An Approach to Aristotle's Physics: With Particular Attention to the Role of His Manner of Writing.

De Groot, Jean

BOLOTIN, David. An Approach to Aristotle's Physics: With Particular Attention to the Role of His Manner of Writing. Albany: SUNY Press, 1997. 168 pp. Cloth, $44.50; paper, $14.95--In the introduction to An Approach to Aristotle's Physics, David Bolotin presents an exceptionally clear account of the difficulties of making a claim for Aristotle's natural philosophy as a contemporary teacher about nature. Modern science has repudiated the chief elements of the Aristotelian cosmos--the geocentric universe, the account of projectile motion--and so the contemporary interpreter treats Aristotle as a brilliant' expositor of the world "as it appears." Alternatively, the interpreter may say there is no final troth in the matter of nature, so Aristotle's cosmos within its own perspective was as compelling as our modern science is within its own perspective. Neither of these interpretations suits Aristotle, Bolotin says, since the philosopher's conception of science included its being a true account of nature itself.

Bolotin's own solution to the problem of Aristotle's relevance is to suppose, and attempt to show, that Aristotle did not really mean any of those troublesome and antiquated scientific ideas. The Stagirite presented them to deceive, contriving faulty and inadequate arguments (p. 5). Accordingly, Aristotle did not believe there are principles like matter and form that are permanent and imperishable. He may well have believed that the cosmos originated by chance, and the only continuity he claimed for material nature is the perception of continuity. Indeed, Bolotin's Aristotle did not believe natural philosophy can tell us much about what is in the world (p. 24). This acknowledgment of the limitations of natural knowledge was supplemented by a programmatic principle about the primacy of perception (p. 70) and a noble vision of what genuine science would be if it were possible, namely "the articulation of the manifest character--understood as the truest being--of the given world" (pp. 151-2).

In making these claims about Aristotle, Bolotin analyzes the Physics with considerable care, treating many of the classic puzzles and problems of the text. In book 1, he points out the incongruity of saying seed, which changes and disappears, is an exemplar of a substratum that persists. In book 2, he analyzes what is left out in the exclusive disjunction of "by chance" and "for the sake of which." In book 6, he explores why Aristotle gives two different answers to Zeno's paradox about motion. Interestingly, Bolotin's solution to these problems often incorporates traditional themes. The view of form that Bolotin takes to be Aristotle's own in book 1 is a standard Aristotelian account of form as an aspect of a being (p. 21). This being/form acts on something else which possesses the potency to become similar to what acts. In his treatment of book 2, he endorses the conclusion of the middle chapters that knowledge of natural forms or, in human affairs, knowledge of purpose, is prior to the apprehension of chance or luck.

Bolotin believes, however, that an inhospitable popular climate for rational inquiry about nature made Aristotle adopt for science a public posture of accommodation to conventional beliefs. These conventional beliefs included the eternity of the world and the existence of purpose in nature. Accordingly, in his writings, Aristotle allows for greater intelligibility in nature than the philosopher truly believed possible. On Bolotin's account, however, it is a good thing that Aristotle practiced such deception. It meant that the idea of science survived so that, over a millennium later, Galileo could begin science again (pp. 150-1).

Whether Bolotin is right about the meaning of Aristotle's doctrines or not, his thesis creates an intellectual space in which to consider some interesting possibilities of interpretation--for instance, that Aristotle might have believed the world originated through chance--and to reassess the style of presentation in Aristotle's texts. The reader should be aware, however, that this Aristotle holds to a conventionalist view of science reminiscent of Ernst Mach. Furthermore, Bolotin's dismissal of the classical philosophical tradition entails certain limitations. His treatment of "acting for an end" in Physics 2 is played out in terms of the alternatives of intelligent purpose and chance. This disjunction is typical of Enlightenment philosophy of nature but can only be regarded as an impoverishment of the richness of kinds of ends that Aristotle utilized in explanation.

--Jean De Groot, The Catholic University of America.

(*) Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

The Review of Metaphysics 53 (September 1999): 141-207. Copyright [C] 1999 by The Review of Metaphysics