摘要：Labor unions play an important role in debates about smoke-free worksites. We investigated the role of flight attendants and their unions in creating smoke-free air travel. We used case study methodology to search tobacco industry documents and labor union periodicals and to interview key informants (i.e., people identified as having first-hand information and experience in the campaign to make airlines smoke free). We then compared findings across these data sources. Tobacco industry strategies against the establishment of smoke-free worksites failed in the case of airlines, largely because of the efforts of flight attendants and their unions. Other factors contributed to the failure but likely would have been insufficient to derail industry efforts without strong stands by the flight attendants. This case illustrates the potential for successful partnerships between unions and tobacco control policy advocates when developing smoke-free worksite policies. IN 1989, THE US CONGRESS banned smoking on domestic flights of 6 hours or less. This ban followed a 1987 ban that made flights of 2 hours or less smoke free. While airline cabins are public spaces, they are also workplaces, and the law represented the first—and so far only—federal legislation that regulates workplace smoking. In 1986, Congress rejected the Stevens Bill, which proposed that all federal workplaces be smoke free; so why did it ban smoking on airliners? The tobacco industry has understood the role that labor unions play in smoke-free work-sites since early 1980, when it formed coalitions with sympathetic labor unions. 1 The Tobacco Institute (TI), which lobbies for US tobacco companies, and 5 unions that had contracts with the industry formed the Tobacco Institute Labor Management Committee (LMC) in 1984. 2 The Labor Management Committee’s goal was to block smoke-free worksite legislation and increases in tobacco taxes. 3– 5 The TI had a 4-part strategy for contesting smoke-free policies, and its alliance with labor unions facilitated this strategy. In a 1987 speech about the TI’s lobbying activities during the 1980s, Peter Sparber, vice president of TI, outlined its strategy: “Broaden the public issue to overall indoor air quality.” “Challenge the scientific community to deal honestly with ETS [environmental tobacco smoke].” “Demonstrate the many unintended … negative … economic and social ramifications of smoking restrictions.” “Rely on third parties to communicate our point of view.” 6 The tobacco industry’s strategy for preventing smoke-free US airlines was not as successful as its strategy with other US worksites 7– 10 and international airlines. 11 We examined why the industry’s strategy failed in the case of smoke-free US airlines by focusing on the role that flight attendants and their unions played. By becoming advocates for smoke-free airlines, the flight attendants, tobacco control advocates, and political leaders successfully facilitated congressional action. This case parallels current debates about smoke-free restaurants and bars, 7 where the workplace intersects with public space and where unions make a difference.
