首页    期刊浏览 2024年11月25日 星期一
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Relación entre gobierno corporativo, control familiar y desempeño en empresas colombianas
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Diógenes Lagos Cortés ; Jose Betancourt Ramírez ; Gonzalo Gómez Betancourt
  • 期刊名称:Revista Innovar Journal Revista de Ciencias Administrativas y Sociales
  • 印刷版ISSN:2248-6968
  • 出版年度:2018
  • 卷号:28
  • 期号:69
  • 页码:85-98
  • DOI:10.15446/innovar.v28n69.71698
  • 语种:Spanish
  • 出版社:Universidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Bogotá
  • 摘要:Corporate governance seems to have a positive effect on business performance as a tool to minimize agency problems. This paper studies the relationship between corporate governance, family control and financial performance in Colombian companies. Through the generalized method of moments (GMM), this relationship was estimated in a balanced data panel for 104 companies registered in the National Registry of Securities and Issuers (RNVE, in Spanish) during the 2008-2014 period. Analyzed companies were classified as a family business (FB) when a family was identified as majority controlling shareholder. Performance was measured by the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE). The 41 practices recommended in the Country Code were used in order to measure the corporate governance level. It was found that only those practices referring to the board of directors are related to roa, while in the case of the roe no evidence of any of the corporate governance practices was found. Regarding the family character, it was found that when a family is the first controlling shareholder companies show a higher performance. However, no relationship with performance was observed when the first two controlling shareholders are families.
  • 关键词:desempeño financiero;empresa familiar;endogeneidad;gmm;gobierno corpo¬rativo;junta directiva;conselho diretor;desempenho financeiro;empresa familiar;endogeneidade;Generalized Method of Moments;governança corporativa
  • 其他关键词:Financial performance;family business;endogeneity;gmm;corporate governance;board of directors
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有