Neuhouser, Frederick. Rousseau's Theodicy of Self Love.

Ferrara, Alessandro

NEUHOUSER, Frederick. Rousseau's Theodicy of Self Love. New York: Oxford University Press. 2008. x + 279 pp. Paper, $70--Rousseau's philosophical world is notoriously a highly complex one, which has often defied--let alone just plainly discouraged--attempts to bring it to thematic unity. In his outstandingly well written Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love, Frederick Neuhouser convincingly succeeds in unraveling the puzzle. The notion of amour-propre is identified by Neuhouser as the foundation upon which Rousseau's diagnosis of the ills of modern civil society, his vision of a just society where everyone joins in the formation of a communal will and enjoys protection while remaining as free as beforehand, his "negative education" aimed at cultivating autonomy, and other aspects of his work all rest.

Amour-propre, as distinct from the nondistinctively human amour de soi, is a sentiment or disposition that presupposes social relations: for it amounts to the social actor's concern for the image that others form of his merits and to a desire for their esteem. Very interesting in Neuhouser's book is his recasting of Rousseau's analysis of the dynamics of amour-propre in terms of the un-Rousseauian concept of recognition. Indeed, the dual dimension of recognition--recognition of the other as a social being like me, which amounts to an inescapable condition of the possibility of social action, and recognition of the other as worthy of my esteem, which is entirely contingent on shared codes of evaluation--is reflected in the distinction between a modicum of amour-propre which cannot and should not be eliminated, lest the very possibility of social life would be undermined, and "inflamed amour-propre", which is the product of the specifically competitive, property dominated and deleterious form of modern social life.

Hence, according to Neuhouser, Rousseau's structuring of the theme of amour-propre as a theodicy becomes manifest. While at a Golden-agish initial stage of association amour-propre innocuously accompanies everyone's awareness of being included in the cognitive horizon of the other and does not stand in the way of harmonious relations, subsequently a Fall is determined by the invention of property, the rise of agriculture and metallurgy with the enhanced division of labor they stimulate, and all the ensuing developments up to the Parisian social life of the salons. This is the era when inflamed amour-propre unfolds, reigns and dominates all social life, generates the vices of duplicity, envy, vainglory, self-estrangement, and ultimately accounts for the fact that a being who is born free, is everywhere in chains. Yet, at a Hegelian-sounding third stage, the dual nature of amour-propre "brings with it the possibility of redemption and transcendence," that is, the possibility of "recreating, on a higher plane and in full self-consciousness, the harmony among humans--and between humans and nature--that was their original, pre-lapsarian lot." Differently than in Hegel's line of thinking, however, there is no built-in necessity in the Rousseauian narrative of burgeoning, inflamed and finally tamed amour-propre. Only contingency--the rise of society as due to men's accidental discovery of the usefulness of cooperation in responding to life-challenges, and then the contingency of historical reform--drives the process.

Nenhouser's focus on amour-propre allows him to smoothly bring unity to the whole or at least most of Rousseau's multi-faceted oeuvre: The Social Contract and Emile can then be understood as distinct moments of the solution to the problem of curbing the effects of the rampant amour-propre induced by the social arrangements of modern civil society.

The central chapters of the book spell out the distinctive features of amour-propre: its finality, artificial quality, phenomenological manifestations, pathological forms, social causes and possible public and private remedies. In Chapter 3, a fine-grained analysis is offered of the varieties of "inflamed amour-propre" and a very interesting discussion can be found of what a non-pathological, non inflamed form of amour-propre, still consistent with the overall Rousseauian framework, could look like. Certain forms of the desire for "recognized excellence"--such as being the idealized object of another person's love, or being generally recognized as "the best" in one special field appear not divisive and conflict-inducing. Indeed, the desire for being considered excellent (by one, some, or by everybody) in just one area may prove generalizable, insofar as in seeking this kind of recognition, as Neuhouser points out evoking a famous Lockean phrase, the recognition seeking actor "does not rob others of the chance to find esteem that is 'enough and as good as' what one has found for oneself."

In the concluding section, the book brings out the limitations inherent in Rousseau's view of amour-propre. Mostly they come down to the overambitious aspiration, on the part of Rousseau, to "deliver a systematic account of the perils and promise of human existence" from the analysis of a single component of human nature, broadly construed and understood as at once part of the problem and of its solution. One is left wondering, however, whether the source of evil, in Roussean's theodicy, really is in the end psychological, or does not reside in the social arrangements--divisive and competitive in the spontaneous order emerging from proto-sociation, harmonious and equitable after the "social contract" is enacted--that cause the same psychological disposition to generate two quite different outcomes.

In sum, the book creatively brings together the themes of amour-propre and recognition and sheds also a systematic philosophical light on the nature and import of our concern for our fellows' consideration.--Alessandro Ferrara, The University of Rome-Tor Vergata.