the new target set in March 2016 was facilitated substantially by the number of private sponsors who were either still waiting for the refugees they had sponsored or were willing to receive refugees. Indeed, by this time in 2016 the major challenge for the federal government was not the lack of private sponsors, but the continuing challenges it faced in processing the resettlement of so many refugees in the relatively short time expected by eager sponsors. The delay in resettling additional Syrian refugees, in light of so many willing private sponsors, became the focus of one critique toward the government's efforts to resettle that particular group of refugees. There were also three other interrelated critiques. The first was the critique that the federal government was far too ambitious and imprudent in attempting to resettle so many Syrian refugees in such a short timeframe. The second critique was that the federal government was devoting too much attention to the resettlement of Syrian refugees and not enough attention to the resettlement of refugees from other parts of the world. The third critique was that the federal government was resettling any Syrian refugees at all into Canada. Evidence of this critique is found in the online petition circulating in the spring of 2016 with approximately 50,000 signatures requesting the government to stop the resettlement of an additional 25,000 Syrian refugees in Canada (Kanji 2016).

Whereas the Syrian GARs were destined primarily to 36 cities that had settlement services organizations with the capacity and authority to provide initial reception and resettlement services within the scope of the Refugee Assistance Program (RAP), the Syrian PSRs and BVORRs were more widely distributed across approximately 300 other cities and other types of municipalities where their respective sponsors lived (Canada 2016a). Of those 36 cities, 23 were outside Quebec and 13 were inside Quebec. Whereas the cities outside Quebec were pre-selected by federal officials, the cities within Quebec were pre-selected by Quebec government officials in consultation with federal officials because that province is responsible for the actual administration of the RAP-like program using funds transferred to it by the federal government (Canada 2016b).

Table 2 shows the communities in various provinces where GARs were destined initially upon arrival in Canada. All except two of the BCMC member cities (i.e., Brampton and Surrey) are listed in Table 2 as initial recipients of GARs. Thus, of the 36 cities listed in Table 2, 20 were members of the BCMC and 16 were not.

Table 3 shows that approximately 29,695 of the 36,135 Syrian refugees who were resettled during that particular twelve month period were initially resettled in 15 of the 22 cities or city-regions that were members of the BCMC. Not surprisingly, it also shows that almost half of those refugees (i.e., 13,830) were initially resettled in the three major metropolitan regions (i.e., Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver).

Table 4 shows the communities within the various provinces where the three major categories of Syrian Refugees were destined between the start of November 2015 and the end of November 2016.

Positions and Roles of the FCM and BCMC on Syrian Refugee Resettlement

The FCM and the BCMC adopted positive, progressive and constructive policy positions, rather than negative, regressive or obstructive policy positions, on the resettlement of Syrian refugees. They began expressing strong support for the resettlement of such refugees on September 12, 2015, just ten days after the tragic death of Alan Kurdi. That tragic event led the FCM and BCMC to become actively engaged both in the discourse and in the actual efforts for resettling Syrian refugees in Canada. In doing so they were explicitly endorsing the position of the Liberal party for more ambitious targets for the number of Syrian refugees that should be resettled because it was good for refugees and for the communities in which they settled, and implicitly they were opposing the position of the Conservative party that the target being proposed by the Liberal party was too ambitious. Indeed, within ten days of that tragic death, the Board of Directors of the FCM unanimously adopted an "emergency recommendation" to coordinate the efforts of cities and other municipalities to facilitate the resettlement of Syrian refugees. Its president articulated the position of the FCM as follows: "Municipalities are critical to the success of Canada's response to this deeply troubling situation. Our cities and communities will play a key role in any effort to resettle families fleeing violence in Syria. Through our coordinated actions we can maximize the size and the effectiveness of Canada's response" (FCM 2015a).

The BCMC echoed the sentiments of the president of the FCM after the Liberal government assumed power in November of 2015 as follows:

As mayors of Canada's biggest cities, we commend the federal government's commitment to bring in 25,000 Syrian refugees. Canada has a long history of opening its doors to people from around the world, and as one of the most peaceful and prosperous countries in the world, we have an obligation to help those who are less fortunate. Canada's big cities stand ready and willing to help assist Syrian refugees as they come to Canada and integrate into our communities. As mayors, we see how much our cities have benefited from welcoming people from all walks of life. The multicultural diversity of our cities is one of Canada's greatest strengths (FCM 2015d).

Those sentiments were echoed individually by mayors of many cities and other types of municipalities. Even municipalities that exhibited some strong sentiments against Muslim immigrants and refugees in the recent past, such as Herouxville where the municipal government adopted a code of conduct bylaw banning the niqab and burka (Gordon 2007), did not mount a concerted campaign against Syrian refugee resettlement. One possible explanation for this is that the chance of any refugees being resettled in those communities was quite remote.

Although the FCM and BCMC remained committed to the principle of resettling a large number of Syrian refugees from the time the plan was proposed by the Liberal party during the 2015 federal election to its full implementation toward the end of 2016, it became evident that they shared some concerns articulated by other political leaders at the federal level (e.g., Rona Ambrose in her capacity as interim leader of the Conservative Party), at the provincial level (e.g., premiers of Quebec, B.C. and Saskatchewan), and at the local levels (e.g., some municipal councilors and school board trustees), as well as members of the general public, regarding the implementation of the plan. More specifically, they claimed that although they were not against the resettlement of Syrian refugees per se, they were concerned about what they deemed to be the ambitious target of the Liberal government of settling 25,000 by the end of December 2016. In this respect the leaders of the FCM and the BCMC were by no means alone, as even the most ardent supporters of the resettlement of Syrian refugees (e.g., settlement agencies and school boards) started to express concerns regarding the capacity of the federal government to deal not only with health and security matters, but also their own capacity to provide actual resettlement services within this very tight timeframe and over the Christmas and New Year's holidays.

The position of the FCM and BCMC on this particular aspect of the resettlement was articulated cogently by Montreal's mayor, Denis Coderre (a former federal immigration minister from January 2002 to December 2003), who stated that although Canada should "stay the course" on refugees, it did not "... necessarily have to have 25,000 in 45 days," the mayor of Quebec City who stated that "rushing can lead to chaotic situations," and the mayor of Toronto who indicated that the tight deadline to bring 25,000 refugees by the end of the year was a "political promise" made in the context of the election campaign and that "Political promises should be secondary at all times to making sure that we do things in the best way and in the right way for the Canadian people" (Morrow, Peritz and Chase 2015).

Despite those concerns, the FCM president, Raymond Louie, made it clear that his organization remained committed to the general goal of resettling a large number of Syrian refugees. In speaking on behalf of the FCM in mid-November 2015, he stated:

We are sensitive to the stresses this will place on the services in our communities that provide critical supports for refugees such as language and cultural services, health and housing. Right now the focus needs to be on supporting the immediate needs of the refugees. All levels of government will have more work to do to ensure we can increase the supply of affordable housing in many of our municipalities and secure investments in services that support successful integration. That is why we continue to work closely with the federal government to ensure the refugees and our communities are set up for success (FCM 2015c).

The FCM president also attempted to quell mounting fears that prevailed among a substantial number of municipal, provincial, and federal politicians as well as some members of the public regarding the potential security and health risks that the refugee resettlement posed for communities. This is evident in the following statement by the FCM president following a meeting with the federal minister for Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada, John McCallum, who was responsible for the refugee resettlement: "The minister ... offered further assurance that the security and health of Canadians will be a key component of the government's plan" (FCM 2015c). That message was reiterated approximately one week later in a statement by the BCMC:

We know the federal government takes security issues very seriously and that the screening process for refugees is thorough and rigorous. There is no need to believe that there is a trade-off between compassion and security. Canada's big cities are working with our government partners and local support agencies to assist in settlement efforts. Those efforts are complex and require proper planning, time, and care. Nevertheless, our resolve to complete the task before us is firm. We must not lose sight of the opportunity to again show the world how Canada is a country that values diversity, acceptance, and compassion (FCM 2015e).

The BCMC then underscored the importance of collective, concerted and coordinated efforts in resettling a large number of refugees in a relatively short period of time, and the key role that local governments play in such efforts.

Canadians all across our country are doing what we do best in times of crisis; we respond quickly and compassionately. All levels of government are working together with private citizens, not-for-profits and service agencies to prepare the ground for the successful resettlement of thousands of Syrian refugees in the coming weeks. This is Canada at its very best and municipalities are proud to be part of this national effort. We support the urgency with which the federal government is addressing the situation. Local governments will play an essential role in welcoming and resettling thousands of Syrian refugees in the coming weeks and months (FCM 2015d).

In its efforts to consolidate and coordinate its own response and that of its members, in September 2015 the FCM established the Task Force on Refugee Resettlement. The Task Force, which was co-chaired by FCM President, Raymond Louie, and Halifax Mayor Mike Savage, also included representatives of the largest cities (e.g., Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver), mid-sized cities (e.g., Ottawa, London, Kitchener, Hamilton, Saskatoon); and smaller communities (e.g., St. Albert, Nelson and Aurora) (FCM 2015b). The three principal purposes of the Task Force were: first, to facilitate the collection and exchange of information on strategies and best practices among municipalities in Canada as well as with partner municipal associations in other parts of the world; second, to coordinate resettlement efforts with the federal, provincial, and territorial governments; and third, to work with refugee assistance groups to increase the capacity of communities, agencies, and groups to resettle refugees (FCM 2015b; FCM 2016b).

In addition to various other initiatives related to each of those three purposes, the Task Force on Refugee Settlement produced a report titled "Welcoming Communities--A Toolkit for Mimicipal Governments" that it released in the fall of 2016 (FCM 2016a; FCM 2016b) with the hope that it would be useful for future refugee resettlement initiatives occurring after 2016. The fourteen-page report profiled eight general areas and some special initiatives within each of those areas that municipalities had undertaken either individually or collectively to support the settlement of refugees between 2015 and 2016, and should continue to undertake in the future (see Figure 1).

That report reiterated the views that the FCM and BCMC had been articulating for approximately one year, namely that for its part the FCM would continue to advocate making Canada a welcoming and affordable place to live, not only for refugees but all categories of immigrants. It also noted that municipal governments and their respective communities were committed to "... working with all orders of government and other partners to create more inclusive and welcoming communities" because "newcomers and the communities in which they live and work ... depend on a strong collaborative approach" (FCM 2016a). The report also included the following plea for the federal government to take a collaborative approach with municipal governments and local settlement organizations in developing plans for providing resettlement services for newcomers. In the words of the author(s) of the report: "The federal government must collaborate with municipal governments and local settlement organizations to develop a plan to expand newcomer services in urban and rural regions across Canada. A robust plan will address employment, language and cultural services and support access to adequate and affordable housing and transit" (FCM 2016a). Fig. 1. Major Headings and Subheadings of the FCM Task Force Report "Welcoming Communities--a Toolkit for Municipal Governments" 1. Create a welcoming environment * Engage nationally--the FCM Task Force on Refugee Resettlement * Involve the media * Pass council resolutions 2. Share information and coordinate services * Engage the community * Centralize information * Coordinate efforts 3. Support the front lines * Create community partnerships * Consider financial and in-kind contributions 4. Find safe, affordable and appropriate housing * Develop temporary accommodation * Gather and exchange housing information 5. Provide cultural education * Provide employee training * Share cultural information 6. Enable access to community services * Hold welcome celebrations * Simplify and centralized processes * Take advantage of existing organizations and services 7. Create connections, support integration * Organize community events * Offer free tours * Organize courses and workshops * Publish community information 8. Advocate for more welcoming communities Source: FCM 2016b.

Roles of Cities in the Resettlement of Syrian Refugees

The foregoing overview of the positions of the FCM and its BCMC attests to the clear commitment they made to the resettlement of Syrian refugees. They were visible and vocal supporters of the resettlement of the large number of Syrian refugees. The objective in this section is to provide an overview of the roles performed and the resources devoted to the Syrian refugee resettlement efforts by most of the twenty-two BCMC member cities, which included: Brampton, Calgary, Edmonton, Gatineau, Halifax, Hamilton, Kitchener, Laval, Longueuil, London, Mississauga, Montreal, Ottawa, Quebec City, Regina, Saskatoon, St. John's, Surrey, Toronto, Vancouver, Windsor, and Winnipeg (FCM 2017).

The information for this overview was compiled by the author and his research assistants through a combination of the review of documents produced by the cities as well as written and oral communication with city officials in May 2016, after the very first and largest wave of Syrian refugees was resettled. The information was compiled from all of the BCMC member cities, except a few which did not produce any reports and did not reply to requests for information. In providing an overview of roles performed by those BCMC member cities, this paper focuses on the following five major categories of roles:

* Advocacy Roles

* Service Provision Roles

* Coordination Roles

* In-kind Contribution Roles

* Financial Contribution Roles

This classification of roles is deduced from the information collected for this section from twenty of the twenty-two of the cities that were members of the BCMC. The validity of this fivefold classification of roles performed by cities is evident in the fact that these roles are profiled either explicitly or implicitly in lists of major initiatives undertaken by municipalities identified in the report of the FCM Task Force on Refugee Resettlement (FCM 2016b, 1-14). That report also provides a few notable examples of initiatives undertaken by some cities and towns in facilitating the resettlement of Syrian refugees.

Advocacy Roles

Advocacy roles are those performed by city mayors, councilors and their administrators in advocating for the resettlement of refugees within their respective boundaries or anywhere else in Canada. In addition to the advocacy roles performed by cities collectively through the FCM and the BCMC discussed in the first section of this article, individually all major city mayors, councilors and administrators implored their respective communities to support the resettlement of refugees in various ways, including sponsoring refugees, assisting those sponsoring refugees, and contributing funds, clothing and household items. As well, they implored their respective communities to provide a warm welcome to refugees. Much of the advocacy occurred in the media and at community forums organized to provide information on the refugee settlement initiatives, to generate public support for the refugees, and to solicit contributions to support various initiatives designed to assist refugees. A notable example of such advocacy was captured in the following headline "Naheed Nenshi Challenges Calgarians to 'Open Our Arms' to Refugees" (Rieger 2015).

Service Provision Roles

Service provision roles are those performed by municipalities to provide various types of services to new residents arriving in their communities. In their efforts to ensure that Syrian refugees and their sponsors could access those services easily, efficiently and effectively, various cities undertook five special sets of initiatives. One set of initiatives was to make the refugees and their sponsors more aware of the services available to them and how to access or use such services. A second set of initiatives was enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of various organizational units and processes that were likely to serve refugees and their sponsors. A third set of initiatives was enhancing cultural awareness and sensitivity among municipal officials charged with providing various services to refugees. Toward that end many cities provided special orientation sessions for their officials regarding the cultural backgrounds and practices of various sub-groups of Syrian refugees.

A fourth set of initiatives was developing or enhancing the structures or function of any components of their organizational systems to perform various roles more efficiently and effectively. Apart from the creation of special coordinating committees, which will be discussed in a subsequent section, several cities also made special efforts to improve their internal communication and coordination in providing services needed by refugees either immediately upon arrival or after their initial settlement period. A notable example of this is the various measures undertaken by the City of Saskatoon to ensure that various departments were able to explain and facilitate the provision of a wide range of community services for newcomers.

A fifth set of initiatives was designed to improve the provision of their own services as well as the services provided by other agencies for refugees. Several cities produced and disseminated reports related to various refugee settlement matters. This included reports related to what the city and others governments and agencies were doing for the resettlement of refugees, as well as reports related to the settlement needs of refugees, the services provided for refugees, and service gaps that existed in the resettlement of refugees. For example, Winnipeg undertook some research on newcomers' needs and the community's assets and gaps; Mississauga contributed to the production of a report on gaps in providing services in languages spoken by the incoming refugees; and Windsor contributed to a comparable survey on special foods consumed or not consumed by various cultural or religious groups designed to help ensure that food banks had culturally appropriate food baskets available.

Collectively these five major sets of initiatives were designed to increase the capacity of city offices and officers to participate in a more substantial or meaningful way in the resettlement of refugees.

Coordination Roles

Coordination roles are undertaken to facilitate the interrelated efforts of various governments, organizations, or groups within cities in the resettlement of refugees. Such coordination has been occurring in one of two principal ways. One way has been on an ad-hoc basis by assisting with the coordination of various events organized by the cities themselves, or by other governments, agencies or groups. This has included the coordination of information sessions, the coordination of fund-raising events, donation drives, and the welcoming of some refugees upon arrival to their cities. Another way has been either by establishing their own coordinative mechanisms or by participating in coordinative mechanisms established by other governmental or non-governmental agencies. The types of coordinative mechanisms and some examples of each type are outlined below. In reviewing the initiatives of various cities, it becomes evident that there has been a high correlation between the size of cities and both the extent of coordination facilitated by cities and the institutionalization of various types of coordinative mechanisms. Not surprisingly, the largest cities have tended to be more extensively involved in performing coordination roles through various types of institutionalized coordinative mechanisms.

Coordinative Mechanisms

All cities are members of coordinative mechanisms created ether by themselves or by other stakeholders. Whereas some of those coordinative mechanisms operate on a relatively informal ad-hoc basis, most of them have operated on a relatively formal institutionalized basis either on an ongoing basis for a fixed time period related to this particular refugee resettlement initiative or indefinitely. The major types of such committees have tended to be inter-governmental, inter-departmental, or inter-agency. Some, of course, have been hybrids consisting of governmental representatives, non-governmental representatives, and possibly also members from one or more city departments.

Intergovernmental Coordination Mechanisms

A notable example of an intergovernmental coordination mechanism is Montreal's 'Governments Committee', which is mandated " ... to coordinate the actions of all three levels of government [city, provincial, federal] in their fields of expertise in order to maximize the efforts made to welcome and integrate refugees" (City of Montreal 2015). The Government's Committee is one of the four operational committees established under the aegis of the Montreal Syrian Refugee Coordination Committee. The other three are: the Integration and Socio-community Groups Committee, which was mandated to supporting neighborhood social and community groups in coordinating the settlement of refugees; the Housing and Education Committee, which was mandated to finding temporary and permanent housing for refugees by various means, including identifying and encouraging anyone with housing stock to provide temporary and permanent shelter for refugees; and the Public Safety and Transportation Committee, which was mandated to facilitating the efforts of government partners to transport and facilitate a safe and warm welcome for refugees into various communities or neighborhoods. This model of a city-established committee with working groups was emulated in several other cities (e.g., Hamilton's Mayor's Advisory Committee).

Inter-departmental Coordinative Mechanisms

A notable example of an inter-departmental coordinative mechanism is Toronto's Interdivisional Team, which was chaired by a member of the Social Development and Financial Administration (SDFA) division that housed the Toronto Newcomer Office (City of Toronto 2015). The Interdivisional Team was formed to identify and mobilize internal resources and response activities among the following divisions (City of Toronto 2016a): Shelter, Support and Housing Administration; Toronto Employment and Social Services; Toronto Public Health; Children's Services; Strategic Communications; Equity, Diversity and Human Rights; Parks, Forestry and Recreation; and Social Development, Finance and Administration.

Inter-agency Coordinative Mechanisms

There are at least two notable examples of inter-agency coordinative mechanism in which cities are members: one is created by a city itself, and the other is usually created by other agencies often through some direct or indirect partnership with a city agency.

A notable example of an inter-agency coordinative mechanism created by a city is Toronto's Inter-Agency Task Force, which was established to coordinate and streamline external response activities, including communication and information sharing (City of Toronto 2015). The initial membership for the Task Force consisted of one representative from each of the follow agencies: City of Toronto SDFA, Canadian Red Cross, Salvation Army, Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI), United Nations Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), Toronto District School Board, Local Health Integration Network (LHIN), and Lifeline Syria. Membership for this committee was "... based on agency mandates, their potential roles, and the need to maintain the ability to respond quickly," and the Secretariat function was performed by the Toronto Newcomer Office located within the city's SDFA division (City of Toronto 2015; City of Toronto 2016a; City of Toronto 2016b).

A notable example of an inter-agency coordination mechanism usually established by community-based agencies, rather than cities, were Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs). Most LIPs were created prior to the resettlement of Syrian refugees. Their core mandate was to coordinate the efforts of various organizations and agencies within their respective communities in the settlement of immigrants and refugees. During the Syrian refugee resettlement initiative, existing LIPs were able to devote some of their capacity in facilitating the coordination of efforts of this member agencies and other agencies.

Two notable examples of hybrid coordinative mechanisms involved in the resettlement of Syrian refugees and the new multi-Syrian resettlement working groups such as Refugee 613 and also the United for Refugees organizations established by various governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in Ottawa in the fall of 2015 (City of Ottawa 2015; CBC News 2015).

In-Kind Contribution Roles

Cities also performed several in-kind contribution roles during the Syrian refugee resettlement initiative. These are non-financial contributions (although many of them could be monetarized) that cities made to governments, organizations, or groups directly or involved in assisting refugees or those interested and involved in sponsoring them. This included a wide array of support ranging from the provision of city facilities and equipment as well as personnel to assist with logistics related to, among other things, communications for various events. In performing these roles cities were providing logistical support for various types of resettlement efforts of various governments, organizations, or groups within their respective communities.

Other significant in-kind contributions included providing complementary passes for refugees to usef various types of services, programs, or events (e.g., public transportation recreation, leisure, library, culture). In performing these roles cities were providing logistical support for the various types of resettlement support efforts of various governments, organizations, or groups.

Financial Contribution Roles

Some cities made financial contributions in assisting various organizations or groups involved directly in the resettlement of refugees. At least three of the major cities donated money to assist agencies and groups working on refugee resettlement efforts at various points in time. Their major financial commitments in 2015 amounted to several million dollars. Toronto provided $0.6 million, of which approximately one third was devoted to funding service agreements with three agencies to assist them in supporting special initiatives for private sponsors in that city (City of Toronto 2015). Montreal devoted $1 million to be used to "... help families find housing and for the operational costs of the refugee hotline, the production of informational material, funding cultural and socio-community activities and providing financial aid to integration and assistance organizations" (City of Montreal 2015). Vancouver donated $4.1 million in land and grants to be used for building the new Vancouver Welcome House for refugees. This included the land, which was valued at an estimated $3.4 million, plus $310,000 in grants, and a reduction in levies estimated at $670,000 (City of Vancouver 2015). Vancouver also provided other grants to refugee and settlement non-profit organizations.

Although many cities did not contribute substantial direct funding to the refugee resettlement efforts, they did support fundraising initiatives either directly or indirectly. One notable example is the United For Refugees fundraising partnership involving the City of Ottawa, the United Way Ottawa, and a group known as Refugee 613, which was established to coordinate community efforts to resettle Syrian refugees through a set of taskforces mandated to assist with various settlement needs such as housing, health care, and employment (City of Ottawa 2015). Another notable example is cities in partnering with agencies in their respective communities for the purpose of submitting applications to the Welcome Fund for Syrian Refugees established by Community Foundations of Canada to support the resettlement of refugees. By the end of April 2016, cities such as Ottawa, Calgary, London, Halifax, Montreal, Hamilton and Vancouver received approximately $3.5 million from that fund (Barton 2016; Venn 2016).

Whereas those contributions and fundraising initiatives were made specifically in conjunction with the Syrian refugee resettlement initiative, some cities already had funding programs in place to support the settlement of both immigrants and refugees that had been established prior to this particular refugee resettlement initiative. One notable example of this is the City of Winnipeg, which provides the Immigrant Centre with $27,000 annually for the provision of interpreter services (available 24 hours a day/7 days a week) for all civic departments. As well, it also provides the Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization of Manitoba (IRCOM) with $73,810 annually for the provision of recreational services to recent immigrants.

Another notable financial contribution that was made by the City of Winnipeg is the one to the Winnipeg Private Refugee Sponsorship Assurance Program (WPRSAP) (Canada 2002). The WPRSAP Agreement between the City of Winnipeg, the Manitoba Refugee Sponsors (MRS) and the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council (MIIC) came into effect on 13 January 2004. Pursuant to the WPRSAP, the City of Winnipeg agreed to provide $250,000 for an assurance fund designed to ensure that guaranteed financial support was available to Sponsorship Agreement Holders (SAHS) and Constituent Groups (CGs) in Winnipeg who undertook family or community linked refugee sponsorships in the event of a breakdown in sponsorship (Canada 2009, Chapter 4). The fund was created to meet the federal government's requirement for refugee-sponsoring organizations to increase the likelihood that refugees would not be left unsupported in the case of a failed sponsorship arrangement. The WPRSAP was slated to terminate on 31 December 2016 (City of Winnipeg 2015) but in July 2016 the City of Winnipeg adopted a motion to terminate the current agreement, and to transfer the existing funds to Manitoba Refugee Sponsors (MRS) and Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council (MIIC) for them to establish an endowment fund possibly under the auspices of an existing community foundation. If the fund is established under the auspices of a community foundation then representatives of those major SAHS might serve as members of the committee responsible for the fund (City of Winnipeg 2016). This was a departure from the arrangement that the City had to provide the requisite funds and to have the major local refugee agency administer the WPRSAP (Leo 2012, 321-322). As 2016 drew to a close the City of Winnipeg was still in the process of developing the details for the new founding arrangement. Interestingly, despite the fact that this particular fund was lauded and advocated as an innovative measure to assist sponsoring organizations for many years, there is no evidence to suggest that any other city has replicated it in supporting refugee-sponsoring organizations either prior to or during the Syrian refugee resettlement initiative. However, in the fall of 2015 at least two cities (i.e., Toronto and the Halifax Regional Municipality) did put this matter on their respective agendas. Toronto placed the issue on its agenda and directed its staff to "... explore the implications of such a fund, and options for delivering should such a fund be feasible" (City of Toronto 2015, 5-6). Similarly, the Halifax Regional Municipality also placed this issue on its agenda and directed its staff to "... consider the possibility of a municipal contribution to an assurance fund to support increased private sponsorship of refugees" (Halifax Regional Municipal Council 2015; Large 2015). To date, however, Halifax has not contributed to the establishment of such a fund. The fact that more cities did not establish such an assurance program during the Syrian refugee resettlement initiatives is surprising given that the various orders of government, including city governments, were desperately encouraging and imploring existing and new organizations and groups to sponsor refugees. This shows that there were limits to how much of their funds some cities were willing to devote to the cause, and also that there were limits to the types of initiatives to which they were prepared to direct their funding. Of course, it may reveal that they were somewhat concerned regarding the possibility that if some private sponsors could not meet their commitments, the assurance fund would be depleted very quickly.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article has been to provide an overview of the policy positions and roles of the FCM and its members, but particularly members that comprise the BCMC, in the resettlement of Syrian refugees from the fall of 2015 until the fall of 2016. The two objectives in this concluding section are: first, to reflect on the importance of both the policy positions taken by the FCM and its members and the roles performed by the BCMC member cities; and second, to identify some areas for further research.

More specifically, this article reveals that the FCM and its members were very important agents in performing at least two major constructive functions in the resettlement of Syrian refugees. These functions were identified both in the report of the FCM Task Force on Refugee Settlement and in the research on BCMC member cities.

The first major constructive function was adopting and advocating progressive and proactive policy positions that aligned with those of the Liberal party and the new Liberal government for resettling a relatively large number of refugees during a relatively short time. By adopting such policy positions both during the 2015 election campaign and for more than one year thereafter, the FCM contributed to achieving and maintaining the requisite degree of support among key governmental and non-governmental stakeholders for the plan to resettle a substantial number of Syrian refugees in a relatively short time. The second major constructive function was animating, coordinating and supporting various local and regional formal and informal partnerships involving governmental and non-governmental actors designed to facilitate the resettlement of the Syrian refugees. The news stories and the various materials on the FCM website (e.g., the press releases and the Report of Task Force on Refugee Resettlement), as well as the various communications between the author and officials of cities who are members of the BCMC, all attest to the value that was attached to these two constructive functions performed by the FCM and particularly its members who comprise the BCMC.

Statements made by the federal minister responsible for immigration, officials from the municipal sector, and officials from the settlement sector, which were reported by the media, suggest that if the FCM and its member municipalities had not performed those two major constructive functions, the resettlement of such a large number of Syrian refugees in a relatively short period of time would have encountered more challenges and would have had fewer champtions, means, and resources to deal with those challenges. Close analysis of media reports as well as other materials collected specifically for this research project, suggest that various non-governmental and governmental stakeholders relied on municipal leaders to assume significant leadership and support roles in the resettlement initiatives within their respective communities. They also suggest that if the FCM and its member municipalities had not performed those leadership and support roles, there was a high likelihood that any municipal leaders who were not proactive in this endeavor would have been constrained by progressive community leaders to explain why they were missing in action, particularly if municipal leaders in other communities were fully committed and engaged.

Although this article has provided a base line of information regarding the policy positions and roles of the FCM and members that comprise the BCMC, further research is required in several areas. One area is in producing a more comprehensive catalogue of the actual roles performed by all major municipalities that received a substantial number of Syrian refugees from 2015 to 2016 as well as in the subsequent years. A second area is to compare the positions and roles of the FCM and its various members vis-a-vis Syrian refugees to those they took in relation to other groups of refugees either during that particular timeframe or either before or after that timeframe. A third area is in exploring the factors that influenced the decisions of the FCM and its members on their respective positions, functions and roles not only in the resettlement of Syrian refugees but also in the resettlement of other groups of refugees prior to, during and after 2015 to 2016. A fourth area is the effect that the positions, functions and roles performed by the FCM and its member municipalities had on the settlement and integration of Syrian refugees. These four areas for further research arose from the writing of this article, but more will certainly emerge over time not only as the Syrian refugee phenomenon evolves, but also as Canada responds to the resettlement of refugee flows from other parts of the world that are likely to occur in the future.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge the excellent research assistance provided by Anna Luisa Taveres Neto and Colleen George. He would also like to thank three reviewers for their invaluable observations and suggestions that led to several major improvements to the initial draft of this article.

JOSEPH GARCEA is Associate Professor of Political Studies at the University of Saskatchewan where he teaches courses in Canadian politics, public policy, public management, public-private partnerships, and local governance. His research agenda includes analysis of immigration, integration and citizenship issues. TABLE 1. Number of Syrian Refugees Admitted by Canada (November 4, 2015-December 30, 2015) Refugee Category Number of Refugees Government-Assisted Refugee 21,751 Privately Sponsored Refugee 13,997 Blended Visa Office-Referred Refugee 3,923 TOTAL 39,671 Source: Canada 2017b. TABLE 2.36 Major Cities with RAP Service Provider Organizations Receiving GARS PROVINCES CITIES British Columbia Vancouver Alberta Edmonton, Calgary, Lethbridge, Medicine Hat, Red Deer Saskatchewan Regina, Saskatoon, Prince Albert, Moose Jaw Manitoba Winnipeg Ontario Toronto, Ottawa, London, Windsor, Hamilton, Kitchener New Brunswick Fredericton, Moncton, St. John Newfoundland & St. John's Labrador Nova Scotia Halifax Prince Edward Island Charlottetown Quebec Montreal, Laval, Longueuil, Gatineau, Quebec City, Sherbrooke, Drummondville, Granby, Joliette, Saint-Hyacinthe, Saint-Jerome, Trois-Rivieres, Victoriaville Source: Canada 2017b. TABLE 3. Number of Refugees Initially Resettled in 16 Cities of BCMC CITIES (Members of BCMC) NUMBER OF SYRIAN REFUGEES Calgary 1,845 Edmonton 1,865 Ottawa (Ottawa-Gatineau) 2,040 Halifax 1,030 Hamilton 1,455 Kitchener (Kitchener-Cambridge) 1,410 London 1,590 Montreal 4,055 Quebec City 250 Regina 500 Saskatoon 565 St. John's 290 Toronto 7,420 Vancouver 2,355 Windsor 960 Winnipeg 1,065 TOTAL 29,695 Source: Canada 2016c. TABLE 4. Canada--Admissions of Syrian Refugees by Province-Territory and Census Metropolitan Area (CMAA) of Intended Destination and Immigrant Category November 4th, 2015--November 30th, 2016 Province/Territory and Census Blended Government- Metropolitan Area Sponsorship Assisted Refugee Refugee St. John's 55 200 Other--Newfoundland and Labrador 25 0 Newfoundland and Labrador Total 80 200 Charlottetown 20 125 Other--Prince Edward Island 5 0 Prince Edward Island Total 25 125 Halifax 80 820 Other--Nova Scotia 170 0 Nova Scotia Total 250 820 Moncton 35 510 Fredericton 35 435 Saint John 55 410 Other--New Brunswick 75 10 New Brunswick Total 200 1,360 Montreal 15 475 Trois-Rivieres 0 105 Quebec 0 210 Sherbrooke 0 150 Granby 0 75 Drummondville 0 45 Victoriaville 0 30 Saint-Hyacinthe 0 20 Other--Quebec 5 205 Quebec Total 20 1,315 Toronto 710 2,535 Ottawa--Gatineau 270 1,340 London 85 1,135 Hamilton 95 1,190 Kitchener--Cambridge--Waterloo 180 1,065 Windsor 20 790 Peterborough 20 130 Kingston 25 90 Guelph 45 0 St. Catharines--Niagara 65 -- Leamington 35 80 Thunder Bay 25 65 Oshawa 15 0 Sault Ste. Marie 20 45 Stratford 35 0 Greater Sudbury 20 0 Barrie 20 0 Sarnia 25 0 Chatham-Kent 20 0 Brantford 15 0 Brockvillc 20 0 Other--Ontario 290 10 Ontario Total 2,060 8,470 Winnipeg 90 880 Brandon -- 35 Other--Manitoba 120 0 Manitoba Total 215 915 Saskatoon 65 465 Regina 20 475 Moose law 0 110 Prince Albert 0 100 Other--Saskatchewan 35 0 Saskatchewan Total 115 1,150 Edmonton 135 1,125 Calgary 115 865 Lethbridge -- 195 Red Deer -- 165 Medicine Hat 10 130 Brooks -- 30 Other--Alberta 65 5 Alberta Total 335 2,520 Vancouver 120 1,835 Victoria 40 315 Kelowna 25 10 Abbotsford--Mission 15 15 Nanaimo 25 20 Duncan 20 0 Salmon Arm 25 0 Kamloops 25 0 Other--British Columbia 140 -- British Columbia Total 430 2,200 Yellowknife 5 0 Northwest Territories Total 5 0 Whitehorse 10 0 Yukon Total 10 0 Province/territory not stated 5 0 Syrian Refugees Total 3,755 19,080 Province/Territory and Census Privately Syrian Metropolitan Area Sponsored Refugees Refugee Total St. John's 30 290 Other--Newfoundland and Labrador 15 40 Newfoundland and Labrador Total 45 330 Charlottetown 105 250 Other--Prince Edward Island 0 5 Prince Edward Island Total 105 255 Halifax 130 1,030 Other--Nova Scotia 35 205 Nova Scotia Total 165 1,235 Moncton 10 555 Fredericton -- 470 Saint John 0 465 Other--New Brunswick -- 85 New Brunswick Total 15 1,575 Montreal 3,570 4,055 Trois-Rivieres 935 1,035 Quebec 40 250 Sherbrooke 90 235 Granby 0 75 Drummondville 0 45 Victoriaville 0 30 Saint-Hyacinthe 0 20 Other--Quebec 90 300 Quebec Total 4,720 6,055 Toronto 4,180 7,420 Ottawa--Gatineau 430 2,040 London 370 1,590 Hamilton 170 1,455 Kitchener--Cambridge--Waterloo 165 1,410 Windsor 150 960 Peterborough 40 190 Kingston 45 160 Guelph 100 140 St. Catharines--Niagara 70 135 Leamington -- 115 Thunder Bay 5 100 Oshawa 65 85 Sault Ste. Marie -- 70 Stratford 0 35 Greater Sudbury 10 35 Barrie 10 25 Sarnia 0 25 Chatham-Kent -- 25 Brantford 10 25 Brockvillc -- 25 Other--Ontario 85 385 Ontario Total 5,915 16,445 Winnipeg 90 1,065 Brandon -- 40 Other--Manitoba -- 120 Manitoba Total 95 1,225 Saskatoon 35 565 Regina 5 500 Moose law 0 110 Prince Albert 0 100 Other--Saskatchewan 10 45 Saskatchewan Total 50 1,320 Edmonton 605 1,865 Calgary 865 1,845 Lethbridge 35 240 Red Deer 0 170 Medicine Hat 0 140 Brooks 5 40 Other--Alberta 75 145 Alberta Total 1,585 4,440 Vancouver 400 2,355 Victoria 60 415 Kelowna 20 60 Abbotsford--Mission 10 40 Nanaimo -- 40 Duncan 10 30 Salmon Arm 5 30 Kamloops 0 25 Other--British Columbia 75 220 British Columbia Total 580 3,215 Yellowknife 0 5 Northwest Territories Total 0 5 Whitehorse 5 15 Yukon Total 5 15 Province/territory not stated 15 20 Syrian Refugees Total 13,300 36,135 Source: Canada 2016c.