摘要：In 1984, the tobacco workers’ union and the Tobacco Institute, which represents US tobacco companies, formed a labor management committee (LMC). The institute relied on LMC unions to resist smoke-free worksite rules. In a review of the internal tobacco industry documents now publicly available, we found that the LMC succeeded for 2 primary reasons. First, the LMC furthered members’ interests, allowing them to overcome institutional barriers to policy success. Second, the LMC used an “institutions, ideas, and interests” strategy to encourage non-LMC unions to oppose smoke-free worksite rules. While public health advocates missed an opportunity to partner with unions on the issue of smoke-free worksites during the era studied, they can use a similar strategy to form coalitions with unions. In 1984, the Bakery, Confectionary and Tobacco Workers International Union (BC&T) and the Tobacco Institute, a trade association representing US tobacco companies, formed a labor management committee (LMC) to work on issues of joint concern. Eventually, 4 other unions contracting with US tobacco companies—the Machinists, Carpenters and Joiners, Sheet Metal Workers, and Firemen and Oilers—also joined the LMC. In 1987, Samuel Chilcote, president of the Tobacco Institute, summarized the LMC’s functions: (1) lobbying and briefing elected officials at all levels of government (primarily at the federal level), (2) discouraging liberal and labor coalitions from taking antitobacco positions, (3) building support for industry positions throughout the labor movement, and (4) communicating with the public. 1 The LMC primarily worked to prevent passage of 2 types of legislation—excise taxes and workplace smoking restrictions—and remained in existence for nearly 20 years. Political coalitions persist when they help member organizations overcome institutional challenges in political arenas. 2 In the case of the tobacco industry, the LMC used its union connections with liberal policymakers to further the industry’s policy goals, including opposing smoke-free worksites. For the trade unions, the industry was a rich ally with conservative political connections. The LMC, as is true of many business–labor committees, was perceived as a mutually beneficial alliance by its members. As of mid-2004, 3 7 states (California, Delaware, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, and New York) and more than 74 municipalities had passed complete smoke-free worksite laws, including smoke-free bars and restaurants, and in many of these cases trade unions supported those laws. 4 , 5 Conversely, as recently as 1995, only 8% of union locals included in a nationally representative survey sample actively opposed indoor smoking restrictions. 6 But throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the LMC—the voice of 5 national trade unions—helped create labor opposition to smoke-free worksites, and this effort was particularly effective at the federal level. To date, the US Congress has passed only 1 smoke-free worksite bill, which mandates smoke-free airplanes. 7 The persistence of the LMC makes its history an excellent case study in how political coalitions form and endure. Here we analyze how the tobacco industry used a potentially volatile and no-win issue such as workplace smoking to craft alliances with significant elements of organized labor. While the LMC dealt with both worksite smoking rules and excise taxes, we focus here on smoke-free worksites to allow a more thorough exploration of coalition issues. The next 2 sections of this article lay out the theoretical framework and methods used to analyze the LMC. These sections are followed by a discussion of the LMC’s history and an analysis of how the Tobacco Institute maintained the committee for nearly 20 years. We conclude with a discussion of what public health and tobacco control advocates might learn about coalition building by studying how the Tobacco Institute, ironically, used a health issue to create a coalition that helped to block restrictions on worksite smoking.
