Lebanon after Ta'if: another reform opportunity lost?

Hudson, Michael C.

The national accord document for Lebanon issued in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, on 24 October 1989 was composed with the active mediation of Saudi Arabia, discreet participation by the United States, and behind-the-scenes influence from Syria. Signed by nearly all the surviving members of the 1972 Chamber of Deputies, it was the blueprint for restoring the Lebanese state and ending the long civil war. The Ta'if Accord modifies the "rules of the game" of the First Republic but does not alter their basic character. Postwar Lebanon - in form - remains more-or-less a consociational democracy. Sectarian proportionality is still there, but the proportion of Muslim to Christian legislators and officials has been increased to 50-50. The President of the Republic remains for the foreseeable future a Maronite Christian, but his powers have been substantially reduced. The Prime Minister remains a Sunni Muslim, but the powers of the Council of Ministers, which he chairs, have been increased. The office of President of the Chamber of Deputies still goes to a Shiite, but his tenn has been increased from one year to four, and so has his influence. The power of the Chamber itself is increased by the elimination of the old provision allowing the Executive to pass "urgent" legislation without parliamentary involvement. At the same time, Ta'if explicitly calls for a gradual phasing out of political sectarianism.

Other provisions of the Ta'if Accord relating to Lebanon's external relations were more controversial. "Lebanon is Arab in belonging and in identity" is a stronger expression of Lebanon's "Arabness" than was found in the 1943 National Pact and thus alarmed some Christians. Even more alarming was the provision authorizing a "special relationship" between Lebanon and Syria, one that would give Syria a privileged position on matters relating to national security, among other things. Moreover, a pledge by Syria to redeploy its forces in Lebanon east of the Lebanon mountain range within two years of the formal ratification of the Ta'if Accord, the holding of a new presidential election, and the formation of a new cabinet were also conditioned by "the approval of political reforms." Two years later, with a new president and cabinet in place, the Syrians refused to redeploy on the ground that all the political reforms (by which they meant beginning the process of desectarianization) had not yet been achieved. Furthermore, as long as Israel controlled its self-styled "security zone" in southern Lebanon, Syria could justify keeping its own military presence in the country.

THE POST-TA'IF PERIOD

In theory, Ta'if had much to recommend it. True, it restored a "temporary" confessional order, but one that was fine-tuned to accommodate new realities. But Ta'if on paper indicated much more than a simple restoration of the confessionalism of the past. Its clear commitment to the dismantling of confessionalism and the strengthening of the public sphere through an enhanced judiciary was commendable. The nagging question remains, however: Did those who were responsible for the document really believe in its liberal-reform provisions? From a realpolitik perspective it is easy to imagine that the Syrian, American, and Saudi governments were minimalists, preferring to make tactical adjustments rather than risk a transformation that could threaten their respective Lebanese clients. The aging parliamentarians who collectively legitimized the Accord did not include many reformers. One cannot repress the suspicion that Ta'if in 1989, like the National Pact of 1943, was merely paying lip-service to liberal reform. In any event, Ta'if in practice deviated significantly from Ta'if in theory.

THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 1992 AND 1993

General Aoun and many Maronite Christians either opposed Ta'if outright or accepted it with great reluctance. They also opposed the holding of new parliamentary elections in August and September 1992, but Syria refused all requests to delay them, even for technical reasons: How could the electoral rolls be updated following the vast demographic upheavals of the previous 17 years? The elections were held nevertheless, and notwithstanding the shadow of Syria and a boycott in much of the Maronite heartland of Mount Lebanon, the new Parliament was welcomed in most other parts of the country as an important, if flawed, step on the road back to stable representative government. Comparison of the 1992 election with its predecessors revealed lower voter participation, especially in Mount Lebanon, where it averaged around 16 percent, although it was closer to 40 percent in the Biqa' and South Lebanon; the overall turnout in 1972 had been 55 percent. As for the composition of the new parliament, new entrants not surprisingly filled 80 percent of the 128 seats; yet fully a third of the deputies either had been elected to earlier parliaments or were close relatives (sons, sons-in-law, brothers, or cousins) of former deputies. Of twenty "parliamentary families" prominently represented in parliaments going back to 1943, eleven were found in the 1992 parliament, suggesting - for better or worse - a certain continuity. The occupational background of deputies revealed a continuing steep decline in large landowners and lawyers and a large increase in the professions - doctors, journalists, engineers, clerics, retired civil servants, and professional politicians.

There were several striking trends in the political makeup of the new Chamber. Some 47 percent of the new deputies were affiliated with a political party or movement (as opposed to a traditional grouping or independent status), compared with 31 percent in the 1972 parliament. Some of the parties showed continuity - for example, the Ba'th, Walid Junblat's Progressive Socialist Party, and the Armenian Dashnak. More striking was the disappearance of many traditional Maronite actors - personalities like the Shamuns, Gemayels, and Eddes, and parties like the Phalanges. Absent too were prominent anti-Syrian militia chiefs of the civil war such as Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. Many Maronites of Mount Lebanon looked on these results as depressing evidence of the end of Maronite hegemony, and some waited for General Aoun to return from exile in France to restore Lebanon as a "Christian" country. But not only were traditional Christian players missing, there were now new Islamist actors on the parliamentary scene: the Shiite parties Areal and Hizballah now constituted the largest blocs in parliament - 12 for Hizballah (and allies) and 20 for Areal. There was also small but significant representation from two Sunni Muslim Islamist parties. Even Lebanese observers who detested Syria's involvement in Lebanese politics admitted that Damascus had on the whole acted skillfully to implant its influence in postwar Lebanon while allowing quite a broad spectrum of traditional and new political forces a place on the political stage. If Lebanon were to emerge definitively from its past agony, the traditional Christians of Mount Lebanon would need to be brought back into the formal system one way or another. On the whole, then, the 1992 elections raised as many questions as they answered about Lebanon's future stability. The simple fact that they had taken place was perhaps the most positive result, but they did little to help relegitimize the Lebanese political system. However, a reminder of Syria's hegemony in Lebanon was the decision in November 1995 to amend the constitution to extend the mandate of President Elias Hrawi - a Maronite "outsider" - for an additional three years.

The elections of August-September 1996, therefore, took on particular significance. In many ways they advanced Lebanon's political recovery. Voting participation rose to 44 percent, still well below the 1972 level, although the Interior Minister claimed that the "real" figure might have been 66 percent, owing to the number of absent and dead voters on the electoral rolls (Lebanon Report 1996: 24). The results were a decisive victory for the post-Ta'if regime led by Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, thus further entrenching the Syrian-dominated post-Ta'if establishment and (for better or worse) enhancing its stability. Many of its 128 members had been affiliated with the once-dominant militias of the civil war period; others were wealthy businessmen, many of whom had profited from the civil war. It was estimated that perhaps 85 of the 128 deputies were independently wealthy or had income sources other than their salaries (Lebanon Report 1996: 23). Hariri came into parliament with a bloc of 30-40 deputies, and he was supported by eight other blocs, led by Nabih Berri (Shiite, Areal leader), Omar Karami and Ahmad Karami (Sunnis) in the North, Walid Junblat (Druze, from the Shuf district of Mount Lebanon), Hizballah (Shiite, in the South and Biqa' districts), an Armenian bloc, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the bloc of President of the Republic Elias Hrawi. This parliament was not expected to present any serious challenge to Prime Minister Hariri or to Syrian policy in Lebanon. While Islamists continued to be represented, their numbers actually shrank somewhat: Hizballah lost one seat (out of 8) and several allies, while two Sunni Islamist parties were completely eliminated from parliament.

On the negative side, however, the 1996 elections were marked by significant irregularities, according to an independent monitoring group, the Lebanese Association for the Democracy of Elections. Furthermore, the marginalization of the Maronites and of the traditional political establishment continued. True to form, the Christian opposition split, with a group of notables in exile (General Aoun, Raymond Edde, and former President Amin Gemayel) calling for another Christian boycott, while another group inside Lebanon insisted on participating - and for the most part losing. The government, meanwhile, moved ahead with legislation to shrink the electronic mass media, leading the opposition to accuse it of curtailing freedom of expression. Certainly there seemed to be few pressures on it to improve its unimpressive performance in institutional reform or social policy.

The 1996 results seemed to confirm several post-Ta'if trends. The structure of sectarian bargaining had certainly changed, even though sectarian consciousness (by many Lebanese accounts) remained high. The Maronite establishment, including even the Patriarch, had been marginalized, and former Maronite militia leaders had been totally excluded. The Druze and Shiite militia elites seemed very much intact even though their militias (except for Hizballah, fighting the Israeli occupation in south Lebanon) had been demobilized. Most of the old Sunni and Shiite traditional politicians were gone. Money appeared to be talking loudly, to the extera that one could speak of an oligarchy of the very rich. In some ways the handful of main power brokers in the 1996 parliament resembled the small oligarchy of traditional leaders who had run Lebanon in the 1940s. Might one then expect the emergence of a new - and multi-sectarian - grouping of socially conscious, ideologically driven activists to challenge this cozy order, as happened in the early 1950s? And would such an ideology submerge sectarian chauvinism in the interests of a broader constituency of the neglected? The Syrian factor, of course, would be important though not necessarily decisive in future bargaining configurations.

SYRIAN TUTELAGE AND GOVERNMENT BY TROIKA

Although Syria was not formally present at the Ta'if gathering, its shadow falls heavily over post-Ta'if Lebanese politics. The Ta'if Accord speaks of "the special relationship" between Lebanon and Syria. With a 30,000-man army in Lebanon, along with an elaborate intelligence apparatus, Damascus has the means to shape the nature of that special relationship. But Syria's influence rests even more firmly on its ability to manipulate the three leading "presidencies" in post-Ta'if Lebanon: the presidency of the Republic, the presidency of the Council of Ministers, and the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies. Syria secured the election of Maronite Elias Hrawi (from the Syrian-dominated Biqa') as President of the Republic in 1989 and was able to obtain a constitutional amendment for a three-year renewal in 1995. As the presidency came up for reelection in 1998, opinions differed over whether Hrawi might be renewed again or whether Emile Lahoud, commander of the army, or some other individual might be chosen, but no one doubted that Syria would determine the outcome (an outcome which is by now clear, Emile Lahoud having been chosen as president). Similarly, Sunni millionaire-businessman Rafiq al-Hariri and his successor Salim al-Hoss could not have been selected as prime ministers without Damascus's blessing. Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri, whose prominence lies in his leadership of the Shiite Amal movement, owes his prominence largely to Syria, to whom he has been a loyal ally. There is no love lost among these three presidents: none want to be dominated by the others. This has made it all the easier for Syria to play them off against each other.

The dysfunctional aspects of government by troika might be alleviated if there were other institutions in place for articulating and channeling political activity. Unfortunately, such institutions are weak or nonexistent. For example, the lack of a strong party system leaves only a weak token "loyal opposition" in parliament, numbering between a dozen and two dozen deputies, depending on the issue at hand. Meanwhile, the more ideologically oriented (and polarized) elements among the Maronites (Aounists, ex-Lebanese Force partisans, certain traditional politicians, and the Patriarch) and the Shiites (Hizballah, trying to play a dual role) lurk on the margins of the formal political arena, each subject to periodic constraints and encouragement by the Syrians. Another theoretically important institution, the judiciary, does occasionally exert a tempering effect on political abuses (for example, when the Constitutional Court condemned certain electoral irregularities in 1996), but it is far from able to restrain the troika. The press and electronic mass media also play a considerable role, but the Hariri government (with Syria behind it) steadily whittled away at their freedom and pluralism. Instead of being an open forum, the country's permitted TV channels reflect sectarian and za'im (boss) interests: one for then Prime Minister Hariri (Future TV), one for Speaker of Parliament Berri (NBN), one close to President Hrawi (LBCI), and one close to Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Michel Murr (Murr TV). Thus the media and other structural bulwarks of a civil society are attenuated, leaving the field to the "non-civil" (or at best "semi-civil") institutions of religion, sect, clan, patriarchy, and plutocracy. This is the political field on which the troika leaders have played their parochial games.

Coherent public policymaking also suffers in this deformed institutional setting. The country's current economic crisis is a case in point. According to the Paris-based Lebanese economist Georges Conn, "Mr. Hariri's management record is cause for dismay" (Corm 1998). While the prime minister beguiled the international financial community with his showcase project - the reconstruction of Beirut's central business district - he eased the tax burden on the rich while increasing it on the poor, and permitted the debt burden to reach astronomical levels (with a gross domestic product of $13 billion in 1997 the total public debt was more than $15 billion). Middle-class Lebanese regularly lament the demise of the middle class in Lebanon and point to the growing ostentation of the super-rich while the poor seem to get both poorer and more numerous. These trends are even more depressing when viewed against the post-civil war social situation in Lebanon. According to Antoine Haddad (1995), some 28 percent of Lebanese families now live below the poverty level, and in the main urban centers there are an estimated 750,000 poor, of which 90,000 are "extremely poor." Parliamentary opposition is too weak and unstructured to mount significant criticism of these problems. There is little parliamentary oversight of revenues and expenditures. Because other key za'ims have gained control of their own shares of the government pie, they are less likely to join in any concerted oppositional attack on corruption and mismanagement. Hariri and the Sunnis are said to control the substantial funds of the Committee on Development and Reconstruction (CDR), but Shiite leaders control the funds of the Council for the South, and Walid Junblat, the Druze leader, controls the Fund for Displaced People - the some 700,000 (mainly Christians) driven out of the Shuf in the intersectarian fighting in 1983. Economic policy rationality has been further inhibited by the particular rivalry between Hariri and Berri over patronage and civil service issues. Corm suggests that, as the Christians lose ground, there is increasing competition between the Sunnis and the Shiites for the resources of the state.

If "within the system" parliamentary and press opposition is ineffectual, it is reasonable to ask whether protest could arise "outside the system" if socioeconomic conditions do not improve. The Lebanese Confederation of Labor Unions has threatened general strikes and continues to lobby for massive salary increases for workers. A Lebanese journalist, Carole Dagher, recently observed that sectarian antagonism on the popular level may be re-emerging, at least if crowd behavior at recent sports events is a valid indicator. Early in 1998 when a Lebanese soccer team (backed by Hariri) played a visiting Iranian team, the largely Shiite fans cheered for the Iranians, and in a basketball game between local Christian and Muslim teams the fans started insulting each other. Is it any wonder, then, that, while Syria's "hegemonic" role is widely resented in Lebanon, even some Lebanese who resent it wonder whether Lebanon would retain its post-Ta'if stability without it?

LEBANON'S "NEW REPUBLIC": AN ASSESSMENT

Enough time has elapsed since the Ta'if Accord (1989) and the end of the fighting (1990) for the main contours of Lebanon's "new republic" to become evident, making at least a preliminary assessment possible. In doing so it is important to note that Lebanese politics is not simply a matter of sectarian power-sharing. One must also consider socioeconomic cleavages, patronage and clientelism, ideological movements, and extraordinary external involvement.

That said, however, there is no escaping the centrality of sect. Ironically, despite the marginalization of "clerical" leaders like the Maronite Patriarch, the Sunni Grand Mufti, and the President of the Higher Shiite Council, and despite the ubiquity of intra-sectarian cleavages, the mythology of sectarianism not only persists but has probably become stronger as a result of fifteen years of often savage internal warfare. Ta'if in theory restores a consociational sectarian order, albeit with salutary alterations in the power-sharing formula, but it also explicitly states a procedure for ending institutionalized sectarianism. Yet Ta'if in practice thus far has ignored that procedure or any other for desectarianizing the political system. Furthermore, Ta'if in practice appears to have deepened sectarian segmentation, especially in the top executive institutions. In prewar Lebanon, during the relatively tranquil periods, the President of the Republic, although a Maronite, also enjoyed widespread support from the Muslim communities. But in postwar Lebanon executive power is distributed among a "troika" whose leaders are more narrowly identified with their respective sectarian constituencies: Prime Minister (Sunni), Speaker of the Parliament (Shiite), and President of the Republic (Maronite).

SECTARIANISM: RESURGENT AND UNEASY

If one could analyze the mood and concerns of the country's major sects in the post-Ta'if period so far, one would probably find a general lack of confidence in the reconstituted institutions of government combined with a heightened concern about sectarian status and security. Some, to be sure, are more unhappy than others.

The Maronites are significantly disaffected. Stung by Ta'if's diminution of their former formal hegemony, they have been even more disturbed by Syria's post-Ta'if behavior. Many believe that the Syrians were responsible for the assassinations of two (Maronite) presidents: Bashir Gemayel in 1982 and Rene Moawad in 1988. Much of the traditional Maronite aristocracy is disaffected, including the Gemayel, Shamun, and Edde families. And the younger generation of Maronite populists who had worshiped General Aoun are biding their time, waiting for the opening that would give them revenge for Syria's crushing of the Aounist crusade in 1990. To be sure there are some respected centrist Maronites operating "within the system" (such as Nassib Lahoud, former ambassador to Washington), but on the whole the once-proud Maronites are feeling defeated and marginalized. Given the polarization of Lebanese politics over the course of the civil war, some Maronites also have had to bear the burden of their collaboration with the Israelis; and given the popular attitude toward the Israelis (especially after their brutal bombardment of southern Lebanon and Beirut in April 1996) it does not make the task of inter-confessional reconciliation any easier.

At the other end of the ideological spectrum, the Shiites find themselves united against Israel but ambivalent about post-Ta'if Lebanon. To be sure, the Shiite speaker of the parliament now enjoys a longer term and more influence. Shiite officers are also more prominent (along with Maronites) in the reconstituted Lebanese army officer corps. But the more militant Shiite revolutionaries (those who had been influenced by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini) must be wondering whether the civil war, with all its suffering, has really led to an improvement in the hitherto downtrodden condition of the Shiites in Lebanon. Clearly, the Shiite community is divided. On the most militant extreme are the partisans of Hizballah, even though their spiritual guide, Shaykh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, has withdrawn Hizballah's earlier demand to make Lebanon a Muslim state. Despite its strong Iranian backing, Hizballah is now reaching out to other Lebanese communities and trying to present itself as a peaceful nongovernmental organization, committed to social welfare projects and "normal" political party participation. Hizballah has won considerable prestige from other Lebanese communities for its aggressive resistance activities against the Israeli occupation in south Lebanon. Closer to the middle of the ideological spectrum is the Shiite Amal movement, led by Nabih Berri. Closely linked to Syria, Amal provides a useful check against Hizballah (over which the Syrians may have had some apprehensions) and also an instrument against the Palestinian guerrilla organizations. Even though Hizballah has considerable representation in Parliament, it is Amal that has the biggest influence in the post-Ta'if Lebanese government. Another, and more moderate, tendency among the Shiites is represented by Shaykh Mahdi Shamseddine, president of the Higher Shiite Council and a leader with good connections to the Maronites, to the Shiites in the army officer corps, and to the Americans. For the time being the traditional Shiite zu'ama', led by Kamel al-As'ad, are sidelined. On balance, the Shiites probably feel that they have not gained enough from the civil war, especially in that they are the largest single sectarian community in the country.

The Sunni Muslims, on the whole, must feel considerable satisfaction with Ta'if and the position of their community. Considering that they had dominated Lebanon of the pre-civil war "golden age" (albeit in second position behind the Maronites), and considering also that they had never been able to field a militia presence comparable to those of the Maronites, Shiites, and Druze during the civil war, they have emerged as the principal sectarian winners in the constitutional "fine-tuning": their leader, the prime minister, is now primus inter pares in the troika along with the Maronite president and the Shiite speaker of parliament. In Rafiq al-Hariri the Sunnis had a dynamic, wealthy, and well-connected prime minister. Even though he was not widely popular, Hariri's commercial connections and his leadership in the redevelopment of Beirut's devastated downtown business district made him a figure to reckon with. In the Republic of Ta'if, the Sunnis obviously have considerable leverage. The Sunnis also fielded a respected opposition candidate, Salim al-Hoss, with numerous regional and international supporters. Why, one might ask, should such a prominent Sunni have been in the opposition? Clearly it was not because he felt his sect was under-represented. He criticized the domination of the country by a small (multi-sectarian) group of wealthy businessmen and notables who in his opinion were choking off full democratic participation, especially from secular, progressive elements.

The Druze could not have been very happy with these arrangements. Although their principal leader, Walid Junblat, holds a cabinet position (albeit a secondary one), the community is not substantially represented in the higher reaches of the civil service or the military. Moreover, Junblat is challenged on traditional grounds by the Yazbaki faction within the Druze community. The Yazbaki Druze include some of Lebanon's most prominent businesspeople and intellectuals, but Junblat has sought to keep them out of politics and even out of the country. The Druze traditionally have played a role in Lebanon far beyond their meager demographic weight (around 7 percent of the population), but this role seems to be shrinking. Indeed, Junblat had to work hard to have the electoral laws of 1992 and 1996 written in a manner to give him a safe seat in the mixed Maronite-Druze governorate of the Shuf.

Although a certain uneasy sectarian balance seems to have been restored, the instrument of that restoration - a Syrian-influenced, clientelistic, wealthy ruling coalition, only semi-legitimized by flawed elections - both generates new problems and exacerbates existing ones. First, as we have noted, executive and legislative power in post-Ta'if Lebanon is concentrated in the troika. But the degree of distrust among those leaders and their preoccupation with clientelistic concerns over public policy appear to account for the government's lackluster and uneven governmental performance (Kamel Shehadi in Lebanon Report 1996: 18). Second, the government's efforts to curtail the news media and to marginalize the opposition through electoral manipulations risks generating a popular backlash of the kind that toppled two Lebanese presidents (Khoury and Shamun) in the past. Third, then Prime Minister Hariri was accused by the enfeebled opposition of running Lebanon as if it were one of his many businesses. By bypassing the traditional political and administrative establishment he made enemies both in his own community and outside it. Traditional Lebanese politicians do not easily accept being bypassed by technocrats and nouveau-riche entrepreneurs with business school diplomas. This is something General Fuad Shihab discovered to his dismay back in the 1960s. Fourth, there does not appear to have been any significant development of the institutions of civil society since the end of the civil war. There is still no party system and no individual parties with any kind of national constituency. While there are numerous traditional and modern NGOs, there is little evidence that they affect the policymaking process. And the government's clampdown on the media hardly encourages the development of a "public sphere" in Lebanon. Fifth, while the country has made considerable progress in reconstruction and in overall economic growth, there is a growing problem related to economic inequality. In the summer of 1995 there was major labor unrest, and another crisis in March 1996 was only averted by the military declaring a curfew to prevent bloody strife between striking laborers and the government security forces. The Hariri government, as we have noted, gave priority to the development of Beirut's devastated central business district while neglecting the growing - and increasingly visible - problem of disparities between rich and poor. Considering the catastrophic disruptions caused by fifteen years of internal conflict, the country has problems of poverty, homelessness, and unemployment that would challenge far more wealthy governments. In Lebanon, acute economic crises can explode into sectarian political conflicts.

HOSTAGE TO THE "PEACE PROCESS"

The last "hot war" theater of the Arab-Israeli conflict is Lebanon. In April 1996 Israel launched a 16-day operation, "Grapes of Wrath," against Lebanon that cost the country some $500 million, displaced around 500,000 civilians, damaged 130 industries, killed between 170 and 200 people, and wounded 400 ("What Did Grapes of Wrath Cost," 1996). Notwithstanding United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 (1978), which demanded Israel's unconditional withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the Israeli occupation was still in place twenty years later. The Arab-Israeli "peace process," initiated in Madrid in 1991 and reinvigorated by the Oslo agreement of 1993, had led to a certain engagement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, thus obviating the casus belli between Israel and Lebanon. Having occupied Lebanon to liquidate the PLO, Israel now found itself suffering increasing losses from the guerrilla operations of an authentically Lebanese movement, Hizballah. Yet Lebanese diplomacy was, and is, entirely subordinated to Syrian policy. With the breakdown of the so-called "peace process" in 1996, the progress that had been made between Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights came to an end, and so did any prospects for the Lebanese-Israeli "track" in the peace process. But in 1998 the Israeli government began sending out signals that it was ready to consider a withdrawal from south Lebanon, in accordance with Resolution 425, if its security conditions could be met. Lebanon and Syria received these signals with the greatest skepticism, insisting on an unconditional withdrawal. Without a resumption of the Syrian-Israeli negotiations over the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan Heights, however, it did not seem likely that the south Lebanon situation would be normalized. Consequently, Lebanon appeared fated to have to deal indefinitely with a state of tension and endure the attendant economic, developmental, and political burdens. The problem of the south discourages investment and reconstruction, not only in the south itself but in Lebanon as a whole. It also prevents solution to the social dislocations of two decades of armed conflict. And on the political level it perpetuates the anomalous situation of Hizballah as the primary Lebanese resistance force against the Israelis and their local proxy, the South Lebanon Army. Hizballah is allowed to function as an armed militia for this purpose, even though all the other militias of the civil war period have been more-or-less disarmed; but it also has sought to redefine itself as a normal political party within the mainstream of public and parliamentary life. But the asymmetry of an armed party driven by a Shiite Islamist ideology (albeit toned down from its earlier years) competing in the Lebanese political arena generates tensions and apprehensions elsewhere in the system.

Finally, the issue of the 300,000-350,000 Palestinians resident in Lebanon remains highly contentious (Hudson 1997). Without movement on permanent status issues (including refugees) between Israel and the Palestinians, it is difficult to envision a solution to this problem. Most Lebanese resent having had their country drawn in as a proxy battleground between Israel and the PLO from the 1960s to the 1980s; and so the idea of tawtin (permanent resettlement and even naturalization) of Palestinians in Lebanon is anathema. But the Palestinians' goal of 'awda (return to what is now Israel and/or the Palestinian state-to-be in the West Bank and Gaza) is rejected so far as Israel is concerned and deemed by many specialists as demographically and economically unfeasible for the Palestinian areas alone. Many Christian Lebanese especially are worried that the Palestinians could once again disrupt the country's political stability and once again pose a national security problem.

LEBANON'S FUTURE AND THE LIMITS OF POWER-SHARING

It is hard to avoid concluding that postwar Lebanon's political recovery has been only partly successful. The most important achievement has been peace and quiet. People have had time to recover from the depression induced by years of civil strife. For a time they were optimistic if not euphoric about the bright possibilities for recovery. Even before real stability had been achieved, overseas Lebanese investment capital was beginning to return home. Reconstruction of Beirut's central business district, despite criticism, was moving ahead dramatically. But in the late 1990s, on both the political and economic levels, things are not so bright. Even though there have been salutary adjustments to the old consociational formula, there has been no progress toward dismantling the system of confessional representation. And casting its shadow over the entire political scene is the continuing presence of external powers in Lebanon. Israel's occupation in south Lebanon continues to generate instability and misery - as the devastating bombardments in 1996 illustrate once again. Syria thus has a continuing rationale for keeping its own forces in Lebanon - not as an occupier but as a "sister." Similarly, Hizballah is allowed - even encouraged - to maintain its militia as the only possible armed resistance movement against the occupation. None of this is good for the normalization of political life. But we should not be completely pessimistic. Ta'if was, after all, not just a return to consociationalism, with all its negative side-effects, but also a call for deeper structural reforms in the Western liberal mode, which might (if enacted in phases) move Lebanon beyond political confessionalism toward a more legitimate and effective system of governance. Were this "consociationalism-plus" model actually being implemented, one might be more optimistic. One can make a case for a consociational-type sectarian bargaining formula at certain historical moments. One such moment was independence in 1943, and the National Pact provided "growing time" for the new republic. Another such moment was in 1989, when the Ta'if Accord bought time for the embattled and embittered sects to reconstitute a viable unified state. But in both cases the power-sharing solution outlived its usefulness and in fact impeded what might have been the transition to a more inclusive political order that would provide not just for sectarian participation but for the growth and integration of a larger, more complex civil society into the body politic.

A decade after the Ta'if Agreement, Lebanon stands at a crossroad. The Lebanese urgently need to confront their political future with clarity and realism. The country's modern history suggests that while "muddling through" may have short-term tactical benefits, it has disastrous long-run consequences. If no serious effort has been made in the last ten years to undertake the reform of the confessional system mandated by Ta'if, why should anyone suppose it will happen at all? Can the present political order - characterized, as we have seen, by heightened confessional chauvinism, weak institutions of political participation, low policymaking and administrative capabilities, and government by troika - cope with the growing economic and financial problems, postwar social inequalities, and a truly difficult regional security environment? Lebanon needs strong executive leadership legitimized on a national, civic basis and not just on sectarian and patronage-based constituencies. It also needs a stronger, fairer electoral system (at the municipal as well as parliamentary level) and one that encourages the development of nationwide political parties with cross-confessional support and non-confessional orientations. To be sure, those Lebanese and foreigners who compare Lebanon favorably to many other political systems in the region have a point. But that does not ensure that Lebanon can avoid another political catastrophe in the years ahead that will once again make it the object of pity by its neighbors rather than envy.

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Michael C. Hudson is Professor of Political Science at Georgetown University. An earlier version of parts of this essay were published in "Trying Again: Power-Sharing in Post-Civil War Lebanon," International Negotiation 2, no. 1 (1997): 103-22, reprinted by permission of the publisher, Kluwer Law International, The Hague.