Introduction

Indigenous communities across Canada, and within the province of British Columbia, have pursued self-determination with increasing success in recent decades. Punctuated by high-profile court rulings and assertions of rights and title, a hard-fought progression has enabled several Indigenous communities to move toward self-determining governance systems and advance their political and economic wellbeing (Cornell and Kalt 1998; Papillon 2011).

Many Indigenous communities own businesses for the purpose of economic development that meets community goals (Cornell 2006; Booth and Skelton 2011; Anderson 2014; Nikolakis and Nelson 2015) such as employment for community members, access to training and skills development and financial transfers to support programs and service delivery. Effective self-governance is often understood to require strong and sustainable economic development (Cornell and Kalt 1998; Anderson, Dana, and Dana 2006; First Nations Leadership Council and B.C. Ministry of Economic Development 2007) and creating and sustaining productive enterprises is one of the most powerful tools that an Indigenous community can use to break free of dependency on outside governments (Cornell 2006; Boyd and Trosper 2010). The objectives of economic development may range from creating employment for community members, providing access to training and skills development to more strategic goals, including developing own source revenues to re-establish autonomy and authority over decision-making and traditional lands and resources.

Much of the literature exploring Indigenous economic development has emphasized the importance of separating business from politics, such that it now appears a commonly accepted "wise practice" (Sixdion 1997; Auditor General of Canada 2003; Martin 2003; Tulk 2013; Stanley 2015; Poelzer and Coates 2015). To achieve separation, many Indigenous communities in Canada have established semi-autonomous Indigenous economic development corporations (EDCs) that oversee business operations with the goal of returning profit or other benefits to the community (Wilson and Alcantara 2012; Tulk 2013; CCAB 2015). These EDCs are owned by the community but intended to operate independently of political decision-making (Cameron 1990; Atkinson and Nilles 2008; Ratcliff & Company 2014). While having some degree of separation between business and politics is highly correlated with success of Indigenous community-owned businesses (Jorgensen and Taylor 2000; Nikolakis and Nelson 2015), complete separation can result in lack of communication and generate misunderstandings that can equally harm economic prospects (Trosper et al. 2008; Booth and Skelton 2011). Cornell and Kalt (2003) note that successful Indigenous economic development places "management in the hands of appointed boards of directors that are accountable to [political leaders] in the long run, but are genuinely independent of it in the day-to-day management of business operations." This article examines the practicalities of this situation, asking: how do Indigenous communities create governance systems that provide both accountability and separation?

Indigenous EDCs can also be considered part of a broader set of social enterprises (SEs), defined as hybrid organizations that pursue both economic and social objectives (Anderson, Dana, and Dana 2006; Volynets 2015). Interest in SEs has grown significantly in recent years as a tool to address persistent challenges around poverty alleviation and environmental issues and limitations of the capitalist model. When viewed through an SE lens (Mason, Kirkbride, and Bryde 2007; Doherty et al. 2009: 235), the stakeholders of an Indigenous EDC are the community members who, in conjunction with the board of directors of an EDC, provide strategic direction to business managers.

The literature on corporate governance of SEs provides a starting point for this exploration. In addition to ensuring successful delivery of social and economic benefits, SEs must remain accountable to their stakeholders (Doherty et al. 2009: 213). Of particular concern is the risk of multiple or conflicting objectives, such as maximizing revenues and creating employment, and of choices with financial implications such as non-profit status or benefits under tax codes. The complexity of interests and goals that exist within most SEs is far from the profit maximization or shareholder value principles that may orient governance of a conventional enterprise. This can lead to mission drift (Doherty, Haugh, and Lyon 2014; Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair 2014), in which an SE drifts away from intended objectives established by its stakeholders. Accountability is presented as essential for keeping SEs on track (Montgomery and Kaufman 2003; OECD 2004; Mason, Kirkbride, and Bryde 2007; Doherty et al. 2009).

Accountability is characterized as the right of actors to hold others to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities and to impose sanctions if necessary (Grant and Keohane 2005: 29). In the context of SEs and economic development, accountability focuses on what values a business is intended to create, who should benefit from those values and how information flows between levels of governance to support monitoring of decisions and activities at each level (Plumptre and Graham 1999; Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair 2014). Accountability is particularly relevant in the context of First Nations that remain governed under the Indian Act--the regulation that governs the relationship between the Federal Government and First Nations in Canada. The Act is often criticized for offering too much power to the Federal Minister and to a Chief and Council, who can make important decisions without engaging community members (Imai 2007). For this reason, many First Nations are also restructuring their governments, in addition to their economic development efforts, to enhance accountability to community members (Alcantara, Spicer, and Leone 2012). At the furthest extent of this effort, some First Nations are pursuing self-government negotiations that will take them outside the Indian Act and place them in direct accountability to the community members. Formal processes, or mechanisms, are emphasized as important manifestations of governance institutions that can be used to control actions at each level of governance and maintain accountability to community members (Mason, Kirkbride, and Bryde 2007).

This article focuses on formal institutional mechanisms and processes used to ensure accountability in the context of Indigenous EDCs. While published literature about governance of SEs describes the importance of developing and articulating strategic direction for SEs--including the vision, mission, objectives, strategies and plans--and measuring performance (Doherty et al. 2009; Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair 2014), literature on Indigenous EDCs focuses primarily on describing the governance structure used (e.g., Cameron 1990; Atkinson and Nilles 2008; Curry, Donker, and Krehbiel 2009). The article fills a gap in the literature regarding formal mechanisms used by Indigenous EDCs to ensure accountability between four levels of decision-making: the community, political leaders, an EDC board of directors and business managers.

A literature review, expert interviews and document analysis were used to explore how formal mechanisms maintain accountability between these levels and to identify examples of these mechanisms in practice in British Columbia (B.C.), Canada. With nearly one-third of First Nations communities in Canada located in B.C., this province was chosen as the focus of this article because many communities are pursuing self-governance and economic development strategies. A historic lack of treaties, recent jurisprudence, provincial policy and important resource industries, including forestry, all appear to contribute to diversity in economic opportunities and activities. While the situation in B.C. may not be representative of Indigenous EDCs across Canada, this article presents one of the first detailed examinations of this topic and a narrow scope was deemed necessary to provide sufficient detail of analysis.

Background

Traditionally, Indigenous communities in Canada--including First Nations, Inuit and Metis communities--operated under a range of governance systems. For example, some groups adopted clan systems, recognizing the authority of elders and hereditary leaders and adhering to customary laws (Coates 2008). However, in 1876, the federal government introduced the Indian Act and sought to assimilate First Nations into colonial culture (Coates 2008; Alcantara and Spicer 2016). The Indian Act imposed new governance systems and assumed power on the part of the federal government to override traditional methods of governance (Abele 2007; Coates 2008). Federal legislation strongly influenced First Nations' governance by creating a centralized government with a single chief executive (the tribal chair or president), a one-house legislature (the elected council) and a weak or absent judiciary (Cornell and Kalt 2003; Coates 2008). Over the ensuing 150 years, colonization, expanding settlement and commercial exploitation of lands displaced Indigenous communities from their traditional territories, reduced their occupation of forestlands and limited their ability to practice traditional governance and management systems.

However, recent court cases (e.g., Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia) have strengthened Indigenous title claims and foreshadow future shifts in decision-making authority over traditional territories. These legal precedents have created opportunities for Indigenous communities to establish their own forestry businesses (Wyatt 2008; Bowie 2013; Wyatt et al. 2013), many of which are overseen by an EDC for the benefit of the community. With approximately 80 percent of First Nations communities located in Canada's forest regions (Government of Canada 2011), participation in the forest industry is a logical choice for economic development and has been encouraged by federal and provincial governments (Wyatt et al. 2010).

Some Indigenous communities also pursue participation in the forest sector as part of a broader progression toward self-governance. In such cases, access to land is critically important (Wilson and Graham 2005; Anderson, Dana, and Dana 2006; NCFNG 2009). Forestry-based development has been especially important in B.C., where the Provincial Government committed to assisting First Nations to become active participants in the forest sector through shared decision-making, revenue and benefit sharing and support for economic self-sufficiency for First Nations (First Nations Leadership Council and First Nations Forestry Council 2007; Forsyth, Hoberg, and Bird 2013; Nikolakis and Nelson 2015).

In B.C., as in the rest of Canada, access to forestlands typically occurs through forest leases, otherwise known as forest tenures, which are allocated by provincial governments and focus primarily on timber harvesting. While some Indigenous communities have directly secured control over forest lands through treaty negotiations and agreements (e.g., British Columbia and Nisga'a Nation 1999) or by proving Aboriginal title to these lands in court (e.g., Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia), the majority of harvesting rights held by indigenous communities in B.C. are in the form of smaller, short-term harvesting rights issued by the Province (Wilson and Graham 2005; Wyatt et al. 2010; Nikolakis and Nelson 2015). These short-term tenures were developed to encourage participation by Indigenous communities in the forest sector and have been described as "the most powerful tool of forest management" (Notzke 1994: 83; Wyatt et al. 2010).

However, the potential for conflict between forestry businesses and Indigenous communities exists with the former typically seeking maximum timber production, while Indigenous values for forests often involve maintaining a functioning ecosystem and spiritual relationship with the land (Booth and Skelton 2011). Indigenous communities often have distinct values and paradigms regarding land and forest resources that may come in conflict with paradigms prevalent among non-Indigenous state or provincial forest managers and industry (Wyatt 2008; Booth and Skelton 2011; Nikolakis and Nelson 2015; Nikolakis, Akter, and Nelson 2016). As stated in Manuel and Derrickson (2015:11):

"Our goal is not to simply replace Settlers Resource Inc. with Indigenous Resource Inc. Instead we are interested in building true Indigenous economies that begin and end with our unique relationship to the land. This is essential so we can be true not only to ourselves, but also to a future we share with all of the peoples of the world."

If managers of an Indigenous community-owned business diverge from the vision, values and goals of the community, the business may lose the trust and support of community members (Aboriginal Forest Industries Council 2010), even if it is able to deliver economic or other benefits (Jorgensen and Taylor 2000; Grant and Taylor 2007). For example, in 1992, members of the Meadow Lake community in Saskatchewan blockaded forestry operations of the forest management company in which they were equal owners (Chambers 1999).

Indigenous EDCs have been widely adopted to separate politics from business in the context of economic development (Cameron 1990; Atkinson and Nilles 2008; Curry, Donker, and Krehbiel 2009; Tulk 2013, CCAB 2015; Soonias et al. 2016). At the same time, stakeholder theory maintains that accountability between levels of decision-making is essential to avoid mission drift and keep SEs on track to achieve stakeholders' objectives (Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair 2014). In the case of Indigenous economic development, we identified four levels of governance, the first being Indigenous communities themselves as key stakeholders in an SE. Elected political leaders are the second level, responsible for outlining the role of Indigenous EDCs, approving annual budgets and strategic plans and appointing members of a board of directors--who are the third level of governance. Finally, business managers, hired or appointed by the Board, make operational decisions and engage in high-level communications (Cameron 1990). The existence of different levels of governance in an Indigenous EDC raises the possibility of divergent priorities between levels (Vining and Richards 2016). Thus, creating an EDC increases the need for accountability to avoid mission drift, with the challenge being how to prioritize and align interests at all levels (Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair 2014). Formal institutional mechanisms can help to direct and control behaviour of various actors, while also maintaining accountability and measuring performance (Doherty et al. 2009; Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair 2014). These mechanisms variously provide strategic direction to actors at each level. The focus of this article is, therefore, on examining and characterizing formal institutional mechanisms used by Indigenous communities to ensure accountability in the context of EDCs.

Methods

The research followed a three-stage process involving a literature review, expert interviews and document analysis to explore formal mechanisms to support communication between the four levels of decision-making involved in Indigenous EDCs. The literature review included both peer-reviewed and non-peer reviewed material on Indigenous economic development in the U.S. A and Canada. We included non-peer reviewed literature in recognition of the importance of applied knowledge and non-academic experience in the field.

Interviews were conducted with experts in the fields of Indigenous economic development and Indigenous community-owned forestry businesses to identify mechanisms of communication between levels of decision-making. The interview method was based on modified qualitative expert elicitation (Hagerman et al. 2010) with individuals who have developed specialized knowledge and expertise through their work practice (Orlikowski 2002). The approach sought to reveal a diversity of views and approaches among Indigenous communities and to address the complex nature of economic development and followed that used by Nikolakis and Nelson (2015), which identified 25 interviewees with experience managing forest resources for communities in B.C. and interviewed eighteen of them. For this study, ten interviewees were identified who possessed knowledge of Indigenous economic development and Indigenous community-owned forestry businesses in B.C. from either an operational or research perspective. Eight of these prospective interviewees agreed to be interviewed: four also possessed broad expertise in the field of Indigenous economic development in Canada at the national level as well as more specialized knowledge of Indigenous forestry businesses; while six had specific experience at the community level in B.C. through working for or with multiple EDCs. Two interviewees from the latter group had also served as elected political leaders. Three of the interviewees have published extensively in peer-reviewed journals in the area of Indigenous governance. While balanced representation of male and female experts was sought, there appear to be more men than women in this field; only one female expert was identified who was willing to be interviewed. Six of the eight interviewees self-identify as Indigenous. A list of interviewees and their characteristics is included in Table 1.

Interviews were conducted via telephone, were conversational in nature and began with a brief overview of the research topic. Interview questions were open-ended and explored interviewees' perspectives about the relationship between business and politics in Indigenous community-owned businesses, what they think is important when managing the boundary between business and politics and how they see this boundary being managed by communities. Discussions were focused on the interview protocol but followed lines of inquiry to delve more deeply into issues of importance as they emerged.

Finally, document analysis was used to validate the mechanisms and identify the frequency of their use by First Nations in B.C., thereby triangulating information from the literature and interviews (Bowen 2009). The First Nations Economic Development Database (FNEDD) provided a starting point for the document analysis. The FNEDD is maintained by the B.C. Aboriginal Business and Investment Council (2016) and contains information about more than 1,100 First Nations businesses in B.C., Canada. A keyword search for "forestry" in the FNEDD returned the names of 160 businesses whose primary activity or activities include forestry. Internet searches conducted for business names listed in the FNEDD identified 36 Indigenous economic development corporations that operate forestry businesses and associated First Nations communities. Indigenous community, EDC and forestry business websites were reviewed to compile documentation regarding formal mechanisms to support accountability used by Indigenous communities, EDCs and community-owned forestry businesses. All documents available on these websites that pertained to governance of lands and resources were compiled and analyzed using NVivo software. Coding followed a Grounded Theory approach (Strauss and Corbin 1990), which treats coding as an evolving process. Documents were initially coded according to the type of formal mechanism they represented, then detailed coding was performed to identify ways in which they contributed to accountability. Each type of formal mechanism was treated as a separate case of a formal institutional mechanism and analysis of data for each case was performed in an iterative cycle that allowed continuous comparison of new results with previous findings to inform subsequent analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1990).

Results

The expert interviews, literature review and document analysis identified seven formal mechanisms that are used to support accountability between Indigenous communities, political leaders, EDC Boards and business managers in the context of Indigenous economic development. The first three address roles and responsibilities regarding decision-making at these different levels, while the remaining four focused on processes for establishing strategic direction or reporting.

The First Nations Economic Development Database, which lists Indigenous community-owned businesses operating in B.C., was used to identify the frequency of use of these seven mechanisms in practice. We identified 56 Indigenous communities in British Columbia that operated 63 community-owned forestry businesses across the harvesting, sawmilling and consulting sectors. Of these communities, 36 had established an EDC. These communities were distributed across B.C., with nine located in the northern regions, seven located on Vancouver Island and the rest located across the southern regions of the Province. This distribution mirrors the overall geographic distribution of Indigenous communities across B.C. Four of the communities--the Nisga'a, Tla'amin and Toquaht Nations and the Uchucklesaht Tribe--have modern treaty agreements and one--the Westbank First Nation--has a self-government agreement. Table 2a and b summarize the frequency and prevalence, respectively, of formal mechanisms used by Indigenous communities in B.C. that have established an Indigenous EDC and an Indigenous community-owned forestry business. A complete list of formal mechanisms, by community, is provided in Table SI (Supplementary Material).

Of the seven mechanisms identified during the research, visions, strategic plans and reporting were the most commonly associated Indigenous community-owned forestry businesses listed in the FNEDD. Those prescribing rules or roles (e.g., constitutions, legislation, charters) were less common.

Constitutions

A constitution is a declaration that establishes the roles of community members and political leaders and ways that rules shall be made in keeping with the community's shared beliefs and values. Typically, it highlights guiding principles and values, specifies selection, jurisdiction and authority of political leaders and community members and protects individuals' rights and freedoms (Alcantara and Whitfield 2010). While Alcantara and Whitfield (2010) propose that Indigenous constitutions also represent an attempt to reconcile distinct legal traditions and constitutional orders of Indigenous and settler societies, Ladner (2005) and Borrows (2010) assert that Indigenous and non-Indigenous constitutions embody fundamentally different assumptions about authority, history, customs, rights and responsibilities and that Indigenous constitutions encompass a multitude of "oral documents" in addition to written ones.

Constitutions are typically developed through considerable engagement with the community and are subject to a ratification process. While it may not necessarily speak specifically to economic development, a constitution will influence how it occurs. Cameron (1990) suggests that the best way to ensure that an Indigenous EDC remains accountable to the community is to establish it through the community's constitution or charter because this would require support of the community when deciding to establish or dissolve the corporation.

Interviewee 2: "Some communities are thinking of having a business statement or legal charter that is built into articles of the constitution. So that both sides, governing and business, know they are moving in the same direction.

Six examples of constitutions were identified during the document review, all of which clearly established the authorities of their respective First Nation governments as well as their responsibilities to remain accountable to community members, in part through general assemblies held at least once per year.

The Constitution of the Tla'amin Nation (2009), for example, states that the Tla'amin Government, Tla'amin Public Institutions and their officials will "be accountable to the Tla'amin Nation." Among its accountability measures, the Constitution specifies that "the Tla'amin Government will establish a process for consultation with Tla'amin Citizens on issues that may impact on the collective interests and rights of Tla'amin Citizens, including [...] land use planning." Thus, land and resource decisions require input from and accountability to community members.

The Constitution of the Haida Nation establishes accountability to community members somewhat differently. This Constitution specifies that the Council of the Haida Nation "will develop and enact policies pursuant to legislation adopted at the House of Assembly and in accordance with this Constitution" (Council of the Haida Nation 2014). Since any Haida Citizen may propose and vote on policy legislation during a House of Assembly and any resolutions and motions at the House of Assembly that are supported by at least three-quarters of voting Citizens are deemed valid under the Constitution (Council of the Haida Nation 2014), the Council of the Haida Nation is directly accountable to its Citizens.

While the Constitution of the Uchucklesaht Tribe (2011) also requires the Uchucklesaht Council, as political leaders, to consult with community members on important issues, its Constitution has vested greater power in the Council than the previous two examples. The Constitution states that "The Uchucklesaht Council shall consider all resolutions passed by the Uchucklesaht People's Assembly" (Uchucklesaht Tribe 2011). Thus, the Uchucklesaht Council may exercise greater discretion in its decisions than the Council of the Haida Nation, which receives its mandate directly from Haida Citizens.

Legislation

Legislation can also formalize rules for economic development. Communities that have established self-government or modern treaty agreements may develop their own legislation to govern resource management activities within their territory (e.g., Nisga'a Lisims Government; Toquaht Nation), can make laws and these laws take precedence over those of other levels of government (Quesnel 2012).

One interviewee described the role of self-governance in Indigenous communities' ability to use this mechanism.

Interviewee 2: "They are not like other governments [...] that set up their own governing bodies that are tied back to legislation. First Nations don't have that under the Indian Act and self-governing ones are still struggling with this."

Creating legislation can enable the community to establish limits for acceptable economic development while allowing Indigenous community-owned and private businesses to be developed independent of political influence.

Document analysis identified twelve examples of legislation used by five Indigenous communities to govern lands, resources and economic development. All of these communities had established constitutions to which the legislation referred, noting that legislation must remain in accordance with the community's constitution, thereby adhering to systems of accountability outlined therein. These documents frequently emphasized Indigenous communities' connection to land and stewardship responsibility as well as social, cultural and economic objectives. Legislation served one of two purposes: to delegate decision-making authority or to establish land designations and permitted activities. The Toquaht Nation Economic Development Act aims to achieve the former, while the Westbank First Nation Land Use Lazo and Community Plan Law are geared toward the latter (Westbank First Nation 2007, 2010a).

The Toquaht Nation Economic Development Act (Toquaht Nation 2012) focuses specifically on responsibilities of individuals "who carry out economic development on behalf of the Toquaht Nation or on Toquaht lands" to maintain accountability. The Act articulates a mission and values for economic development and specifies that Toquaht businesses will "operate profitably" and "free from political interference" and "be held accountable to their owners, the Toquaht Nation" (Toquaht Nation 2012). Toquaht Nation political leaders remain responsible for overseeing economic development with input from an economic development committee that is comprised predominantly of non-political appointees (Toquaht Nation 2012). An economic development officer is responsible for communicating with political leaders and the community, through the People's Assembly, upon request by the economic development committee (Toquaht Nation 2012).

The Westbank First Nation Land Use Law and Community Plan Law, on the other hand, enact the community's Land Use Plan and Community Plan, respectively, including zones, designations and permitted activities (Westbank First Nation 2007, 2010a). Both laws maintain accountability of political leaders to the community by establishing periodic review of the Community Plan through community consultation and voting of community members on amendments to both the Land Use Plan and Community Plan (Westbank First Nation 2010b).

Memoranda of understanding, charters, terms of reference

Other options to allocate powers and authority and define respective roles include memorandums of understanding (MoU), corporate charters and terms of reference. In some cases, these arrangements may be legally binding; in others, they are less formal. An MoU may take many forms such as a Protocol Agreement, Letter of Expectations or other document that stipulates the authority of two or more levels of decision-making (e.g., Council of the Haida Nation and HaiCo 2011).

Interviewee 5: "What it does is it tries to lay out: what are our rules of engagement? And the purposes of ours are to foster an effective working relationship [...] and set out a clear division of roles and responsibilities and the parties, the company and the shareholders, respect each other."

For example, the agreement may recognize and acknowledge the role of the board of directors to manage economic development of resources within the traditional territory for the benefit of the community (e.g., Council of the Haida Nation and HaiCo 2011; Ahousaht Hawiih First Nation 2013). It may also specify conditions for that authority, such as the need to make decisions in a way that is open, transparent, equitable and accountable to all community members. A corporate or business charter, established between political leaders and the board of directors or the board or directors and business managers, may specify the objectives, roles and responsibilities of each level of decision-making and expectations regarding communications between these levels (e.g., Mistawasis First Nation 2011). It may also specify the composition of the board of directors, qualifications and selection process for directors, duration of terms in office, roles and remuneration, frequency and content of reporting by the board of directors to the political leaders and limitations on influence of political leaders over decisions by the board of directors (e.g., Union of Ontario Indians 2008).

Document analysis identified ten examples of these types of mechanisms used by seven Indigenous communities. Documents variously addressed expectations at each of the levels of decision-making, including political leaders, boards of directors and business managers, and provided clarification regarding purpose, composition, structure, authority, conduct and reporting requirements at each level to maintain accountability.

The Nak'azdli Terms of Reference for Chief and Council (Nak'azdli Nation 2005), for example, includes an explanation of the purpose of the document, citing a "lack of existing written policy, which made it difficult for new band Council members to step into their respective roles." Thus, in the case of the Nak'azdli First Nation, this document helps to clarify expectations and accountability by outlining responsibilities and rules of conduct and establishing that "assets of the First Nation belong to members collectively" and "they must be considered as 'owners' or 'shareholders'" (Nak'azdli Nation 2005).

The Protocol Agreement between Ahousaht Hawiih and Ahousaht Elected Chief and Council (Ahousaht Hawiih First Nation 2013) refers to the guiding principles of Ahousaht sovereignty, using both Nuu-chah-nulth and English languages, and asserts that the Maaqutusiis Stewardship Hahoulthee Society will "manage economic development of all resources within the Hahoulthee [traditional territory] of the Hawiih [Hereditary Chiefs] for the benefit of the Ahousaht Muschim [community members]" in a manner that is "accountable to all Ahousaht" (Ahousaht First Nation 2013). Thus, while the agreement was made between hereditary and elected political leaders, ultimate accountability remains to the community

Reporting requirements, in particular, are emphasized as establishing a chain of accountability for decision-makers. The Westbank First Nation Economic Development Commission Charter (Westbank First Nation 2016), for example, specifies that the economic development committee will "report every three (3) months to Council and at least annually to the WFN Membership on its activities," thereby establishing accountability to both political leaders and to the community. Similarly, the Haida Accord (Council of the Haida Nation 2013), which was signed by all hereditary and elected leaders of the Haida Nation, commits these leaders "To be accountable to the people by presenting factual reports and full financial disclosure on all programs and services within the Nation."

Visions

While the preceding mechanisms emphasize the roles and responsibilities of various actors, an integral part of successful economic development is identifying its purpose.

Developing a vision at the community level for economic development can be a useful starting point for effective engagement in decision-making (NCFNG 2012). Recognising that effective governance begins with the people (NCFNG 2009), visioning processes are typically initiated by political leaders, supported by others from within the community. Community members shape the vision that then guides the work in which communities and their organizations engage (NCFNG 2009). The vision itself charts the course from where the community is to where it wants to be, is relevant to present and future generations and is typically accompanied by a mission statement that describes what broad actions the community will take (Union of Ontario Indians 2008).

Two interviewees emphasized the importance of a visioning process for ensuring that all levels of decision-making move together toward shared goals.

Interviewee 3: "What goals are you trying to achieve? These would be set by the chiefs as a function of their responsibility to act on behalf of the Creator and the community."

Interviewee 2: "The people responsible for governing, do they have the same overall vision as the business and how are they communicating back to the constituents? How does the vision get disseminated on the First Nation government side and on the corporate side?"

Vision statements included in the document review articulated an overarching direction and intent for decisions and emphasized three aspects: economic development, with linkages to self-sufficiency and equality; ways of being, often stated with reference to traditional cultural values; and well-being, often with references to equality and unity.

The Stswecem'c Xgat'tem First Nation vision statement, for example, touches on all three of these aspects.

"Stswecem'c Xgat'tem is an economically and politically self-sustaining Secwepemc community living our Secwepemc culture, language, and traditions in a healthy and safe environment." (Stswecem'c Xgat'tem website)

Halfway River Group, an EDC, focuses on economic development and traditional values in its vision.

"Traditional values of respect, community and partnership, combined with innovation, performance and pride are deeply rooted in the Halfway River Group." (Halfway River Group website)

Others, such as the Council of the Haida Nation (2005), use words from their language to articulate these values, accompanied a description of their meaning in English. Guiding principles were used by Ahousaht First Nation (Ahousaht First Nation website) and Heiltsuk Economic Development Corporation (HEDC website) to clarify how the vision and values were to be operationalized by individuals in the context of economic development.

Strategic plans

Strategic plans are often developed by communities to identify goals that align with their vision and objectives. A plan may exist in the form of a strategic or economic plan, blueprint, land or resource policy or other document (e.g., Union of Ontario Indians 2008; Grand Council of the Cree 2010; Brian Payer & Associates 2015) and can help to coordinate and integrate activities across multiple industry sectors and businesses to meet community needs, while ensuring cultural uses of lands are preserved.

Strategic plans and goals can become the basis for establishing and operating a community-owned business. These goals can have specific economic objectives (e.g., diversifying in the face of competition, providing economic independence for the community) (Grant and Taylor 2007) or be culturally specific (e.g., stewardship of the land and its cultural values, protecting certain resources) (Booth and Skelton 2011; Nikolakis and Nelson 2015). The strategic plan provides a way of defining and communicating these goals to business managers, who are then held accountable to these goals (Grant and Taylor 2007).

An EDC Board may develop a strategic plan or an economic development plan that outlines the vision, mission and role of the EDC and describes an approach to achieve the strategic goals of the community (e.g. Westbank First Nation 2010b; Haida Enterprise Corporation 2011). Plans typically require review, approval and endorsement by political leaders. The plan may include a set of measurable indicators associated with each goal that can be used to monitor performance over time and provide progress updates to political leaders and the community (e.g., Haida Enterprise Corporation 2014).

One interviewee outlined the role of the strategic plan.

Interviewee 5: "The strategic plan lays out broad goals; goals are things that you can work towards. The strategic plan also contains the corporate charter, like your vision, your mandate, your core values, this is what we need to consider as we think about our strategic direction, and it will often contain a section on monitoring, a broad section on how we're going to monitor our progress."

Document review identified nineteen examples of strategic plans used by thirteen Indigenous communities to hold political leaders, the EDC Board and business leaders accountable based on a set of strategic goals and objectives outlined.

Haida Enterprise Corporation (HaiCo), an EDC owned by the Council of the Haida Nation, references the importance of accountability in its 2011-2016 Strategic Plan (Haida Enterprise Corporation 2011). The Plan outlines the intent of the document "to clarify the mandate and provide the framework and general direction of the enterprise" (Haida Enterprise Corporation 2011). The mandate itself specifies that "HaiCo will conduct its operations and businesses within the bounds of approved Strategic and Business plans" and "otherwise seek further approval of the [Haida Nation as] Shareholder" (Haida Enterprise Corporation 2011). The Plan required approval from members of the Haida Nation during the annual House of Assembly, which is a gathering open to all Haida Citizens, their spouses and invited guests (Council of the Haida Nation website). To maintain accountability to the community, HaiCo must not only obtain Haida Citizens' input and approval on its long-term goals but also undertake progress reporting, including annual reporting during the House of Assembly.

The Skeetchestn Indian Band Comprehensive Community Plan (2015) establishes a similar expectation for community engagement and defines accountability in terms of the Skeetchestn cultural values of knucwentwecw, "The Secwepemc concept and practice of helping each other," and yecxvmenstswecw, "The Secwepemc concept and practice of looking out or caring for each other." Together, these values create a responsibility for reciprocal accountability in which all Secwepemc are accountable to each other (Skeetchestn Indian Band 2015). The Plan establishes that all planning and implementation will proceed in accordance with these values.

Land use plans

Indigenous communities may develop land use plans to provide strategic direction for development in their traditional territories, for example, outlining how they should proceed with and respond to external proponents of resource development projects (Donovan & Company 2008). A land use plan may be developed to guide decisions about the timing, extent and location of permitted activities and protected areas within a community's traditional territory based on its vision and strategic plan (e.g., Heiltsuk Nation 2006; Aboriginal Forest Industries Council 2010). Community forums and planning can help to determine the core values that underpin a land use plan (Aboriginal Forest Industries Council 2010). Importantly, the plan can also help to document and communicate with businesses regarding areas of ecological, spiritual and/or cultural importance and provide greater clarity and certainty regarding the types and locations of development that the community feels are desirable and acceptable within its traditional territory (Ecotrust 2009).

Interviewee 3: "Community input [is] a form of accountability for business. Business leadership can then operationally decide what they can or cannot do on the land."

Five land use plans, each used by a different Indigenous community, were identified during the document analysis. All of the plans emphasized linkages between land use, cultural values and stewardship; however, only one of the plans, the Tla'amin Land Use Plan, explicitly referenced accountability. Other land use plans, such as the Nak'azdli Nation Stewardship Policy, tended to focus more on technical and operational information than on governance aspects.

The Tla'amin Land Use Plan (Tla'amin Nation 2010) references the Tla'amin word for accountability, Yeeqotltlet, and provides an operational definition in the context of the Plan.

"Regular and relevant reporting will be made throughout the process to elected leaders and community members with responsibility at the forefront of planning." (Tla'amin Nation 2010)

The Plan goes on to describe the governance model that has been adopted by the Tla'amin Nation, which is based on the traditional longhouse design and places the Tla'amin people "at the top in the rafters as a reminder that we are here for our people above all else" (Tla'amin Nation 2010). The Plan includes an Uhmsnah jehjeum, or forest management, land use designation, associated objectives to support both sustainable forestry as well as traditional and cultural uses of Tla'amin forest lands and a map delineating the land use zoning districts (Tla'amin Nation 2010).

The Nak'azdli Nation Stewardship Policy (Nak'azdli Nation 2015) focuses on delimiting areas in which consultation is required prior to resource development by external third parties, while the Skeetchestn Indian Band Economic Zone Land Use Plan (Urban Systems 2016) was developed to establish preferred land uses for individual areas as agreed to by Chief and Council and the community. This suggests that land use plans are most commonly used to clarify expectations of the community regarding land use and delimit areas by land use zone.

Progress reporting

Progress reporting receives less attention in the peer-reviewed literature but several interviewees described its importance between levels of decision-making, including community newsletters or newspapers, Board Chair reports or CEO reports. Progress reporting supports reflection and ongoing review of activities at all levels to ensure that they remain relevant and aligned to the vision and can be adjusted accordingly (NCFNG 2009). Performance monitoring, reporting and communication using indicators that measure outcomes associated with community values can help to maintain confidence between levels of decision-making and minimize suspicion and public criticism (NCFNG 2009). For example, business managers may provide monthly, bi-monthly or quarterly performance reports to the board of directors and even to the broader community using indicators such as area harvested, profit, reinvestment in the community, number of jobs created for community members, number of community members trained and number and area of culturally important sites protected.

Interviewee 7: "We have other cases where there are [...] regular reporting schedules, so that the Board is reporting to Council on a regular basis, [...] it could be quarterly or it could be twice a year, [...] where they're basically saying to Council, 'You asked us to go off and do x, and here's how we've done against that objective.'"

One interviewee emphasized that finding the right measurables is essential for communicating with other levels of decision-making and generating support.

Interviewee 4: "In order to report, you need to have measurables [...] How do you measure against your own values and objectives? How do we measure and bring information back to our own people? [...] I sit on many different boards and we are able to develop transparent and clear financial statements every month and these are consistent every month and we make it easy for [political leaders] to bring that info back to the community."

Thus, a key aspect of progress reporting is providing information in a way that is meaningful to the intended audience, whether it is the community, political leaders, the board of directors or business managers. Otherwise, lack of language proficiency and formal education can become barriers to some individuals and prevent them from fully understanding and engaging with the information they are provided (NCFNG 2009).

Progress reporting was one of the most widely-used mechanisms to support accountability identified during the document analysis: twenty-eight forms of reporting were used by fourteen Indigenous communities.

The Council of the Haida Nation, for example, is required under its Constitution to "keep the Citizens of the Haida Nation fully informed" (Council of the Haida Nation 2014) and produces publicly available progress reports at all levels including a community newsletter, corporate progress report and quarterly reports from the chair of the board of directors, chief executive officer and general manager.

In its Community Economic Development Plan, Westbank First Nation (2010b) explicitly commits to "accountability in governance through open and consistent communication with the Membership" in the form of "regular membership meetings, a community newsletter, quarterly reports" and other mediums of communication.

Discussion and conclusions

The seven formal mechanisms to maintain accountability that were identified during this study achieve the objective in different ways. All interviewees confirmed the importance of formal mechanisms for maintaining accountability by ensuring that businesses were perceived as generating benefits for the community and not only for the business and its employees. Many interviewees noted that, without such a connection, community members were less likely to view forestry operations favourably.

Overarching documents, such as constitutions, visions and some MoUs and charters, tended to offer commitments, declarations and high-level guidance upon which other, more specific mechanisms can be developed. These mechanisms serve to broadly orient individuals at two or more levels in the same general direction, often emphasizing cultural values and principles to establish norms of behaviour.

More specific operational and technical documents, such as legislation, land use plans, strategic plans as well as other MoUs, charters and Terms of Reference, tended to offer frameworks, establish authorities and responsibilities for one or more levels of decision-making and provide clarification and guidance to decision-makers. These mechanisms were more geared toward providing clear rules and outlining expectations of decision-makers.

While these overarching and specific documents establish systems of accountability, progress reporting was emphasized as a critical mechanism for delivering on accountability. Reporting to Indigenous community members, either regularly or upon request, and in either verbal or written form, was noted to be an important element of accountability across all other types of formal mechanisms. Written progress reports were most common in our document analysis, but we also found other examples of progress reporting at all levels of decision-making.

One important aspect that was identified by all interviewees was the need for community engagement and input into development of formal mechanisms to ensure they meet the needs of the community. Based on document analysis alone, it was not possible to determine the level of community engagement in developing the formal mechanisms included in this study. For example, several overarching visions for forestry businesses were identified; however, it was unclear from the documents how these visions were developed.

While existing literature emphasizes the importance of separating business from politics to support successful Indigenous economic development and the supporting role of EDCs, too much emphasis on separation can be detrimental. This article examines formal institutional mechanisms to maintain accountability between levels of governance in the context of Indigenous economic development corporations (EDCs), with a focus on Indigenous community-owned forestry business in the B.C., Canada. Published, peer-reviewed literature on corporate governance of social enterprises (SEs) provided a starting point for this exploration. As with other SEs, Indigenous community-owned forestry businesses must remain accountable to their stakeholders who are, in this case, Indigenous community members. Maintaining accountability can help to reduce the risk of multiple or conflicting objectives leading to mission drift, which can otherwise lead to loss of community support for a forestry business or even conflict between Indigenous community members and individuals at other levels of governance (Booth and Skelton 2011).

This study identified seven formal mechanisms that are used to maintain accountability between four levels of decision-making in the context of Indigenous EDCs: Indigenous communities, political leaders, a board of directors and business managers. Of the seven mechanisms identified, visions, strategic plans and progress reporting were the most commonly associated Indigenous community-owned forestry businesses in B.C. Those prescribing rules or roles (e.g., constitutions, legislation, charters) were less commonly used.

While this article focuses on formal mechanisms, informal mechanisms such as social and cultural norms are also important and require further exploration, particularly given oral traditions of many Indigenous communities (Tonkin 1992; Hulan and Eigenbrod 2008). Further research could investigate informal ways of improving accountability between levels of decision-making involved in Indigenous EDCs, how these could support or substitute for formal mechanisms (Martin 2003) and to what extent institutional developments related to political and economic accountability can support one another, particularly in the context of Indigenous communities pursuing self-governance.

Indigenous EDCs also provide a place to further explore important research questions related to SEs, such as how to manage for multiple values and resolve what may be conflicting objectives to prevent mission drift. In addition, the diversity of Indigenous community-owned businesses associated with EDCs, some which involve outside partners, can offer insights into how different actors within SEs manage the tensions associated with achieving multiple organizational goals (Doherty, Haugh, and Lyon 2014).

Finally, a comparative analysis of the experiences of Indigenous communities pursuing forest-based economic development in Canada, based on the methods of Cornell and Kalt (1998), could provide helpful insights regarding determinants of success. Further study on the ways that values, paradigms and knowledge of Indigenous communities can be incorporated into forest management policy is also needed as Canada moves toward self-determination and economic success for Indigenous Peoples.

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Ngaio Hotte is a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Forestry, University of British Columbia. Harry Nelson is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Forestry, University of British Columbia. Tim Hawkins is a Masters student in the Faculty of Forestry, University of British Columbia. Stephen Wyatt is a Professor in the Faculty of Forestry, Universite de Moncton. Robert Kozak is a Professor and Associate Dean, Academic, in the Faculty of Forestry, University of British Columbia. This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada. The authors also wish to thank eight interviewees for making the time to share their expertise and experience as well as three anonymous reviewers and the journal editor for their constructive feedback that greatly improved this article.

Table 1. Interviewees and Their Characteristics
Interviewee Characteristics'

1   Indigenous, Academic, Canada--outside British Columbia, 60-70
2   Non-Indigenous, Consultant, Canada--British Columbia, 40-50
3   Indigenous, Consultant, Canada--British Columbia, 30-40
4   Indigenous, Indigenous community-owned forestry business,
      Canada--British Columbia, 40-50
5   Indigenous, Indigenous community economic development
      corporation, Canada--British Columbia, 60-70
6   Indigenous, Indigenous industry association, Canada--British
    Columbia, 40-50
7   Non-Indigenous, Academic, U.S.A., 60-70
8   Indigenous, Indigenous industry association, Canada--outside
      British Columbia, 40-50

(a) Note: Characteristics are given in the following order:
Indigenous or non-Indigenous (self-identified), employment, location
and age.

Table 2. Formal Mechanisms to Maintain Accountability between Levels of
Decision-Making for Indigenous Community-Owned Forestry Businesses by 36
First Nations in British Columbia

                                          Number of First   Number of
Type of mechanism                          Nations using     examples
                                          this mechanism    identified

a) Frequency of different mechanisms
Decision-making rules & roles

Constitution                                     6               6
Legislation                                      5              12
MOU, charter, TOR                                7              10

Strategic direction and reporting

Vision, mission                                 27              30
Strategic plan                                  14              19
Land use plan                                    5               5
Progress reporting                              14              28

b) Prevalence of multiple mechanisms used by a single First Nation
Number of First Nations using

6 types of mechanisms                            2
5 types of mechanisms                            1
4 types of mechanisms                            2
3 types of mechanisms                            7
2 types of mechanisms                            8
1 type of mechanism                             16

Most common pairs of mechanisms

Vision + Progress reporting                     10
Vision + Strategic plan                          8
Vision + Land use plan                           3

Most common trios of mechanisms

Vision + Strategic plan + Progress               5
  reporting
Constitution + Legislation + Strategic           3
  plan