摘要：Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. For example, passports are no more pure paper documents. Instead, they contain a chip that stores additional information such as pictures and fingerprints of their holder. In order to ensure privacy, these chips include a mechanism, i.e. a cryptographic protocol, that does not let the passport disclose private information to external users except the intended terminal. This is just a single example but of course privacy appears in many other contexts such as RFIDs technologies or electronic voting.
Formal methods have been successfully applied to automatically analyse traditional protocols and discover their flaws. Privacy-type security properties (e.g. anonymity, unlinkability, vote secrecy, ...) are expressed relying on a notion of behavioural equivalence, and are actually more difficult to analyse than confidentiality and authentication properties. We will discuss some recent advances that have been done to analyse automatically equivalence-based security properties, and we will review some issues that remain to be solved in this field.
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