Minilateralism Revisited: MIKTA as Slender Diplomacy in a Multiplex World.
Kim, Sung-Mi ; Haug, Sebastian ; Rimmer, Susan Harris 等
Minilateralism Revisited: MIKTA as Slender Diplomacy in a Multiplex World.
THE INCREASING PREVALENCE OF MINILATERAL DIPLOMACY IN TODAY'S
GLOBAL order can be a costly business for governments. Over the past
decade, minilateral diplomatic mechanisms--arrangements including only a
limited number of countries--have proliferated to handle emerging
problems of deepening global interdependencies. New venues have been
sought to solve old problems outside traditional multilateral avenues,
which have become increasingly deadlock prone and anachronistic. (1)
This means that the number of international organizations, partnerships,
and initiatives that diplomats can possibly attend has increased in
tandem with the fragmentation and layering of global governance.
Few countries are adequately equipped to handle these challenges,
as few have invested in the financial and human resources of their
diplomatic apparatus sufficiently and in a timely manner. (2) It is
expensive to ensure effective strategic participation and visibility and
to pursue normative leadership. Compared to global superpowers, many
lesser powers are more likely to struggle to react and respond to--let
alone shape--seismic changes in the multilateral sphere. Their foreign
ministries tend to be overwhelmed by more immediate, high-stakes,
high-politics challenges amidst rapid shifts in their traditional
bilateral relationships and regional dynamics.
It is in this context that we approach Mexico, Indonesia, Korea,
(3) Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA), an informal, voluntary, and flexible
partnership of five Group of 20 (G-20) members outside minilateral
behemoths such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS)
and the Group of 7 (G7). Against the backdrop of a multiplex order that
has replaced a short period of liberal hegemony, (4) states are
grappling with heightened geopolitical uncertainty and deepening
interdependency by exploring alternative diplomatic instruments and new
opportunities for influence. (5) As Amitav Acharya argues, today the
"agency in building world order is more dispersed, and lies more
with the audience than with the producers (great powers)." (6)
Existing literature on minilateralism has tended to discuss the
costs and benefits ofthis "new, messy multilateralism" in
macro terms, mainly from the perspective of global governance and
related to questions about efficiency, accountability. or
forum-shopping. (7) We contribute to this literature by turning our
investigative focus to the micro backstage dynamics of minilaterals,
from the perspective of participants. With the case of MIKTA, our
analysis provides a close-up look at how members assess the
grouping's relevance and what their key motivations have been in
keeping it "alive" for the past five years. We base our
analysis on over seventy interviews with diplomats and experts from all
five MIKTA member countries, conducted between June and November 2017.
(8)
The jury is still out on whether--or to what extent--MIKTA will
come to be seen as a success or failure in terms of innovation in
multilateral diplomacy, member countries' foreign policies, or the
provision of global public goods. Our interviewees' experiences of
MIKTA ranged from calibrated enthusiasm to an overall judgment of the
grouping as "a second-row alliance." Some MIKTA officials
expressed frustration about their group's slow progress, less
effective coordination, and less impact compared to the BRICS; although,
somewhat paradoxically, they also viewed MIKTA's informality and
flexibility as the group's comparative advantage and a major
attraction for participation.
Our focus here is not to make an evaluation or conjecture about
MIKTA diplomacy per se. Instead, we hold that MIKTA's emergence and
trajectory to date provide insights into the dynamics of contemporary
minilateral diplomacy. In particular, the case of MIKTA demonstrates how
foreign ministries of countries beyond the world's superpowers
attempt to deal with the increasing complexity of the "multiplex
order," an issue of utmost relevance for practitioners and foreign
policy analysts alike. (9)
MIKTA's Design and Origins
MIKTA was created in 2013 as an initiative by foreign ministers to
create a "cross-regional consultative platform" of
"democracies that benefit from open economies... strategically
located and strongly linked to surrounding regions." The group
expressed its will and capability to "contribute to protecting
public goods and strengthening global governance" (10) by playing a
series of strategic bridging roles between developed and developing
countries and between global governance and regionalism, and by acting
as a catalyst for global governance reform initiatives. (11)
MIKTA was designed to be nimble, and is sometimes described as a
"diplomatic start-up." Without a summit process, foreign
ministers are at the apex of MIKTA activities. They meet twice a year on
average on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly or G-20 summits, and
discuss a wide range of topics of regional and global concern. MIKTA
foreign ministers last met in Buenos Aires on the margins of the G-20
foreign ministers meeting in May 2018 and exchanged views about a range
of issues, including North Korea, the situation in the Middle East,
Rohingya refugees, and postelection Venezuela. (12)
The organization of MIKTA is kept lean. It operates on a rotating
chair system, without a secretariat. Mexico took over as the first chair
of the group in 2014, followed by Korea, Australia, and Turkey in
subsequent years. Indonesia assumed the chair role in 2018 to complete
the first cycle. (13)
Over the past five years, MIKTA countries have employed a flexible
and issue-oriented approach and have issued forty-two joint statements
on a wide variety of topics (see Table 1). Various other initiatives
have been set up at both senior and junior official levels, in MIKTA
capitals and elsewhere. Multilateral missions have organized joint
policy consultations and workshops at UN headquarters and offices in New
York, Geneva, and Vienna, and at the Paris-based Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). At the bilateral level,
embassies have also organized and participated in MIKTA initiatives.
Representatives from MIKTA embassies regularly meet to discuss common
interests. Some make joint contributions to local media as part of
public outreach (e.g., in Indonesia, Portugal, Poland), and they
collaborate to organize policy seminars (e.g., in Senegal, South Africa,
Malaysia) and cultural events (e.g., in Iran, Kenya, Australia,
Azerbaijan). (14) In addition, governments encourage MIKTA collaboration
outside foreign ministry structures. Defense and trade ministers have
convened in side meetings of major global forums, and the speakers of
MIKTA parliaments have met for consultations.
When setting up MIKTA, member countries did not frame it as a
problem-solving mechanism to address a specific challenge. MIKTA was
rather conceived as broadly "solutions oriented" and as a
platform for the "force for good" in a wide range of issue
areas; there were no pressing expectations attached to it. (15) As
individual members of the G-20, MIKTA governments had a major stake in
making the G-20 work in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 global financial
crisis. (16) MIKTA's formal inception in 2013, however, happened
when the sense of imminent crisis had already faded and the G-20 had
become an increasingly embedded--although still contested--process, with
somewhat deflated political interest. (17) As a Turkish diplomat puts
it, there was "no compelling need for MIKTA to appear when it did.
MIKTA does not aim to replace or compete with existing international
institutions either. MIKTA was not created in the context of hostility
or an urgent problem."
According to the literature on multilateralism, one defining
characteristic of today's minilateral arrangements is that they are
"informal, non-binding, purpose-built partnerships and coalitions
of the interested, willing, and capable" set up to address
challenges in specific issue areas. (18) In line with this,
minilateralism is understood as a targeted approach, where a "magic
number" of countries can tackle problems with greater efficacy,
avoiding gridlock typical in large multilaterals. (19) MIKTA, by
contrast, has no straightforward specific purpose if that means
attending to a clearly identified functional need. MIKTA also differs
from other minilateral arrangements that were created as an
identity-building mechanism (e.g., with a shared sentiment toward
demands for global power redistribution such as the BRICS), and it has
not been a particularly visible caucus group within the G-20 either.
(20)
Compared to prevalent modes of minilateralism, MIKTA has--according
to representatives from member governments--operated more as a
capacity-building and diplomatic exchange mechanism. MIKTA diplomats say
that the partnership has helped to enhance bilateral relationships and
has provided opportunities for cross-regional policy learning and
resource sharing for foreign ministry officials (more below).
For MIKTA advocates, the unusual combination of members is seen as
its strength. MIKTA does not attempt to articulate a group identity
other than "bridge builder and agenda setter." Recently, the
elephant in the room among diplomats has been Turkey's growing
authoritarian tendencies, which have tarnished MIKTA's initial
self-definition as a group of "liberal democracies." (21)
Descriptions of the group as a "middle power" partnership also
do not seem to adequately reflect all of its members' development
trajectories and ideological traditions. While Australia and Korea
sometimes self-identify as "middle powers," Indonesia, for
instance, has been reluctant to embrace the term for its traditional
activism in the Non-Aligned Movement since the 1950s. (22)
Instead of bringing to the fore those apparent differences, MIKTA
seems to rely on the general assumption that, by and large, member
countries are like-minded and share similar viewpoints on world affairs.
According to a Turkish diplomat, "It happens only very rarely that
anyone of us is opposed to what another [MIKTA] member country
suggests." And a Mexican diplomat highlights that, at the G-20,
other MIKTA countries told us that whatever we [Mexico] would be able
to negotiate with the US on migration the other four would agree with;
we [Mexico] would not engage too much with climate change or
terrorism--others would take on the battle over these issues--but focus
instead all our energy on migration; and whatever would come out of our
battle with the US, all other MIKTA member countries would accept.
It is also notable that MIKTA is a noncompetitive platform. It does
not try to replace or take over functions from existing organizations,
but offers a space of exchange and coordination for a variety of
purposes. As an Indonesian diplomat argues, "The great advantage of
MIKTA is that there are no [countries with major] geopolitical ambitions
like India, China, Russia--[this is] a good attribute. We can seek to
represent the rest but not dominate the rest."
MIKTA's Rationale: Value-for-Money Diplomacy in Search for a
Global Mandate
What, then, have been the specific motivations behind MIKTA's
creation and continued existence, given that the literature usually
points toward coalitions created to solve particular issues? Our
interview data suggest that MIKTA foreign ministries have used the group
as a capacity-building and network-sharing scheme; and as a toolkit to
diversify their traditional diplomatic channels and increase global
visibility in various multilateral forums. The attraction of MIKTA seems
to rely on the fact that members get these benefits without incurring a
major additional burden to stretched ministerial budgets by keeping it
low maintenance and flexible.
Capacity-building and Network-sharing
First, member diplomats say MIKTA has been a mechanism to build
diplomatic capacities and share regional networks in a cost-effective
manner. For instance, all five MIKTA countries perceive their G-20
membership as an international call to act as "responsible global
players." But engagement with the G-20 has also led to the need to
invest to handle resource-heavy processes. The Indonesian foreign
ministry, in particular, has faced capacity issues. The ministry has
been burdened by more than 100 meetings every year in preparation for
the G-20 summit. Against this backdrop, MIKTA offers the possibility to
rely on "like-minded" partners to represent collective
positions in various multilateral spaces--at least for certain
nondivisive issues that do not immediately impact sensitive national
interests.
To further enhance diplomatic capability, MIKTA foreign ministers
have agreed to support each other's diplomatic missions through
exchange programs. MIKTA members can also send diplomats to the missions
of other members in countries where they have no diplomatic
representatives of their own. This has been particularly relevant for
Indonesia since the Indonesian foreign ministry faces serious capacity
constraints, perhaps the most serious among MIKTA countries. As
Indonesian foreign minister Retno Marsudi highlighted in a press
statement: "With this cooperation, Indonesia could send its
diplomats for internship programs to MIKTA members'
representatives, such as in the Pacific countries, Africa or Central and
South American countries, where Indonesia has no diplomatic
representatives." (23)
Increasing diplomatic capacity has been an incentive for other
MIKTA members as well. When Australia was preparing for the Commonwealth
Games in April 2018, MIKTA provided outreach networks overseas in
regions that are only lightly covered by Australian missions: "If
you undertook a mapping of diplomatic representation, MIKTA embassies
would show great global reach which no single country can achieve
alone" (Australian diplomat).
Diplomatic Diversification and Global Visibility
Second, MIKTA officials are interested in using the partnership as
an alternative avenue to diversify traditional diplomatic channels. It
functions as a global engagement platform for countries that have often
had to act alone to exercise international influence. For Korea, MIKTA
engagement is interpreted as an investment to expand Korean diplomacy
beyond the security imperatives involving nuclear weapons in North Korea
and great-power politics in Northeast Asia. As a Korean expert puts it,
"I am not an avid supporter of MIKTA diplomacy, but I can agree
that Korea needs to prepare for the future, and a developing-country
mindset of the past does not work anymore. I think it is a good idea to
keep MIKTA as a low-maintenance diplomatic instrument and a necessary
investment for the future."
Indonesia sees MIKTA as an additional diplomatic tool to leverage
its global positioning beyond the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
and to express views that are difficult to put forward as a member of
the Group of 77 bloc at the UN. For Turkey, MIKTA has presented an
opportunity to explore a more realistic engagement with global
governance. In a context where Turkey's own "exaggerated"
(Turkish expert) vision of its position in the world often has not lived
up to reality, MIKTA presents an alternative platform untainted with
"complex relations" (Turkish diplomat), in contrast to its
links with countries in Europe and the Middle East as well as the United
States. Australia welcomes MIKTA not only as a general space for
diplomatic innovation and experiments, but also as a venue where its
intricate relations with Indonesia may be reframed constructively. For
Mexico, MIKTA has offered an alternative space beyond Latin American
alliances and, more recently, an additional--if minor--mechanism for
diversifying political and economic relations in the context of its
increasingly problematic ties with the United States.
Officials also hold that MIKTA can serve as a platform for jointly
stating what member countries do not want or are not able to say
individually, and that the MIKTA backing ensures that these statements
come with more weight internationally. Many diplomats highlight that
Turkey and Australia have no "natural regional fit" and
usually have to work harder to be part of multilateral alliances. Korea
also sits in a region where regional mechanisms are underdeveloped due
to historical disputes and contested interests. Seoul diplomats
underline that MIKTA provides the country with a much-needed group
platform for discussions in New York and Geneva. An Australian diplomat
argues that MIKTA is a way to escape the "gang warfare" of the
multilateral world and work on constructive sensible solutions.
Particularly in light of G-20 dynamics between the G-7 and the
BRICS, some diplomats hold that MIKTA has a potential to become a
"ginger group." Some expect that MIKTA can be "a new
mechanism that goes beyond the slow traditional multilateral
spaces," challenging "the one-dimensionality of international
politics where the US and its allies have always called the shots"
(Turkish diplomat). MIKTA's cross-regional consultative discussions
also function as an "experimental space" (Australian diplomat)
and a "test-bed" (Korean diplomat) to estimate the potential
global reception of policy ideas against the realities of other regional
perspectives. Most diplomats agree that exchanges in the MIKTA framework
have been frank, speedy, and stimulating. According to a Korean expert,
"Since the apex of MIKTA diplomacy is the foreign ministers'
meeting, MIKTA needs to ensure a space of insight, spontaneity,
manoeuvre and flexibility for those top officials navigating
fast-changing world affairs." An Australian diplomat also remarks
that "a great advantage of MIKTA is the speed with which ministers
can agree. There can be free-flowing conversation around contentious
issues. Each foreign minister has been able to explain regional issues
and be forward-leaning."
MIKTA has also helped enhance bilateral relations among members
thanks to increased opportunities of engagement across different ranks
of ministry officials: "MIKTA membership also often functions as a
bonding opportunity among member diplomats, facilitating more open,
frequent exchange of ideas and creating opportunities of
friendship" (Korean diplomat). A Mexican diplomat underlines that
"before MIKTA it was almost irrelevant whom we would send as
Ambassador to Turkey; but now this has become an important
decision."
An Inexpensive, Flexible, Multipurpose Tool
Finally, the modus operandi of MIKTA seems suited to members'
cost-saving needs. So far, the budget allocated to MIKTA in member
governments has been minimal and MIKTA has not required much investment
in terms of resources and follow-up. MIKTA has no secretariat, few
people in member country capitals are involved with MIKTA processes on a
daily basis, and those in charge at the working level have opted for
rather informal and direct communication--mainly via e-mail--for speedy
coordination. With relatively low-level activity, MIKTA as a minilateral
tool is on standby, ready to be used if need be. This reflects MIKTA
officials' preference for looser formats that avoid binding
commitments: "Sometimes you invest a lot of political capital in an
initiative or institution, and at the end of the day all efforts lead to
nothing. This is why, for now, MIKTA's low-key engagement is
alright" (Mexican diplomat). A Korean diplomat warns that "we
need to be cautious about committing resources to diplomatic
institutions. Within the UN system and elsewhere, we have seen numerous
multilateral organizations that consume lots of resources for almost
nothing."
Diplomats seem generally concerned that institutionalization--such
as setting up a secretariat and increasing investment in terms of
financial and human resources--would transform MIKTA into a
resource-intensive bureaucratic exercise and, thus, undermine much of
MIKTA's comparative advantage.
Issue-wise, MIKTA governments have taken a broad and flexible
approach with virtually no limitations regarding the range of topics
addressed. As part of a strategy to funnel MIKTA's efforts toward
selected issues and raise visibility, officials agreed in 2016 on seven
priority areas to guide MIKTA activities: energy governance,
counterterrorism, economic and trade cooperation, governance and
democracy, sustainable development, gender equality, and UN
peacekeeping. But government officials and experts both prefer to keep
MIKTA's agenda broad and open-ended while the seven issue areas can
provide a general framework: "No matter how minor an issue appears,
it should be listened to and integrated, because we do not know which
issue will become relevant in the future" (Turkish diplomat).
The MIKTA network has also been versatile across diverse
multilateral spaces. Over the years, MIKTA's main focus seems to
have shifted away from the G-20, its birthplace. Diplomats say that at
the OECD, where country blocs do not play a major role, MIKTA action
could be geared to concentrate on specific technical initiatives. In the
UN arena, where traditional regional and ideological blocs still matter,
they argue that MIKTA's engagement should focus on concrete
initiatives that bridge divides, such as the peace and security agenda,
in cooperation with the UN Secretary-General's office.
MIKTA's Challenges: A Tepid Embrace
MIKTA's main dilemma is that a too systemized and stringent
approach can backfire to the detriment of the group's creativity
and agility while flexible ad hoc engagements have led to a loss of
focus and an increased risk of becoming obsolete. While there is general
agreement that MIKTA is an interesting idea that has led to some initial
achievements, most officials echo the words of their colleague that
MIKTA is "neither a major success nor an outright failure"
(Mexican diplomat). It is this tepid embrace that arguably best captures
the overall mood among the interviewed diplomats. Nongovernmental
experts are more pessimistic about MIKTA's possible future and
highlight the need for MIKTA to produce concrete outcomes.
Coordination Challenges and Competitive Pressure from the BRICS
Lacking an explicit issue-specific functional purpose and formal
institutional setup, MIKTA faces harsh competition from other foreign
policy mechanisms in terms of political attention and funding. MIKTA
activities are widespread, often ad hoc, and sometimes only loosely
coordinated. For some critics, MIKTA's work on multiple global
governance issues seems "too idealistic with little evidence of
tangible achievements" (Korean expert). Others dismiss MIKTA as a
loose arrangement that lacks real impact, (24) or a mere "contact
group" without a coherent vision. (25) A range of stakeholders
perceive a substantive gap between MIKTA's official rhetoric (e.g.,
"a force for good," facilitator) and the reality of its
actions. In multilateral spaces, MIKTA remains "a concept in the
making" (Korean diplomat), and coordination among MIKTA countries
is "still in its infancy" (Mexican diplomat).
While foreign policy processes never exist independently from
domestic dynamics, its weak institutionalization makes MIKTA
particularly susceptible to the changing political climate and factional
interests in member country capitals. As an Australian expert
highlights, "The challenge of MIKTA is that it is too personalized
to foreign ministers [which presents a] big structural weakness; MIKTA
is not yet fused into foreign policy agenda and priorities and therefore
could be seen as a hobbyhorse instead."
So far, member governments' engagement with MIKTA has not been
particularly systematic. The lack of strategy and the absence of
effective coordination among members are becoming more pronounced as
both actors and initiatives under the MIKTA umbrella have increased in
number. A Mexican diplomat argues that MIKTA Sherpas "should be the
leading figures but have lost control over the process." As a
result, MIKTA has become "everything and anything" from
student exchange programs to cultural events.
Thus, many are concerned that MIKTA may not survive a potential
charm offensive from the BRICS. Diplomats are wary that some MIKTA
members might be ready to defect if the BRICS--as the most visible
emerging power grouping--decides to expand. Mexico was invited to the
BRICS summit in 2017, and there was speculation that Indonesia could be
another likely candidate in case the grouping was to be enlarged. MIKTA
appears lagging far behind the BRICS's speedy institutionalization
and resourcefulness. MIKTA's efforts in terms of global positioning
and visibility are seen as "a futile attempt to stand up to the
BRICS" (Mexican diplomat).
Mexico and Indonesia, once enthusiastic about MIKTA's economic
potential in terms of trade and direct investment, seem especially
disappointed. An Indonesian diplomat notes that the combined gross
domestic product (GDP) of MIKTA countries is barely 8 percent of global
GDP: "There is power in money, and the power is not yet there [in
MIKTA]." And an Indonesian expert argues that "within eight
years of its foundation, BRICS has held nine summits, and each year more
than ten ministerial level meetings. BRICS also successfully established
a Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the New Development Bank. In
contrast, the outcome of MIKTA's meetings has been statements and
joint communiques without clear future direction."
Domestic Priorities and Shrinking Resources
Across the board, national priorities have recently come to play an
increasingly dominant role for MIKTA countries. From Turkey's
domestic and regional challenges to Korea's denuclearization
diplomacy and Mexico's focus on changing relations with the United
States, diplomats agree that all MIKTA countries are currently trying to
sort out their own issues, leaving little time and energy for joint
initiatives. In particular, the advent of the Donald Trump
administration has led to abrupt shifts in traditional trade and
security relations; and, by and large, MIKTA countries are dealing with
these critical challenges individually. Coordinated action would require
a certain level of diplomatic infrastructure and investment as well as
an integrated strategy, all of which MIKTA as a group is lacking:
"Theoretically there should be more space for creative middle power
diplomacy [in times of transition], but more energy is taken up just
[by] reacting to extraordinary and unpredictable events in the White
House" (Australia expert). A Mexican diplomat agrees that
"enormous amounts of time and energy are going into our
relationship with the US: our new minister [of foreign affairs]
basically never leaves Washington" (Mexican diplomat).
Changes in governments, budget cuts, and institutional
reorganizations in foreign ministries have also slowed down
members' engagement with MIKTA. As a result, the most serious
challenge to MIKTA's future concerns issues of members' uneven
and generally weakening commitment, and the ensuing leadership vacuum.
Australia, for instance, showed significant enthusiasm for MIKTA during
its year as chair, but its approach seems to be changing in light of
tightening financial resources. While the Australian government has
highlighted its interest in heavy investment in the Indo-Pacific region,
MIKTA has been restructured out of existence in the organizational chart
of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as updated in late 2017.
Korea--along with Australia, one of the more active MIKTA members
so far--has recently been reluctant to position itself as a leader of
the group, preferring to settle for the role of a "good
follower." Seoul's budget earmarked for MIKTA diplomacy has
already been on a gradual decline since 2015, its chair year. The change
of government in the aftermath of an unprecedented presidential
impeachment in 2017 has also meant that existing initiatives from the
previous government have been reassessed under a new leadership. As no
member country seems currently interested in taking up a leadership
role, MIKTA's internal momentum will largely rely on the annually
rotating chair system without sustained investment of money and ideas
from particularly committed members.
Minilateralism Revisited: Grappling with a Multiplex World on a
Budget
MIKTA's story to date points to the evolving realities of a
minilateral world populated with an increasing variety of what might
have previously been qualified as rather improbable groupings. Contrary
to minilateral alliances set up as issue-specific arrangements, MIKTA is
both driven and beset by the need for countries to engage more
cost-effectively with global governance mechanisms. In an increasingly
fragmented global space, participation in multilateral politics comes
with a substantial burden. Faced with an expanding array of issues,
foreign ministries have to invest increasing amounts of time and energy
in mapping and understanding complex constellations and processes. MIKTA
suggests that constraints on resources, global reach, and expertise can
be key factors driving the proliferation of inexpensive minilateral
arrangements.
The dynamics behind MIKTA's trajectory suggest that there is
more to today's minilateralism than coalitions of the willing or
alliances led by the world's major powers that address specific
functional questions. In an increasingly fragmented world order, where
clear-cut country blocs are set to become less important, building
diplomatic capacity and expanding networks with a growing number of
players can provide an important motivation for minilateral engagement.
Overall, minilateral arrangements are likely to become increasingly
tailored to budgetary and capacity-related needs of governments and
their bureaucratic apparatuses.
MIKTA's flexible, but precarious, institutional realities also
suggest that minilateral arrangements lacking a solid organizational
setup may have much shorter life expectancies than more formal
traditional multilaterals. Very much personalized to foreign ministers,
MIKTA has been vulnerable to domestic political cycles, budget cuts, and
the changing whims of political leaders. Like other minilateral
partnerships, MIKTA lacks a dedicated staffed secretariat and a formal
international treaty--the two critical lifelines that have traditionally
sustained the expansion of international organizations. (26) This means
that in a world of emerging minilateral diplomacy, we are more likely to
witness "zombies" (arrangements that exist on paper, with
minimal real activities) and "deaths" (arrangements that
disappear altogether) than in the traditional multilateral diplomacy of
the past century. (27) New minilateral initiatives, including MIKTA, are
often designed in a way that they may go extinct or inactive without
legal complications or collateral damage such as job losses in
secretariats. Against the backdrop of strained financial and human
resources, minilateral arrangements a la MIKTA are a reflection of an
increasingly pragmatic and selective--and overall more slender--approach
to multilateralism.
The case of MIKTA suggests that countries with moderate
capabilities tend to create and participate in complementary minilateral
arrangements on an informal, inexpensive, and low-key basis while
strained diplomatic resources are first spent on key bilateral,
regional, and, overall, more traditional relationships. Many minilateral
mechanisms that share MIKTA's operational characteristics are
likely to be short-lived and suffer from weak member commitment,
resource constraints, forum-shopping risks, and a leadership vacuum.
Some, however, may survive and become a new species of actor in a
multiplex world. Our analysis shows that we need to pay more attention
to backstage dynamics and the perspective of diplomats to understand the
existence and utility of minilateral governance mechanisms.
Notes
(1.) Matthew D. Stephen, "Emerging Powers and Emerging Trends
in Global Governance," Global Governance 23, no. 3 (2017): 483-502.
(2.) See, for example, Daryl Copeland." 'Expectations
Proliferate, While Capacities Diminish'New Rabbits, Old Hats:
International Policy and Canada's Foreign Service in an Era of
Reduced Diplomatic Resources," International Journal 60, no. 3
(2005): 743-762, at 747. See, further, Brian Hocking and David Spence,
eds., Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats
(London: Palgrave, 2002).
(3.) "Korea" in this essay refers to the Republic of
Korea (South Korea).
(4.) Amitav Acharya, "After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a
Multiplex World Order,''Ethics andInternational Affairs 31,
no. 3 (2017): 271-285.
(5.) Middle powers are said to have the potential to successfully
implement "games of skill" as new agenda setters, alliance
makers, and creative thinkers, especially at moments of international
transition. See Mark Beeson and Richard Higgott, "The Changing
Architecture of Politics in the Asia-Pacific: Australia's Middle
Power Moment?" International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14, no.
2 (2014): 215-237, at 215.
(6.) Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge: Polity. 2018), p. 9.
(7.) Stewart Patrick. "The New 'New
Multilateralism': Minilateral Cooperation, but at What Cost?"
Global Summitry 1. no. 2 (2015): 115-134.
(8.) Interviews with MIKTA diplomats and experts took place
face-to-face or via email, telephone, or video conferencing. Most
interviewees were based in MIKTA capitals, bilateral embassies, or
multilateral missions. Interview data breakdowns by country are as
follows. For Mexico, sixteen diplomats and three experts participated in
the interviews with Sebastian Haug between June and September 2017. For
Indonesia, Susan Harris Rimmer interviewed six diplomats and five
experts between July and October 2017. For Korea, Sung-Mi Kim
interviewed ten diplomats and five experts from July to November 2017.
The Turkish data was collected by Sebastian Haug from interviews with
twelve diplomats and three experts between June and September 2017.
Susan Harris Rimmer conducted Australia interviews with eight diplomats
and six experts from June to October 2017. The use of interview data
contained in the paper is preconditioned by the request of the funder
(the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs) that interviewees would not be
identifiable. Given the relatively small size of ministerial staff
engaged in MIKTA diplomacy, and in consideration of anonymity requests
by interviewees, the paper refrains from providing more detailed
information regarding individual interviews (e.g., interviewee's
name, title, or location) and instead only identifies nationality and
occupation (e.g., diplomat, expert).
(9.) For a discussion of the challenges that foreign
ministries--particularly those of countries beyond the world's
current great powers--face when trying to deal with increasing global
complexities, see Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, Diplomatic Strategies of
Nations in the Global South (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p.
436.
(10.) MIKTA Vision Statement, May 2015,
www.mikta.org/about/vision.php?ckattempt=1, accessed 1 June 2018.
(11.) Ibid.
(12.) Current as of May 2018. See, further, Selcuk Colakoglu,
"Has MIKTA Augmented the Global Governance Role of Middle
Powers," The Global Blog, 29 May 2018,
https://theglobal.blog/2018/05/29/has-mikta-augmented-the-global-governance-role-of-middle-powers/, accessed 1 June 2018.
(13.) See also Siswo Pramono, Febrian A. Ruddyard, Jorge A.
Schiavon, Selcuk Colakoglu, Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad, Nicholas
Farelley, Seungjoo Lee, et al., MIKTA: Current Situation and the Way
Forward (Jakarta: Policy Analysis and Development Agency, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 2018).
(14.) All these activities took place in 2017. Sources include
MIKTA activity logs by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
MIKTA's official website, www.mikta.org; MIKTA Australia Twitter.
https://twitter.com/AusMIKTA. accessed 1 June 2018.
(15.) Bruce Gilley, "Conclusion: Delusions of Grandeur in the
Goldilocks Zone," International Journal 71, no. 4(2016): 651-658.
(16.) Andrew F. Cooper and Ramesh Thakur. The Group of Twenty (G20)
(London: Routledge, 2013).
(17.) Ibid.; Andrew F. Cooper, "The G20 and Rising Powers: An
Innovative but Awkward Form of Multilateralism," in Dries Lesage
and Thijs Van de Graaf, eds., Rising Powers and Multilateral
Institutions (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 280-294.
(18.) Patrick, "The New 'New Multilateralism,'"
p. 115.
(19.) Moises Nairn. "Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get
Real International Action," Foreign Policy, 21 June 2009,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/minilateralism/, accessed 1 June
2018.
(20.) We note, however, increased activity defending the World
Trade Organization and rules-based trade during Argentina's G-20
presidency. See, further, the MIKTA Ministerial Communique from the
Meeting of Ministers Responsible for Trade of MIKTA Countries, Buenos
Aires(11 December 2017),
www.mikta.org/document/joint.php?at=view&idx=301, accessed 1 June
2018.
(21.) Commentators differ on the significance of tensions between
democratic and undemocratic members of the BRICS. Zaki Laidi argues that
state sovereignty trumps all, even for the democratic members. Zaki
Laidi. "BRICS: Sovereignty Power and Weakness," International
Politics 49, no. 5 (September 2012): 614-632. Matthew D. Stephen finds
the differences more significant. See, further, Matthew D. Stephen,
"Rising Regional Powers and International Institutions: The Foreign
Policy Orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa," Global
Society 26, no. 3 (2012): 289-309.
(22.) Awidya Santikajaya, "Walking the Middle Path: The
Characteristics of Indonesia's Rise," International Journall
71, no. 4 (2016): 563-586, at 574.
(23.) "Indonesia Wants Closer Cooperation of MIKTA
Countries,"' Jakarta Post, 28 November 2016,
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/11/28/indonesia-wants-closer-cooperation-of-mikta-countries.html, accessed 1 June 2018.
(24.) See Hale Yildiz, "How to Explain MIKTA," 29
September 2014, Australian Institute of International Affairs,
www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian_outlook/how-to-explain-mikta/, accessed 1 June 2018.
(25.) Scott A. Snyder, "Interview with Scott A. Snyder on
'Korea as a Middle Power,'" 25 January 2016, The Policy
Wire, http://thepolicywire.com/scott-a-snyder-korea-as-a-middle-power/,
accessed 1 June 2018.
(26.) Susan Strange, "Why Do International Organizations Never
Die?" in Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek, eds., Autonomous Policy
Making by International Organizations (London: Routledge, 1998), pp.
213-221.
(27.) Julia Gray, "Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of
International Organizations," International Studies Quarterly 62,
no. 1 (March 2018): 1-13.
Sung-Mi Kim is a researcher on nuclear nonproliferation at Ridgeway
Information Ltd. Her research interests are development, security, and
global governance issues involving Korea and East Asia. She was awarded
a Creative Powers Fellowship by the Chatham House Asia Programme
(2015-2016) to write on Korea's middle power diplomacy. Sebastian
Haug is a graduate research fellow and PhD candidate at the University
of Cambridge. He previously worked for the UN Development Programme and
has held visiting positions at New York University, the College of
Mexico, and the Istanbul Policy Centre. Sebastian is interested in
global cooperation dynamics as well as the positions and roles of
so-called rising powers in international development politics. Susan
Harris Rimmer is an associate professor and Australian Research Council
Future Fellow at the Griffith Law School and program leader of "Law
and Global Change" at the Law Futures Centre. Her interests are in
public diplomacy, gender and foreign policy, global and regional
governance, and international and domestic human rights law. The
fieldwork for this research was generously supported by the Korean
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The authors are grateful to all
interviewees for their participation, and thank the participants in two
related research seminars held in Cambridge, UK, and Seoul in November
2017, for their feedback and critical insights. They also thank two
anonymous reviewers whose suggestions helped improve and clarify the
manuscript. Any errors are the authors' own.
Table 1 MIKTA Joint Statements
No. Date Subject
1 14 April 2014 North Korean missile and nuclear
provocations (*)
2 26 July 2014 Concerning downing of Malaysia
Airlines Flight MH17 (*)
3 25 September 2014 Ebola outbreak and global health (*)
4 9 March 2015 Gender equality and women's rights
5 24 June 2015 Reform of UN committee for
administrative efficiency
6 14 July 2015 Financing for Development (*)
7 26 September 2015 Climate change (*)
8 12 October 2015 Terrorist attack in Turkey (*)
9 9 December 2015 International response to disasters
10 10 January 2016 North Korea's fourth nuclear test (*)
11 18 February 2016 Prevention of violent extremism (*)
12 11 March 2016 Human rights (access to information,
freedom of expression)
13 17 March 2016 Prevention of violent extremism
14 10-11 May 2016 Peacekeeping and security
15 23 May 2016 Reduction of disaster risks, promotion
of gender equality
16 12-14 June 2016 Protection of disabled people's human rights
17 30 June 2016 Terrorist attack on Istanbul's Ataturk
Airport (*)
18 22 September 2016 North Korea's fifth nuclear test (*)
19 22 September 2016 Addressing the challenges of humanitarian
crises (*)
20 17 December 2016 Migration
21 5 April 2017 Infrastructure development and innovative
partnership
22 19 April 2017 Interfaith dialogue for peace
23 10 May 2017 Measures to end poverty
24 23 May 2017 Financing for Development
25 13 June 2017 Women's rights
26 15 June 2017 Counterterrorism
27 15 June 2017 Rights of persons with disabilities
28 21 June 2017 Humanitarian aid and gender equality
29 28 June 2017 Education
30 6 September 2017 North Korea's sixth nuclear test (*)
31 25 September 2017 Recent earthquakes in Mexico (*)
32 27 October 2017 Women, Peace and Security
33 31 October 2017 UN peacebuilding
34 26 February 2018 Human rights mainstreaming
35 28 February 2018 Human rights
36 7 March 2018 Rights of persons with disabilities
37 15 March 2018 Human rights
38 18 March 2018 2018 Pyeongchang Olympic Games, efforts
for peace in Korea (*)
39 25 April 2018 Promoting women innovators
40 26 April 2018 Sustaining peace
41 30 April 2018 2018 Inter-Korean Summit (*)
42 14 May 2018 Terrorist attacks in Surabaya (*)
Note: Current as of May 2018, Foreign Ministers' Joint Statements
are marked with an asterisk.
COPYRIGHT 2018 Brill
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2018 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.