期刊名称：Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology
印刷版ISSN：1414-4247
电子版ISSN：1808-1711
出版年度：2018
卷号：22
期号：1
页码：113-138
DOI：10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p113
语种：English
出版社：Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil
摘要：In the field of logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs), the notion of “consistency” is frequently too broad to draw decisive conclusions with respect to the validity of many theses involving the consistency connective. In this paper, we consider the matter of the axiom ( cc ) 0 — i.e. , the schema ◦ ◦ ϕ —by considering its interpretation in contexts in which “consistency” is understood as a type of verifiability. This paper suggests that such an interpretation is implicit in two extracanonical LFIs—Sören Halldén’s nonsense-logic C and Graham Priest’s cointuitionistic logic daC—drawing some interesting conclusions concerning the status of ( cc ) 0 . Initially, we discuss Halldén’s skepticism of this axiom and provide a plausible counterexample to its validity. We then discuss the interpretation of the operator in Priest’s daC and show the equivalence of ( cc ) 0 to the intuitionistic principle of testability. These observations suggest that it may be fruitful for members of the LFI community to look outside the canon for evidence concerning the adoption of principles like ( cc ) 0 .
关键词：Logics of formal inconsistency;Nonsense logic ;Priest–da Costa logic;Consistency operators;Verifiability
其他关键词：Logics of formal inconsistency;Nonsense logic;Priest–da Costa logic;Consistency operators;Verifiability
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