标题：Lack of strategic service provisioning by Pederson’s cleaner shrimp (Ancylomenes pedersoni) highlights independent evolution of cleaning behaviors between ocean basins
摘要：Marine cleaning interactions have been useful model systems for exploring evolutionary game theory and explaining the stability of mutualism. In the Indo-Pacific, cleaner organisms will occasionally "cheat" and remove live tissue, clients use partner control mechanisms to maintain cleaner honesty, and cleaners strategically increase service quality for predatory clients that can "punish" more severely. The extent to which reef communities in the Caribbean have evolved similar strategies for maintaining the stability of these symbioses is less clear. Here we study the strategic service provisioning in Pederson's cleaner shrimp (Ancylomenes pedersoni) on Caribbean coral reefs. In the Gulf of Honduras, we use video observations to analyze >1000 cleaning interactions and record >850 incidents of cheating. We demonstrate that A. pedersoni cheat frequently and do not vary their service quality based on client trophic position or cleaner shrimp group size. As a direct analog to the cleaner shrimp A. longicarpus in the Indo-Pacific, our study highlights that although cleaning interactions in both ocean basins are ecologically analogous and result in parasite removal, the strategic behaviors that mediate these interactions have evolved independently in cleaner shrimps.
