出版社：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
摘要：Empirical research on preferences about the formation of electoral coalitions is focused on ideologically proximate parties. In this paper I argue that electoral coordination also takes place between ideologically nonproximate parties, but with similar derived preferences. To test this argument I examine the case of an electoral coalition between antagonistic parties, Solidaritat Catalana —formed by carlistas, regionalistas and republicanos— in the 1907 national election. I employ a model of electoral coordination. The empirical analysis relies on information about Solidaritat Catalana, the electoral law, and the results of the 1901, 1903, 1905 and 1907 national elections and the March 1907 province election.
关键词：Coordinación electoral;Expectativas;Incentivos;Preferencias derivadas;Tasa de descuento
