In defence of geo-cultural identity: an argument against Kymlicka's view of multiculturalism and minority rights.

Talukder, Munir Hossain

1. Introduction

Cultural diversity is a crucial phenomenon in today's society. Many countries in the world contain diverse language groups as well as diverse ethnic groups. Therefore, clashes between majorities and minorities are likely, and such ethnocultural conflicts cause deadly violence all over the world. Ethnocultural violence commonly occurs for language rights, land claims, claims for territorial autonomy, immigration policy, and even choosing public holidays. Will Kymlicka outlines a new liberal approach to resolve these issues in multicultural politics. He claims that the present liberal democratic system has undermined and surprisingly neglected the rights of cultural minorities, indigenous people, and immigrants.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was one of the important efforts to protect minority rights. Nevertheless, according to Kymlicka, human rights are unable to resolve some fundamental questions regarding minority rights. For instance, what languages should get official recognition? Can state funds be allocated to provide education in minority languages? What should be the policy to protect immigrants' cultural identity? To these, along with many other questions, the traditional human rights view does not have any answer and so, Kymlicka believes, that human rights theory must be supplemented with minority rights. His fundamental claim is that a comprehensive theory of justice in multiculturalism should include universal human rights as well as certain "group-differentiated rights" for minorities. In other words, in an acceptable theory of justice minority cultures should get "special status" or "priorities" (1).

Kymlicka explores three main arguments for group-differentiated rights of national and ethnic minorities. Firstly, the "equality-based" argument which says minority people are facing "unfair disadvantage", and that group-differentiated right can rectify this disadvantage. Secondly, minorities can historically claim a group-differentiated right on the basis of what he calls "history-based" argument, and finally, a "cultural diversity" argument which is about the intrinsic value of a heterogeneous culture. (2) However, Kymlicka's view has been criticized by other multicultural theorists on various points. One of the criticisms is that his approach is characteristically Canadian and inapplicable in different contexts. Additionally, though equality and justice are his main concerns Kymlicka favors a few other minority rights by building a minority rights pyramid.

Would Kymlicka's view be equally applicable in a global scale? For example, if a nation-state wants to preserve both its own cultural traditions and its geographical identity? In that case, could Kymlicka's view be more suitable than that of others? It seems that there are several limitations in Kymlicka's view when we want to preserve both cultural and geographical identity. Kymlicka has pushed minority rights up while overlooks the bond between the individuals' motherland and their cultural practices. A critical review of this widely appreciated theory is therefore necessary. We also need to examine whether Kymlicka's view is particularly applicable to those nation-states which are more concerned both for their geographical and cultural identities, i.e. geo-cultural identity, that as a whole creates a nation-state's position in the global scenario.

This study critically examines Kymlicka's view of multiculturalism and minority rights, and analyzes some of its main criticisms. It will argue that recognizing diversity, while at the same time valuing geo-cultural identity, could make multiculturalism more appealing. I begin by discussing Kymlicka's view of multiculturalism and liberalism, and his arguments for minority rights. After that I will review the criticisms before my own analysis of multiculturalism and minority rights is presented at the end.

2. Kymlicka's view of multiculturalism and liberalism

According to Kymlicka, multiculturalism may denote many types of "cultural pluralism" or "cultural diversity". (3) Cultural pluralism, along with a comprehensive liberal theory of justice, would lead us to a peaceful coexistence. He writes, "We have no choice but to learn to live with cultural pluralism, and to devise strategies for coexistence that are consistent with principles of freedom, justice, and democracy." (4) Kymlicka criticizes traditional multicultural theories that ignore the differences among various minority groups. His view of multiculturalism, therefore, is grounded in some basic ideas, such as a distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups, nationality, group-differentiated rights and differentiated citizenship, freedom, and cultural membership.

Kymlicka holds that three types of rights, namely self-government rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights, are group-differentiated rights. A liberal theory would be just when it incorporates these three group-differentiated rights. Furthermore, when a country confers all of these rights beyond citizenship rights to its minority members, then their citizenship is called "differentiated citizenship" (5).

The self-government rights ensure self-determination of minorities. In order to develop their culture freely, minorities should have the right of "political autonomy" or "territorial jurisdiction". These rights will confirm the political power of minorities to control their territory. Federalism is the mechanism preferred by Kymlicka for recognizing self-government rights because this system gives extensive power to minorities, and guarantees their ability to make decisions. Here he seems to take federalism not just as a form of administrative decentralization but rather as a strategy of empowering minorities. As a common strategy, federalism accommodates national minorities by dividing state powers between the central government, and provinces or states. Thus, in a federal system, at the regional level national minorities could form a majority in order to enable their own culture or language to survive. For example, the Quebecois, though a minority in Canada, has an extensive power to control education, culture, or even immigration decisions in the province of Quebec. Thus, the Quebecois have gained the right to self-government under the Canadian federal system. Federalism thus promotes self-government rights.

Polyethnic rights are also permanent, like self-government rights. For instance, Sikh men may want to wear their turbans, and may demand exemption from motorcycle helmet laws, and police dress codes. Similarly, Muslim girls may want to use scarves, and may demand exemption from school dress codes. So, polyethnic rights can help religious or ethnic or other minorities to protect their particularity without hampering minorities' contribution to mainstream society.

Special representation rights may enrich the Western democratic system which is often criticized as "unrepresentative". Since Western democracy limits representation from minorities, it is also a form of domination and oppression. Special representation rights may eliminate the problem. There are several ways to implement this type of rights, such as reserving seats for minorities in the parliament.

Kymlicka outlines these three mechanisms to show how a liberal society could accommodate national and ethnic minority group demands. However, the group-differentiated rights do not explain their relationship with individual rights and collective rights, one of the most basic issues in liberalism.

Two kinds of safeguards can be erected to protect national or ethnic communities in a state. The first is to protect any group from the unsuitable effect of internal dissent (e.g. not willing to follow traditional customs), while the second is to protect the group from the external decisions (e.g. any political or economic decision of mainstream society). Kymlicka calls the former "internal restrictions" and the latter "external protections". (6) According to Kymlicka, Internal restrictions involve intra-group relations--the ethnic or national group may seek the use of state power to restrict the liberty of its own members in the name of group solidarity. (7)

In contrast, External protections involve inter-group relations- that is, the ethnic or national group may seek to protect its distinct existence and identity by limiting the impact of the decisions of the larger society." (8)

So, by these two dominant conceptions, Kymlicka argues that group-differentiated rights are consistent with liberal principles. In other words, he explores the relationship between individual rights and collective rights in liberalism. As collective rights, both internal restrictions and external protections would uphold the stability of national and ethnic groups. Now the tension is that apparently both internal restrictions and external protections could create injustice because one group may demand state power to impose upon its own members. Similarly, one group might be preserved by marginalizing another group.

However, Kymlicka claims that a justified liberal theory, which includes the group-differentiated rights, could resolve this tension. As the theory would grant land claims, language rights, and special representation rights to all minority groups no group would dominate over another. Nonetheless, some groups may seek internal restrictions to dominate their own members. For example, a Muslim group could forcefully impose compulsory arranged marriages to all of its members. Though such practice is part of a Muslim culture, it is also against individual liberty. Thus, Kymlicka says that liberals "can and should endorse certain external protections ... but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices." (9)

Many liberals (e.g. Waldron) believe that since a minority does not need their own culture in practice, she could at best claim the "right of non--interference", a similar right to practice religions privately without getting any support from the state (10). So, cultural membership to her is not valuable at all. However, Kymlicka believes this approach is seriously wrong because it oversimplifies the complexity of moving different cultures.

His argument is that if the difference between two cultures is so vast, from the technological development and social institutional viewpoints, then some minorities may not integrate themselves successfully. In fact, it might be impossible in some cases. Even if the difference is small it is not a smooth and easy process. Perhaps, it involves a costly process (e.g. language learning) and because the desire of retaining cultural membership in national minorities is "very strong", they should not be obliged to pay the cost for an involuntary act i.e. integrating into a particular culture.

Thus, Kymlicka insists that cultural membership is the legitimate claim for minorities, the claim being to live in and access one's own culture. John Rawls and communitarians (e.g. Michael Sandel) also have similar views. Rawls says, "people are born and are expected to lead a complete life within the same society and culture." (11) Though Kymlicka agrees with Rawls that leaving a culture is difficult, he differs with Rawls' argument. An example may clarify this comment: suppose someone leaves North Korea for South Korea. She is not breaking the bond of culture and language that Rawls highlights, even though she is crossing borders. By contrast, if she leaves Quebec for Alberta, she is not crossing borders, but breaking the bonds of culture and language. Rawls here values culture; however, he ignores the government-citizen bond. Contrary to Rawls, Kymlicka argues for political ties with culture. So, Rawls' argument relies on the inherent bonds to some one's own language and history whereas Kymlicka's argument relies on the bonds between government and its citizen. (12)

Similarly, Kymlicka accepts the communitarian claim of a person's "deep bond" with a social group, but he rejects the scope and goalof that bond. (13) Communitarians are interested in maintaining an attachment with "subnational groups" (e.g. family), and argue that a conception of "common good" can define individual good. Individual members have a "constitutive bond" to her belonging group. Thus, it is moral to limit individual rights to promote common rights. By contrast, Kymlicka argues for one "national" level, where individuals have the choice to revise their ends, to enhance their capacity of choosing by liberal education, without limiting their rights. The national culture creates a context for people to live within their own societal culture by valuing freedom and equality. (14)

Why do people consider their bond to language and culture very strong? Kymlicka mentions two major reasons. Firstly, they can express their thought and imagination in a meaningful ways. In other words, people can be self-identified, and feel safe in their own culture. There is no way to ignore one's bond to their own culture. This bond develops as soon as one is born in a culture, and that cultural structure makes her able to perceive the whole world. Culture teaches her how to live, how to speak, what she should eat, and even what should be the end of her life. Kymlicka mentions that culture makes the world sensible to us. While some people might live a cosmopolitan life, and feel free to accept any cultural structure most people have difficulties with this. They like to attach deeply with their own culture. Thus, Kymlicka writes, "Cultural membership provides us with an intelligible context of choice, and a secure sense of identity and belonging." (15)

Secondly, a person's own culture supports people's dignity and self-identity. Cultures provide a conception of autonomy and identity to each human being. For this reason, the conception of autonomy is relative in one culture (e.g. African communitarian culture) whereas it can be individualistic to another culture (e.g. Western liberal culture). In the same way, individuals could find their self-identity in their own cultures. For instance, an English man may feel free to express himself in English culture rather than in a foreign language and culture. Like him, most people are identified by their own societal culture.

In summary, Kymlicka shows that individual freedom is closely connected with cultural membership, and thus, a liberal theory must incorporate the issue of cultural membership into its basic principles. It would be an obvious injustice if national minorities face restriction in their access to their own culture. Societal culture, therefore, plays a crucial role in Kymlicka's conception of minority rights. In the next section, I will explore how Kymlicka argues that minority rights are the major constituent of justice.

3. Kymlicka's arguments for minority rights

Kymlicka has argued that people want to maintain their own culture, and hence, access to a societal culture is the legitimate claim for individual freedom. He writes, "there are compelling interests related to culture and identity which are fully consistent with liberal principles of freedom and equality, and which justify granting special rights to minorities." (16) However, protecting individual freedom involves opportunity costs for governments, and so Kymlicka has to determine to what extent this claim is justified.

Traditional liberalism holds that in an open and free "cultural market-place" everyone has the right to associate freely with others in any organization, and to share values different from those belonging to other associations. (17) This freedom of association should be enough for minorities. According to this view, supporting cultural membership with state funds would be not only "unnecessary" but also "unfair". In a liberal society individuals have no difficulty to join or to create any association, and to attract other people. Supporting any particular culture under this system would be unnecessary. In the same way, it is obviously unfair to support some one's choice (maintaining their own culture) by sacrificing others' money. (18)

I should note that traditional liberals are not against the cultural bond of individuals but they are opposed to the state's support of the survival of any particular culture. Justice, on this view, is "benign neglect". (19) That is, cultures will survive or decay in their own way. The state should not interfere by protecting or promoting any culture. So, traditional liberalism ignores the difference between national minorities and ethnic groups. Kymlicka argues this view is seriously "mistaken" as well as "incoherent". (20) The state cannot ignore cultural identities, and minorities' response to many governmental decisions, such as state language, public holidays, and even state symbols. He claims that some self-government rights and polyethnic rights are not only "consistent" with, but also "required" by liberal justice. (21)

He defends this claim by developing three arguments: the equality argument, the historical argument, and the diversity argument. I will briefly discuss these arguments.

3.1 The equality argument

Accommodation of differences is the main aim of equality. It is the duty of the government to ensure that all citizens are treated equally regardless of their race or ethnic identity. However, this norm of equality is correct only under certain limits. Kymlicka believes "some minority rights eliminate, rather than create, inequalities." (22)

All participatory groups in the cultural market-place may not be equal. Some of them may be in an "unfairly disadvantaged" position and, therefore, political support is necessary to rectify this. The majority's political and economic decision might be a threat to the societal culture of minorities. Unlike the national majority, only minorities have to face this difficulty. Kymlicka writes, "given the importance of cultural membership, this is a significant inequality which, if not addressed, becomes a serious injustice". (23)

The group-differentiated rights (e.g. language rights, land claims, political representation) that Kymlicka calls external protections may help to eliminate this disadvantage. In other words, the group-differentiated rights can ensure equal opportunity for minorities. Here one important point is that Kymlicka is mainly concerned with the disadvantage caused by "cultural membership", not economic or racial disadvantage. Moreover, he believes that the disadvantages caused by cultural membership are "unchosen inequalities", and a plausible liberal theory of justice should rectify them. One way to rectify such inequalities is by endorsing special rights for minorities, and recognizing "external protections". A liberal egalitarian theory, for instance Rawls's or Dworkin's, that also justifies the elimination of unchosen inequalities, could justify these rights and protections.

As noted earlier, unlike national minorities, ethnic minorities are more worried about "equal access" to the mainstream culture. To ensure equality, some polyethnic rights are justified for ethnic minorities. For example, flexible public holidays, exemption from official dress code, secular instead of religious state symbols, and so forth. The equality argument shows that the government should not be "neutral" or "silent" with regard to national and ethnic minorities, as the "benign neglect" ideal proposes.

3.2 The historical argument

The historical argument says that the group-differentiated rights are simply reflections of historical agreements, treaties, and confederation. Justice would require respecting these historical agreements. Opponents of this view would naturally claim that most agreements are outdated or are based on ignorance. Kymlicka could ask, why not follow the relevant parts of these treatises that require the principle of equality now? For example, there could be an exemption from some laws for minorities.

The government should consider that they have gained the authority to govern indigenous people, now national minorities, by historical mutual agreements. The state should respect historical treaties for two reasons. Firstly, they are morally and legally obliged to respect certain rights noted in those treaties. Secondly, respecting treaties ensures citizens' trust and good faith towards the government. These confederation agreements support certain rights (e.g. self-determination) for national minorities. However, such rights should be outlined in accordance with the equality argument. As Kymlicka says, "Many of the group-differentiated rights which are the result of historical agreements can be seen as providing the sort of protection required by the equality argument." (24)

The historical argument recognizes some polyethnic rights (e.g. exemption from certain education and laws) for ethnic minorities. Contrary to the views of some liberals, Kymlicka has argued that few immigrants may historically claim exemption from certain state laws. For instance, one of the Christian sects called "Hutterites" was promised exemption from education, military service, and land laws if they migrated to western Canada. So, the Hutterites can historically claim exemption from these state laws.

3.3 The diversity argument

This argument is about the value of diversity of cultures. As diversity enriches lifestyles, our experiences, and also promotes our interests, we should support it. The diversity argument differs from the earlier two arguments as an appeal to self-interest, not justice. In other words, the earlier two arguments are based on "obligations", while the diversity argument is about the "interests" of majorities. (25)

According to Kymlicka, the cultural diversity argument does not put much weight on the rights of national minorities. One of the main problems of this approach is that diverse national minorities may contribute less to intercultural diversity. Moreover, it costs more than any other options, for example, increasing immigrants from different cultures at a lower cost. So, Kymlicka holds this argument is "insufficient" in the sense that the majority culture may not always accept diversity as "enlightened self-interest". (26)

Nonetheless, the diversity argument provides a strong defense for polyethnic rights. The ethnic minorities can contribute to the mainstream culture through diversity of arts, music, cinema, and so forth. In most cases, state funding policy includes such diversity. However, learning the mainstream language may promote diversity for minority groups, but there is no legitimate moral ground why minorities should learn it. Therefore, Kimlicka asserts, the diversity argument is a "supplementary" claim but not a necessary claim of equality.

To conclude this section, I have tried to present here Kymlicka's view of multiculturalism, and his three main arguments for minority rights. He believes that individual freedom is dependent on cultural membership; and the group-differentiated rights, as external protections, can ensure the rights of national and ethnic minorities. His equality argument, historical argument, and diversity argument insist that a liberal theory of justice should incorporate the group-differentiated rights. However, Kymlicka's claims are disputable, and have faced several objections. In the next section, I will focus on some major critiques of his view.

4. Critiques of Kymlicka's view

Brian Barry raises some fundamental questions to challenge Kymlicka's view of minority rights. For example, he asks: Can we ascribe rights to cultures? Are cultures morally relevant? Barry argues that cultures are not "the kind of entity to which rights can properly be ascribed." (27) In other words, we cannot take culture as an end in itself. However, communities may have valid claims when they are defined by an element of culture such as language. The validity of such claims depends on the "legitimate interests" of the members of that particular community. Barry supports Peter Jones who argues that cultures cannot be regarded as moral entities. Cultural fairness simply means the fairness of creating a common ground for the people of each culture. Justice to cultural diversity should require "the people who bear them" as the final concern, not the cultures themselves.

According to Barry, cultural membership cannot give any rights to citizens. All citizens are equal because they have the equal rights of citizenship. These rights are the same for all of them irrespective of their gender, culture, race, and religion. Barry does not think cultural diversity is intrinsically valuable. Individuals have a freedom to choose to join or exit from any group. Belonging to any cultural group is not significantly important for cultural diversity. However, cultural diversity will be sustained in its own way. Barry's liberalism argues that the state should be neutral to cultural and religious practices. His view is opposed to coercive assimilation of minority cultures into mainstream cultures. The state, rather than individuals, has an obligation to bear the legitimate costs when someone wants to exit from the group.

Barry points out that Kymlicka has developed a relationship between culture and intrinsic value, and forcefully claims cultural survival is intrinsically valuable. He values more the survival of cultures than the people who belong to them. In fact, he takes cultural survival as an end. Again, Barry uses Jones' argument to refute this view that cultural survival has intrinsic value. He criticizes Kymlicka's claim by saying "this is the kind of nonsense that follows from attributing an intrinsic value to cultural survival, detached from the interests of the individual bearers of that culture." (28) Barry believes that cultural survival as such, as distinguished from the interest of individual members of the culture, has no value.

Thus, the goal of cultural survival cannot be an "end in itself". If the members of a minority culture find that their culture is able to fulfill their various interests and needs, then and only then would the claim of its survival be valid. Beyond their interests cultural survival would be meaningless. According to Barry, the claim of an intrinsic value of cultural survival would treat human beings as "mere ciphers" or as "instruments of a transcendent goal" (29). Thus, Kymlicka's point that regardless of individual's interest multiculturalism, as a political morality, should accommodate national and ethnic minority cultures is problematic. Barry believes that such a conception of multiculturalism neither promotes the interests of the majority nor that of minority. Cultural diversity or group identity "cannot be preserved like items in a museum (30).

Barry also criticizes Kymlicka's conception of multiculturalism that supports "asymmetric federalism", a theory which grants additional power for the province of Quebec in comparison to powers given any other provinces in Canada. According to him, instead of a "political programme" Kymlicka has taken multiculturalism as an expression of some "facts" in treating minorities. (31) Moreover, Kymlicka believes that "a culture" is "synonymous with 'a nation' or 'a people'-that is, as an intergenerational community". (32) Such an attempt is unacceptable to Barry because it "is simply equating nationhood and cultural distinctiveness". According to Barry, the idea of defining a nation by its culture or people, what he calls "romantic nationalist doctrine", is incorrect because it was unsuccessful in many parts of Europe and caused Franco-Prussian war in 1870. (33)

Barry argues that even Kymlicka's asymmetric federalism is unfair. In Canada it allows representatives of Quebec to vote in the national parliament on issues which do not affect Quebec, but it does not allow others to vote on issues which affect Quebec. Thus, Kymlicka constructs his "culturalist" nationhood to support Quebec in Canada but in this case "he is strongly committed to one side." (34)

Kymlicka claims that it would be just to allow Quebec to be a "distinct society", and that the Quebecois should have additional power i.e. the power of self-government. The claim is, therefore, about the asymmetric decentralization of state power. But Barry maintains this asymmetry implies that "Quebec alone is a nationality-based unit within Canada". (35) Kymlicka's model eventually gives the same power to two majorities, one is Quebecois and another is all citizens minus Quebecois, in a single Canadian legislature. Barry believes that this asymmetric model actually is a "recipe for chaos". Moreover, it would create two classes of citizens in one country. He writes, "The complaint, dismissed by Kymlicka, that asymmetry 'create[s] two classes of citizens' seems to me completely valid." (36) Asymmetric federalism thus cannot ensure justice.

Iris Marion Young argues that Kymlicka's view is problematic on two points: firstly, his distinction between national minorities and ethnic minorities is "too rigid", and even "contradictory"; secondly, he uses the concept of "nation" controversially. (37) Kymlicka distinguishes between two minority groups on the basis of their aims. National minorities aim to achieve self-government rights so that they can maintain and appeal to their distinctiveness. Thus, they have a tendency to be separated from the mainstream culture. In contrast, the objective of ethnic groups is to participate in the main society i.e. to achieve polyethnic rights. So, they have a tendency to integrate into the larger society. Kymlicka believes that all minority groups would fit into one or other of these two categories, but Young argues that his claim is too simple.

Moreover, Young points out that there are some other minorities (such as African-American) who do not fit any of the categories Kymlicka mentions. Another important unique group that Young mentions is "former colonial subjects", which does not belong either to national minorities or to ethnic groups. So, there are a large number of people who should be treated as minorities but are neither national nor ethnic. These examples put into question Kymlicka's uses of the idea of nation, and his distinction between national minorities and ethnic minorities.

According to Kymlicka, a nation is "a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture." (38) Now, Young asks whether prior to the founding of Israel, Jews should be considered a nation by this definition? Similarly, why should African-Americans not be considered as national minorities? (39) Young rejects the possibility of only two options, separation and integration, for minorities in a multicultural society, and writes "I think that this analysis, however, puts into question the very possibility of a multicultural society" (40). Her suggestion is that Kymlicka should be "softening and pluralizing" his dichotomous model so that there might have various possibilities where not only societies but also persons have an opportunity to be "multicultural" or at least "bicultural".

One way of softening and pluralizing Kymlicka's dichotomous model, according to Young, is to consider cultural minorities within a "continuum" or "a set of continua". (41) Basically, cultural minorities differ by degrees, not by kinds, because of their wish to be integrated with or to be separate from the larger society. Similarly, how the larger society accepts their participation is also a matter of degree. So, Young believes, a conception of continuum with minority people at one hand, and the groups by degree of cultural differences at the other, can replace Kymlicka's dichotomy. Then multiculturalism would not be a choice between national minorities and ethnic minorities, rather it would be a continuum, and would allow pluralism.

Chandaran Kukathas has rejected any special status or group-differentiated rights for minorities to compensate for the inequalities raised by culture. Contrary to Kymlicka, he believes "cultures should not be given special protection, that there are no cultural rights." (42) Kukathas criticizes Kymlicka's idea of protecting cultural communities in the name of cultural rights. Kymlicka defends cultural rights on two grounds: firstly, he says cultural membership is valuable because culture gives a meaningful life to individuals; secondly, he invokes the liberal equality principle according to which all people have equal rights irrespective of their race, gender, and religion.

The first ground argues that culture directs people's choices, their thoughts, and goals of life. In short, the cultural structure provides individuals with "the context of choice". The main reason to support cultural membership for Kymlicka is "that it allows for meaningful individual choice". So, beyond individual's rights or freedom liberals should be concerned about cultural membership. However, Kukatha's claims such a view is "untenable" from a liberal perspective as well as from the perspective of those who are sympathetic to cultural minorities.

The problem arises when Kymlicka tries to justify cultural rights within a liberal framework. As a liberal, Kymlicka maintains that autonomy is the essential basis for the individual's life, and cultural rights are fully compatible with liberalism. People can express themselves more in their own culture. So, culture in this sense guarantees the ability to make significant choices. Kukathas disagrees. According to him, culture very often subordinates the choices of its members. Some cultures may expect and require obeying and accepting cultural tradition uncritically. Thus Kukathas writes, "Often, the individual and his interests are subordinated to the community. Moreover, the individual might be expected to accept uncritically the long-standing practices of the cultural group." (43)

Liberal equality is the second point by which Kymlicka defends cultural rights. He argues that cultural minorities "can face inequalities which are the product of their circumstances...not their choices or ambitions". (44) Therefore, a liberal theory should include group-differentiated rights. Kukathas points out two issues here: firstly, before incorporating group-differentiated rights we need to consider whether that particular culture is itself liberal or not. If the culture is not liberal it may not value people's choices. Secondly, all minorities may not face the same inequalities and some would prefer additional rights to group rights. Moreover, the disadvantaged position that originates from the lack of choices cannot justify a special status always. Kukathas says, there is no good reason to think that only minorities can face inequalities which are not the product of their choices. Anyone born physically or mentally disabled, for example, could make this claim no matter what his culture, as indeed might anyone born into poverty. (45)

Thus, Kukathas concludes that lack of control over circumstances cannot justify special rights to cultural minorities.

Unlike Kukathas, Ten Chin Liew agrees with Kymlicka that cultural membership gives people the context of choice, and also helps them to make a meaningful choice from various options. But he thinks this does not necessarily justify the policy of protecting minority cultures with special rights. He believes that there are other ways, for example tolerance, by which a liberal state could respond to multiculturalism. Minority groups can participate in and benefit from other cultures. Liberal toleration of cultural diversity would allow an individual to choose her own way of life from a wide variety of ways.

Moreover, Ten argues that Kymlicka's attempt to reconcile "minority rights with the liberty of individual members of minority groups" creates "internal tensions" within his own approach. (46) Like Barry and Young, he rightly shows that Kymlicka is not consistent within his analysis, in particular, his own distinction of the thin sense of culture and the thick sense of culture. The thin sense of culture refers to language and the historical heritage of cultures, i.e. the cultural structure itself, but it does not include any shared values or ends. So, in this sense, people can live in the same cultural community without having common ends or values. For instance, French-Canadians do not share their values, but have the same cultural identity.

By contrast, the thick sense of culture refers to our participation from our childhood in different spheres of life, such as eating habits, dress style, festivals, religion, sex, education, and so forth. In short, it includes the meaning and values of our worthwhile life. The thick sense of culture, therefore, provides some shared values and practices. However, Ten points out that when Kymlicka argues that cultural structure creates meaningful choices for individuals, he "invokes" a thick sense of culture. Therefore, as a liberal theorist his important remark is "Kymlicka's argument adds a layer of complexity to the liberal account of culture, but it does not provide a strong enough case for the state to help in preserving the culture of a minority group."

Finally, contrary to Ten, Jeremy Waldron is doubtful that human beings need any deep bond to their own culture and language, and should protect their cultural membership to live a worthwhile life. He proposes the "cosmopolitan alternative", according to which without feeling any deep bond to a particular culture, people can select and pick "cultural fragments" from a variety of cultures. For example, one can eat Chinese food and hear Western rock music without being a member of either Chinese or Western culture. So, he rejects Kymlicka's core idea that cultural membership shapes and gives meaning of our lives.

As we could imagine, Kymlicka wants to fill the gap of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin's liberal theory which only considers individual rights but also underestimates cultural rights of minorities. He, for the first time, advocates that culture should be a primary good in the Rawlsian sense, and argues that cultural structure or cultural context gives people a choice of meaningful lives. However, Kymlicka is committing here a fallacy of composition, according to Waldron. He writes, Kymlicka is guilty of something like the fallacy of composition. From the fact that each option must have a cultural meaning, it does not follow that there must be one cultural framework in which each available option is assigned a meaning. (48)

Waldron believes people need culture but it does not imply that one's cultural structure can make each of her options valuable or meaningful. Meaningful options may originate from fragments of a variety of cultures. Waldron further argues that the modern world is a creation of heterogeneous cultures, not homogenous cultures. For example, we had Palestinian culture, then Germanic folklore, and then the Roman Republic mythology. So, the idea of "a single cultural matrix" is unacceptable in a liberal theory as it locks individuals into a particular choice, lifestyle, and interest. In short, Waldron maintains "identification with a single cultural frame or matrix, has none of the importance that Kymlicka claims it does." (49)

As discussed above, liberals differ with Kymlicka on various grounds. Most of the critiques show that his view of multiculturalism, which strongly argues for group-differentiated rights to minorities, are theoretically and practically incoherent. However, his view is certainly important for considering culture as one of the main concerns of minorities. He is very much correct to point out the power of culture in shaping and giving meaning to our lives. But the problem occurs when he says that cultures are morally significant. In other words, cultural membership could claim some special rights to ensure justice and equality. Some liberal scholars, such as Barry and Kukathas, have rejected this claim, and maintained that cultures are not morally significant at all. Other liberal scholars, such as Young, Ten, and Waldron, agreed with Kymlicka that to live a meaningful life cultures are valuable. However, they believe a plurality of cultures or tolerance to cultural diversity would be sufficient. In the next section, I will coin a new term, geo-cultural identity, and argue that a justified multicultural society does not need to incorporate all group-differentiated rights for minorities, nor do we need a classification among minorities. Tolerating cultural diversity and promoting geo-cultural identity could make multiculturalism more appealing.

5. A Defense of Geo-Cultural Identity

In the process of globalization, preservation of culture is one of the main challenges for the state as well as for individuals. New technologies are contributing to change cultural values. Modern states are now incorporating a new conception of citizenship and relaxing their immigration policies. They welcome immigrants mainly for economic reasons. However, other reasons, such as the lack of experts in different sectors, scarcity of skilled people, development of science and technology, education, health, and charity service, are also related to immigration. Most nation-states in today's globalized world are, therefore, multicultural. There is no way to keep any nation-state isolated or distinct from this process. Numerous states, whether for and against globalization, are within this system. Nonetheless, many nation-states, on one hand, want to preserve their cultural heritage, but on the other hand, are committed to an individual's freedom and equality.

I will maintain that multiculturalism, primarily as a political theory, guides us how we should live in a cultural diversity; thus, it has political as well as moral implications. The political part will focus on the form of government of a culturally heterogeneous state. The moral part will explore how multiculturalism can ensure justice to minorities in these states. I will deal with moral part here. My defense of multiculturalism and minority rights is grounded on tolerating "cultural diversity" and promoting "geo-cultural identity" by an uncoerced integration.

Kymlicka justifies minority rights on the grounds of cultural membership and equality. But does cultural membership relate to justice and equality at all? Do group-differentiated rights really rectify inequalities and ensure justice? Liberals have different opinions regarding these questions that we have already discussed in the previous section. I believe that although Kymlicka raised an interesting issue, he gave much more weight to cultural membership than it requires. However, he seems correct in saying that culture gives individuals an "intelligible context of choice". Here the term "intelligible" is crucial. If one does not understand various options in her own way, how can she be able to choose among them? Although cultures shape our imagination, thought, values, liking, disliking, and so forth, we refine our thoughts and values by learning voluntarily from other cultures in a manner that Kymlicka misses.

My approach to multiculturalism differs from Kymlicka in a manner that people will appreciate other cultural practices and values, but they are also aware about their geo-cultural identities. In other words, they themselves want a territorial landscape where culture and geography both are favorable to them. For this reason, in many Western cities we find China Town, India Square (or Little India), African Village, and other territorial areas.

Contrary to Kymlicka, I believe that cultural membership may not always "secure" an individual's identity. To some extent, someone may feel secured in her own culture, but if her beliefs and wants clash with her cultural norms and values, then she may feel insecure. Such a person would rather prefer to live in another culture. Obviously, emotional attachment with their own culture would not totally disappear. In this sense cultural identity gives us viability, not security. To my approach, mere cultural membership is not enough for a complete identity of an individual.

Kymlicka holds that most national minorities want to survive as distinct societies, demand self-governing rights to preserve their own cultures, and he strongly supports this distinctiveness. Would that distinctiveness, based on a narrow sense (mainly language) of cultural identity, be enough for the survival of minority people? To my view, geographical and cultural identities are both crucial to survival as a nation. People's identity can only be meaningful and complete by their geographical and cultural identities. Cultural identity refers to their language, dress, food, festivals, norms, values, and so forth, whereas geographical identity refers to their living land. Kymlicka undermines the geo-cultural identity of a nation. An example will clarify my point.

Anywhere in the world, the people whose food habits, dress style, and languages are 'Chinese' can be identified as a member of 'Chinese' culture. That is, the cultural identity of these people is 'Chinese'. But geographically they could be different. For instance, most Chinese people live in China, but some of them are settled in Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Burma, Vietnam, and so forth. So, the Chinese people in different nation-states have the same cultural identity, but different geographical identities. For example, when we introduce a Chinese Singaporean we could say her cultural identity is Chinese but her geographical identity is a citizen of Singapore. So, her complete identity is a Singaporean Chinese. Similarly, a Malaysian Chinese, a Burmese Chinese, a Vietnamese Chinese, and so forth. So, my claim is that cultural membership alone is not enough for an individual's identity. We also need to express her geographical identity. The Quebecois cannot survive only to hold the territorial identity, they also need to assimilate into Canadian culture. Kymlicka does not take this point into consideration.

The concept of geo-cultural identity could make a balance between Kymlicka's view of multiculturalism and the classical liberal view. For classical liberals, cultural membership is less important when minorities get special rights. For Kymlicka, cultural membership is much more important even minorities get some special rights. The concept of geo-cultural identity emphasizes both cultural membership and geographical integration of an individual.

One of the main problems of this geo-cultural approach is that many countries might have citizens of different languages and cultures, and some of them are minorities. What would be the identities of these citizens? Should such countries allow coercive assimilation for a homogeneous identity? The geo-cultural approach could solve this problem without coercive assimilation, I believe. The alternative that Kymlicka proposes to coercive assimilation is three group-differentiated rights, self-government rights for national minorities, polyethnic rights for ethnic minorities, and special representation rights for national, non-ethnic social groups like women or the poor. The aim of introducing group-differentiated rights is twofold: to rectify unchosen inequalities and to ensure justice, and to accommodate cultural heterogeneity. However, it is not clear to me why Kymlicka believes that immigrants have "no basis" for claiming self-government rights and also special representation rights. Why should the national minorities alone receive self-government rights? Most importantly, why should not all minorities belong to only one category? Will not categorization among minorities and introducing various rights for them create injustice rather than justice?

Suppose, for the sake of argument, we accept that the national minority should have self-government rights. One of the ways to give these rights to them is asymmetric federalism. But the concept of federalism is currently losing its support because, in today's world, states are more concerned about security and geographical unity. Terrorism is one of the main worries for all states, either rich or poor. It is not unlikely that a self-governed state would claim geographical independence or at least make trouble for the whole country. Examples are Tibet and Kashmir.

So, all of these three group-differentiated rights are not necessary for justice. On the one hand, they will create division among minorities. On the other hand, they might be a threat to the security and unity of the state. However, I agree with Kymlicka that minorities should have some sort of special representation rights for certain periods. Special representation rights will not only create equal ground for all minorities but it will also reduce their disadvantaged position. Further, contrary to self-government rights and ethnocultural rights, special representation rights are not against the geo-cultural identity. We need to preserve a minority culture, and at the same time we also need to protect the geo-cultural identity of a citizen.

What would be the grounds to treat minority cultures equally? It seems to me that Kymlicka argues for not only equal opportunity but also same degree of influence of each culture. But I believe that equal opportunity is more important than equal influence. Moreover, demanding same degree of influence of each culture in society seems impractical and chaotic. For instance, the Muslims in the U.K. may not need to claim the same degree of influence as the Christians majority has in that society. Similarly, the Christians in Iraq or Iran may not need to claim same degree of influence as the Muslim majority has in those countries. A demand of equal influence of Muslims in the U.K. or the Christians in Iraq or Iran would cause societal unrest.

However, if Christian and Muslim minorities have equal opportunity to practice their own religious faith, equal access to societal institution, equal rights of speech and freedom, equal rights to national issues, and so forth, in those countries that would be enough for harmony and peaceful co-existence. The same degree of influence by all cultures in a society may not guarantee survival of a cultural minority.

So, if members of each culture have equal opportunity, that would seem sufficient for justice to emerge. People are more worried about free speech, equal freedom, equal opportunity, equal rights than the fact the majority prefer the majority's culture to their own minority cultures. If a minority member feels that she is oppressed and suppressed because of her culture that is against the principle of liberalism. In this case "equality" would mean equal opportunity. This idea of equal opportunity is also applicable to immigrants. Like other minorities they sometimes demand equal access to the mainstream culture. Probably, an Indian immigrant would not mind if there is no Indian culture in the U.K. but she would feel bad if she finds discrimination between an American and an Indian. Nevertheless, some Indians may feel better if Indian culture has equal influence in the U.K.

How can minority cultures be preserved? I believe that a combination of two policies could preserve minority cultures: firstly, as Professor Ten suggested, "we should cerebrate, protect, and encourage" (50) cultural diversity; and secondly, we should protect and promote geo-cultural identity. Tolerating and celebrating cultural diversity will enrich our conception of worthwhile lives because there is no single formula or way for a good life. Showing respect to different cultures eventually mean showing respect for all individuals regardless of their race, colour, nationality, and religion. Toleration teaches us to accept open criticisms of our own ways of living, get rid of cultural blindness, share others' decision, and reject coercive assimilation. I believe that we should protect and promote geo-cultural identity to keep continuing the cultural diversity.

The geo-cultural identity seems the source of cultural diversity. Suppose the Canadian immigrant policy fails to preserve Chinese culture in Canada. Will the Chinese culture vanish? It is absurd because we know that geographically China is present and the people of China will preserve their own culture. Thus, we would be able to celebrate Chinese food, Chinese dress, Chinese dance, Chinese herbal medicine, and so forth. The people would decide whether they would belong to their own culture, or any other culture. However, people cannot change some physical attributes, body colour, body structure, and so forth, embedded in geographical identity.

6. Conclusion

How can minority rights be defended in multiculturalism is Will Kymlicka's challenge. He believes that "benign neglect", according to which the state should be neutral to culture or religion, is unsuccessful. Therefore, a new liberal approach to incorporate minority rights is necessary. According to Kymlicka, Cultures are morally significant and cultural membership gives people a secure life with "intelligible context of choice". He divides all minorities into two groups, national minority and ethnic minority. The national minorities prefer to survive as a distinct society and demand self-governing rights, whereas ethnic minorities want to integrate into the main population but demand the recognition of their ethnic identities. Kymlicka argues that a liberal theory of justice must include three group-differentiated rights namely, self-government rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights. He justified the rights of cultural minorities by the equality argument, the historical argument, and the diversity argument. However, liberal scholars, such as Brian Barry, Chandaran Kukathas, have rejected the claim that cultural membership is morally significant. Kymlicka's theory has been criticized as incoherent by other liberal scholars, like Iris Marion Young, Ten Chin Liew, and Jeremy Waldron. They believe that without addressing the group-differentiated rights we could respond to multiculturalism. My view of multiculturalism rests on the values of "cultural diversity" and a new concept of "geo-cultural identity". I have argued that Kymlicka's distinction among various minority groups would create injustice rather than justice. Moreover, except for special representation rights, all group-differentiated rights are not only unnecessary, but also against liberal equality. My suggestion is that all minority groups should belong to one category, and equal opportunity is sufficient to treat minority people equally. In order to preserve minority cultures we should tolerate cultural diversity, while at the same time promote the geo-cultural identity by an non-coerced integration.

In that case, nation-states those are worry about their geographical and cultural identities but also want to acknowledge minority rights could incorporate multiculturalism. A further research is needed to find out the willingness of uphold geo-cultural identity at territorial, local and global level. The psychological identification of people with their land and culture, support and influence of the state to them to endorse the geo-cultural identities, wherever they live, are also necessary to study for a better immigration policy.

Acknowledgements:

I am grateful to Professor Ten Chin Liew, Department of Philosophy at the National University of Singapore, for his comments, corrections, and invaluable guidance in developing the ideas of this paper. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers and editors of CEU Political Science Journal for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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(1) Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, NY: Clarendon Press, 1995), 27.

(2) Ibid, 8.

(3) Ibid., 10.

(4) Will Kymlicka, ed., The Rights of Minority Cultures (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 21.

(5) Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 26-27.

(6) Ibid, 35.

(7) Ibid., 36.

(8) Ibid., 36.

(9) Ibid., 37.

(10) Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative", in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka, 106; also Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 85.

(11) John Rawls, Political, 277; also Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 87.

(12) Ibid., 87.

(13) Ibid., 92.

(14) Ibid., 92.

(15) Ibid., 105.

(16) Will Kimlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 339.

(17) Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 109.

(18) Ibid., 107.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Ibid., 109.

(23) Ibid.

(24) Ibid., 117.

(25) Ibid., 121.

(26) Ibid., 122-123.

(27) Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism ( Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001), 67.

(28) Ibid, 68.

(29) Ibid, 67.

(30) Bhikhu Parekh, "Barry and the Dangers of Liberalism" in Multiculturalism Reconsidereded. Paul Kelly (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). 137.

(31) Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001), 308.

(32) Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 18.

(33) Barry, Culture and Equality, 308-309.

(34) Ibid, 310.

(35) Ibid, 310.

(36) Ibid, 311-312.

(37) Iris Marion Young, "A Multicultural Continuum: A Critique of Will Kymlicka's Etnnic-Nation Dichotomy", Constellations 4 (no 1, 1997): 49.

(38) Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 11.

(39) Young, "A Multicultural Continuum", 50.

(40) Ibid., 51.

(41) Ibid., 50-51.

(42) Chandran Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights?", in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Kymlicka, 245.

(43) Ibid., 242.

(44) Quoted in: Chandran Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights?", in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Kymlicka, 241,

(45) Ibid., 245.

(46) Ten Chin Liew, Multiculturalism and The Value of Diversity (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004), 21.

(47) Ibid., 22.

(48) Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative", in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Kymlicka , 106.

(49) Ibid., 108.

(50) Ten Chin Liew, Multiculturalism and The Value of Diversity, 1.

Md. Munir Hossain Talukder

Jahangirnagar University