摘要：The stock options for employees who have the advantage of being able to participate in the future valuation of the company are at the heart of financial crises and corporate scandals related mainly to the manipulation of financial statements. In view of the new provisions such as those of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and Basel III (2010), among other objectives, there is a need to ensure greater transparency in the management of companies. In this sense, the present study sought to evaluate the level of disclosure of financial institutions after the 2008 financial crisis of employee payment programs. The sample consisted of the main banks of 33 countries, the so-called “big ones to break” that are more likely to absorb public resources as a way to avoid their bankruptcy, totaling a total sample of 172 institutions. The quality of the information was measured by the unit sum of items present or not in the financial statements, it was sought to establish a classification to punctuate individual countries and institutions regarding the practices of disclosure through a set of qualitative and quantitative information that were in the notes explanatory The results indicate that the disclosure level is influenced by Gray’s (1988) model cultural group, with the emphasis of the Anglo-Saxon cultural group on the quality of the information and the uniformity of the results. It was observed that adherence to these remuneration programs is influenced by the size of the economy of the countries, with the exception of countries like Germany, Mexico and India.
