NEW-PRODUCT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: THE EARLIEST STAGE OF THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE.
McClure, James E. ; Thomas, David Chandler
NEW-PRODUCT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: THE EARLIEST STAGE OF THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE.
Our friends up north [at Microsoft] spend over five billion dollars
on research and development and all they seem to do is copy Google and
Apple. - Steve Jobs
I. INTRODUCTION
Austrian economics emphasizes the idea that the price and
production signals of competing firms coordinate capital use across the
stages of production. This idea makes perfect sense for firms whose
priced products are competing on the open market. For example, the price
and production decisions of competing automobile manufacturers influence
one another. On the other hand, the decisions of firms engaged in
new-product research and development are largely uninformed by the
decisions of other firms engaged in the research and development of
similar products. Because, by definition, new-product R&D occurs
prior to the pricing and open market sale of products, competing firms
within this stage of the capital structure are largely ignorant of each
other's preparations.
In this paper, we deepen the understanding of the capital structure
by unpacking the process that coordinates capital within the new-product
R&D stage of the capital structure. The dearth of
capital-coordinating signals emanating from the earliest stage of the
capital structure is unique to the new-product R&D process. Signals,
within the new-product R&D stage, are sparse for three reasons: 1)
price and production signals do not exist for products still under
development or prior to launch on the open market; 2) pre-launch
inventories have minimal impact upon the market price of products
already on the market; and 3) entrepreneurs, engaged in new-product
R&D and seeking "first mover" advantage, have incentives
to shroud their operations and discoveries in secrecy.
The evidence of entrepreneurial secrecy in new-product R&D can
be found in the body of law dealing with trade secrets. Firms, engaged
in new-product R&D, routinely require employees to sign: 1)
"non-disclosure agreements" whereby employees obligate
themselves to keep research and development activities secret; and 2)
"invention agreements" that pre-specify the sharing
arrangement for anything that employees invent during or as a result of
their work on the firm's new-products. (1) Together, the overt
secrecy of entrepreneurs regarding new-product R&D and the absence
of price and production signals reduce and/or delay the cost-dampening
impact of inter-firm competition.
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. In Section II,
we present time lines that facilitate the understanding of: a) the roles
that time and money play in sustainable new-product R&D processes;
and b) the system-wide costs of entrepreneurial secrecy and the absence
of competition-constraining price and production signals. In Section
III, we explain how our more explicit discussion of new-product R&D:
a) deepens understanding of "capital consumption" in Austrian
business cycle theory; and b) offers new insights into the trigger and
timing of credit expansion booms and busts. Section IV presents an
empirical study that validates our emphasis upon new-product R&D as
the earliest component of the capital structure--our study demonstrates
for the period 1996 to 2017 the same positive association between share
price volatility and R&D intensity found in a Journal of Finance
study pertaining to the preceding period, from 1975 to 1995. A summary
follows in Section IV
II. SUSTAINABLE NEW-PRODUCT R&D
The process of new-product research and development consists, by
definition, of new product research followed by new product development.
We define new product research as prospecting for new and viable
innovations (the search for working prototypes). New product development
is pre-launch production consisting of: (a) the productization of
cost-efficient working prototypes; and (b) the production of enough
initial inventories to meet the anticipated demand for products launched
onto the open market.
The timeline shown in Figure 1 illustrates the process by which
new-product R&D successfully delivers new products to consumers.
Successful processes begin with idea-prospecting that leads to working
prototypes. Next, working prototypes evolve into products with costs
that end up, after product launch, to be sufficiently low for the
products to generate at least normal expected returns. Finally, firms
produce sufficient quantities of pre-launch inventories to meet expected
demand and be competitive on the open market. The arrow in Figure 1
shows the successful start-to-finish new-product R&D process: from
idea prospecting, to prototype, to productized pre-launch inventory, to
marketing and distribution of the completed products on the open market,
and finally into the hands of consumers.
Not all investments into new-product R&D will be successful; in
fact, many are likely to fail. This is because across the new-product
R&D stage shown in the Figure 1 timeline, there is, as mentioned in
the introduction, a dearth of market signals. Again: 1) neither price
nor production signals can exist for products in pre-production; 2)
pre-launch inventories have minimal impact on the market price of
products already on the market; and 3) in the pursuit of "first
mover" advantage, firms engaged in new-product R&D routinely
stifle signals about their operations.
The dearth of market signals within the new-product R&D stage
does not mean that no market signals inform capital use within this
stage. Most importantly, as emphasized by renowned Austrian school
thinkers (Mises, Hayek, Garrison, etc.), the interest rate at which
firms borrow has its most significant impact upon the capital
structure's earliest components. Also price, production, and other
signals from active markets, outside the new-product R&D stage,
provide crucial guidance that usefully informs, directs, and constrains
new-product R&D. Summarizing, the three market signals that most
clearly inform capital usage in new-product R&D are: (1) the
interest rate on loanable funds; (2) the price and production signals of
related products (substitutes and complements) currently being exchanged
on the open (post-launch) market; and (3) the prices of the inputs
available on the open market.
In line with standard Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT), so
long as these market signals from outside the new-product R&D stage
are free from artificial constraints or subsidies, we anticipate that
entrepreneurial error in new-product R&D will be constrained
sufficiently to preclude malinvestment booms. But given the absence of
lateral signals within the new-product R&D stage, again consistent
with standard ABCT, there is every reason to suppose that an excessive
expansion of credit will drive the interest rate below the natural rate,
and swell entrepreneurial errors in new-product R&D, leading to an
unsustainable malinvestment boom. Before discussing such an
unsustainable boom, we begin below by first discussing sustainable
levels of the entrepreneurial errors that occur--when investment is
constrained by free market prices and the natural rate of interest. In
particular we discuss three types of errors: (1) superfluous discovery;
(2) duplicative discovery; and (3) duplicative development. We discuss
each of these in turn.
Superfluous Discovery
Superfluous discovery occurs within the idea prospecting (research)
phase of new-product R&D. Superfluous discovery occurs when
prototypes, or models: 1) do not work; or 2) are economic dead-ends
(because the costs of productizing and launching exceed the
prototypes' expected future returns. For example, in the academe,
all those who have conducted significant amounts of research have made
arguments that simply do not "work out." There are a variety
of reasons for unpublished academic research; among them: 1) the
implications of the model are grossly inconsistent with observable,
real-world behavior; and 2) the argument is unclear and/or unpersuasive
to peer reviewers.
Duplicative Discovery
Duplicative discovery occurs when more than one entrepreneur,
engaged in research, discovers the same working prototype, or model,
simultaneously (or nearly simultaneously). Matt Ridley (2017) explains
that many versions of the light bulb existed before Thomas Edison
"invented" it:
Suppose Thomas Edison had died of an electric shock before thinking up
the tight bulb. Would history have been radically different? Of course
not. No fewer than 23 people deserve the credit for inventing some
version of the incandescent bulb before Edison, according to a history
of the invention written by Robert Friedel, Paul Israel and Bernard
Finn.
Ridley goes on to cite a famous example in the history of
science--Darwin's and Wallace's simultaneous discovery of the
theory of evolution. (2)
Duplicative Development
Duplicative development occurs when, following the awareness of
increased demand for a product, a "swarm" of firms, not all of
which will ultimately survive, make investments to bring similar
products to market. For example, in early January of 2007, Apple
Computer announced and demonstrated the iPhone. Shipment of the new
device began in June of that year with great fanfare and significant
market adoption. The success of the new smartphone served as an impetus
for other firms to engage in developing competitive products. One after
another, Palm, Blackberry, Microsoft, Samsung, Nokia, and the browser
company Mozilla (creator of Firefox) among others, invested heavily in
the development, prelaunch inventories, and launch of their smartphone
offerings. The result of this entrepreneurial swarming into the
smartphone space was a successful Samsung/Google Android phone and the
original leader, iPhone from Apple. The others, unable to compete
successfully in the crowded space, dropped out of the race or fell into
obscurity.
The three entrepreneurial errors (again, superfluous discovery,
duplicative discovery, and duplicative development) can reduce the
overall ex post net benefit of the new-product R&D stage of the
structure of capital. However, there is no reason to think that the
market signals from outside this stage (i.e., prices of related goods,
the prices of inputs, and the interest rate) will, absent distortions in
these outside signals, so insufficiently constrain these errors as to
cause the ex post net benefit of new-product R&D to be negative.
Schumpeter's oxymoron, "creative destruction," is famous
because new-product R&D has repeatedly delivered net benefits that
are palpably positive.
This in mind, we argue that the new-product R&D process, absent
governmental and / or credit distortions, will be sustainable--meaning
that the ex post net benefits are positive. In Figure 2, we modify
Figure 1 (which only addressed sustainable new-product R&D), to
include the entrepreneurial errors of superfluous discovery, duplicative
discovery, and duplicative development.
As depicted in Figure 2, entrepreneurial errors appear in lengths
and widths intended to depict sustainable levels, (that is, levels that
result in the overall net benefit of new-product R&D being
non-negative). As shown in Figure 2, the superfluous discovery arrow
ends at the prototype line--this is the sustainable level, meaning that
resources are not invested into productizing uneconomic prototypes or
non-working innovations.
Similarly, the "duplication" arrow in research (this
arrow represents the duplicative research) ends at the
"Prototype" line. Once there is proof of the viability of a
prototype, concept, or model, no more resources go to re-discovering it.
In the case of the light bulb, as Ridley explained in his APEE
presentation (2017), it resurfaced many times only because worldwide
communications at the time limited the knowledge of the various
inventors. Subsequently, once knowledge of the invention of the light
bulb became widely known, reinvention of the basic bulb ceased.
Finally, Figure 2 features a "Duplication" arrow above
"Development." This arrow illustrates the level of duplicative
initial inventory creation that is consistent with a sustainable
new-product R&D process. Notice that this arrow ends at the launch
line. This is not because duplicative products never reach final
consumers, but because they soon cease to reach consumers--crowded out
by the relatively more successful new product(s).
Returning to the cell phone example mentioned above, although many
companies offered alternatives, today, only a few types remain on the
market. In the period of a few decades, market competition winnowed the
field. We do not know of any economist who argues that the costs of this
winnowing process (the costs of duplicative development) are so large as
to cast significant doubt about whether the research and development
process that created cell phones delivered positive net benefits. In
other words, the process that created cell phones was a sustainable one.
III. R&D MALINVESTMENT: ANOTHER SOURCE OF CAPITAL CONSUMPTION
The original Mises/Rothbard/Hayek renditions of Austrian Business
Cycle Theory (ABCT), as Salerno (2012, p. 15) explains, all agreed that
1) "malinvestment," excessive investment in the earliest
stages of the capital structure, is an essential component of the boom;
and 2) "overconsumption" is an essential component of the
boom, albeit with Hayek being "less emphatic." In addition,
"capital consumption" resulting from overconsumption during
the boom, Salerno (p. 21) explains, is what ultimately leads
entrepreneurs to abandon the "wholly new investment projects"
undertaken during the boom. (3)
Our focus and more explicit discussion of new-product R&D, as
the earliest component of the capital structure, provides a
complementary explanation for the "capital consumption" that
takes place during the boom (setting up an inevitable bust).
Salerno's emphasis that it is "wholly new investment
projects", in the earliest stages of production, that will be
incentivized by the credit expansion (many of which will have to be
abandoned due to "capital consumption"), dovetails with our
focus on new-product R&D as the earliest component of the capital
structure.
The additional source of capital consumption, that our unpacking of
new-product R&D exposes, is straightforward. An artificially low
interest rate, caused by the overexpansion of credit, will result in the
bloating of Figure 2's sustainable levels of superfluous discovery,
duplicative discovery, and duplicative development (levels that were
sustainable at the natural rate of interest) into unsustainable levels
(levels incentivized by the artificially low interest rates). For
complete clarity, Figure 2's depiction of the sustainable R&D
timeline is modified in Figure 3's depiction of an unsustainable
R&D time line.
Comparing Figures 2 & 3, the bloating of superfluous discovery,
duplicative research, and duplicative pre-launch production is obvious.
As documented and emphasized by Salerno (p. 5), "Austrian theory is
not an 'overinvestment theory' of the business cycle and was
never construed as such by its most notable proponents." In line
with Austrian theory and tradition, this means that the bloating of the
arrows in Figure 3, relative to Figure 2, is not overinvestment, but
rather malinvestment.
In one crucial respect, malinvestments specific to the new-product
R&D stage are like malinvestments in early stages of the capital
structure generally. All malinvestments arising from credit expansion
contribute to what Salerno (p. 22) aptly describes as the "...
'hole' in the middle stages of the structure of production,
which is 'papered' over by profits and capital gains caused by
the falsification of monetary calculation." In one important
respect, however, malinvestments in new-product R&D are unique. As
we explained earlier, lateral competitors engaged in new-product
R&D, with their products not on the market, are in the dark because
they are literally uninformed by the price and production signals of one
another. (4)
The uniqueness of new-product R&D malinvestment is important
because it offers new insights into: 1) why new-product R&D
malinvestments will tend to pile up for a longer period than will
malinvestments where price and production signals are present; and 2)
what can trigger the bust, and when it will occur. Current Austrian
explanations of what will trigger the bust, and when, are unspecific.
Garrison (2001, p. 72), for example, explains only that "at some
point in the process... entrepreneurs encounter resource scarcities that
are more constraining than was implied by the patter of wages, prices,
and interest rates that characterized the early phase of the boom. Here,
changing expectations are clearly endogenous to the process." (5)
Inspection of Figure 3 suggests an explanation of what can trigger
the bust, and when. Recalling from our previous discussions that the
capital usages within the new-product R&D stage are non-signal
emitting, it becomes apparent that the "launch" line is key to
understanding what triggers the bust. Again, prior to launch, there are
no price and production signals to constrain lateral competitors. It is
at the time of product launch, that price and production signals for
newly developed products first emerge and begin to constrain and
coordinate capital usage across the stages of production. All that need
occur to trigger a crisis is for an excessive amount of duplicative
pre-launch inventory to hit the market simultaneously, or nearly so, in
a Schumpeterian swarm. (6) This insight can improve our understanding of
the timing of monetary inspired crises as illustrated by the two cases
examined in the next section.
IV. EVIDENCE OF GREATER VOLATILITY IN R&D-INTENSIVE FIRMS
According to Austrian business cycle theory, excessive credit
expansions drive the interest rate below the natural rate and, thereby,
incentivize overinvestment in the earliest components of the capital
structure. In line with this theory, it is expected that the uses of
capital in the earliest stages would be more volatile over the business
cycle as the interest rate deviates from the natural rate. In this
paper, we have focused attention upon new-product R&D
(pre-production investment) because it is the earliest component of the
capital structure and because the activities of businesses in the
new-product R&D space are sequestered--the price and production
signals that ordinarily constrain and coordinate the stages of
post-product-launch production literally do not exist to coordinate and
constrain pre-production enterprises. If this focus is apt, then,
empirically, we should expect to see greater volatility in the values of
firms that are more heavily engaged in new-product R&D.
A. Extant Empirics on R&D Intensity and Return Volatility,
1975-1995
A relatively recent study in the Journal of Finance provides
evidence on the impact of new-product R&D on return volatility over
the period 1975 to 1995. Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001, p. 2431)
find that "R&D intensity is positively associated with return
volatility." Their explanation? Consistent with our discussion of
new-product R&D as sequestered capital, they point out that research
and development activity is, under "accepted U.S. accounting
principles," treated as an "intangible asset" and that
this results in a general "lack of accounting information"
which greatly "complicates the task of equity evaluation" (op
cit.) for firms that are highly R&D intensive. (7) To verify that
these findings extend beyond the period from 1975 to 1995, the remainder
of this section empirically investigates the relationship between
R&D intensity and return volatility for the period from 1996 to
2017.
B. A Study of R&D Intensity and Return Volatility for 1996-2017
The purpose of this empirical study is to test the hypothesis that
the sequestered nature of new-product R&D implies that firm
share-price return volatility increases as R&D intensity rises. Our
study presents a series of four OLS panel-data regressions that
estimate, for alternative specifications, the statistical and economic
significance that new product R&D has on firm volatility. The
regressions estimate the coefficient of three-year trends in the new
product R&D (RD_Trend) of 3,668 publicly traded firms as a predictor
of the dependent variables, Market_Beta and Total _Volatility.
Investors regularly rely on Market_Beta as a measure of potential
risk, reflecting the volatility of a firm's stock price compared
with that of the market as a whole. A beta of 1 indicates that the
firm's volatility mimics the volatility of the market, while a beta
greater than 1 reports the percentage increase in volatility of a stock
above the volatility of the market. A beta less than 1 indicates a
percentage decrease in volatility in comparison to that of the market.
To control for potential omitted variable bias, we have included
the natural log of each firm's annual total revenues as well as
annual net income as a percentage of total revenues. All regressions
include both year and firm fixed effects, to control for aggregate
movements in the market (business cycles) and for attributes of firms
and industries.
The data we use are from WRDS-Compustat. Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics on the variables used in the regressions. As
shown in the table there are 32,121 observations of which, for each
firm, there are up to 21 annual observations (1996 to 2017.) The years
1993 to 2017 are included in the data. The years 1993 to 1995 are
included to calculate the three-year averages of total revenues and
total R&D expenses used in the regressions. The market beta values
range from 0 to 16.42, representing a broad range of volatility compared
to the market volatility of 1.
Total Volatility represents the range of volatility on a firm basis
over a three-year period. The Net Income values represent the actual net
income divided by Total Revenues or a percentage of Total Revenues. The
natural log of Total Revenues is calculated by taking the natural log of
the Total Revenues in millions. The RD_Intensity variable is computed by
taking the total R&D expense for the current year and the two prior
years and dividing the total by the total of revenues over the same
three years.
1. Estimation Methods
To assess the relationship between share-price volatility and
R&D intensity we estimate the model
(1) [y.sub.it] = [beta]RDIntensit[y.sub.it] + [alpha][X.sub.it] +
[[mu].sub.i] + [[nu].sub.t] + [[epsilon].sub.it],
where [y.sub.it], depending on the specification, is either the
Market Beta (a standard measure of performance volatility) or Total
Volatility of each firm (i) in year (t). The vector RDIntensit[y.sub.it]
includes the average of the new product R&D as a percentage of total
revenues for current year (t) and the previous two years. In estimations
in which Market_Beta is the dependent variable, the coefficient
estimates on RDIntensit[y.sub.it] measures the percentage impact of an
increase in R&D as a percent of total revenues on Market Beta--a 1
percent increase in RDIntensit[y.sub.it], the estimated coefficient is
the predicted increase in Market Beta. When the dependent variable is
Total_Volatility, a 1 percent increase in RDIntensit[y.sub.it] results
in an increase in the total volatility of the firm's value by the
percentage reflected by the coefficient.
All regressions include firm and year fixed effects, [[mu].sub.i]
and [[nu].sub.t] respectively. Year fixed effects capture price
movements in the market that are largely systemic and often representing
business cycle impact. Firm fixed effects capture time-invariant firm
observable and unobservable variables, such as product market focus. The
identifying assumption in our model is that firm trends are parallel.
The [X.sub.it] vector in the regression model includes firm
financial variables such as the log of total revenues and net income as
a percent of total revenues, aggregated to the firm and year level. We
include these variables to control for the possibility that changes in
firm size and profitability might affect volatility.
2. Results
The estimation results of our empirical study are shown in Table 2.
The table includes two sets of regressions run against Market Beta
(regressions 1 and 2) and two run against Total Volatility (regressions
3 and 4.) In the first regression, column (1) of Table 2, the control
variables for Total Revenue and Net Income are omitted to provide a
comparison for evaluating their impact when included as shown in
regression (2). The coefficient of RD_Intensity is 0.928 and is
significant at the one percent level, suggesting that an increase of one
percentage of total revenues expensed on R&D will result in an
increase in the firm's market beta of 0.928 or approximately 92.8
percent--an economically significant increase.
In the second regression, column (2) of Table 2, the control
variables for Net Income and Total Revenue are added into the model. The
coefficient on RD_Impact declines from the first regression to 0.629,
remaining significant at the one percent level and suggesting that an
increase of 1 percent in the percentage of total revenues expensed on
R&D will increase the firm's market beta by 62.9 percent. The
control variables suggest, as expected, that firms with higher revenues
and profits will have lower beta values and thus lower volatility.
In the third regression, column (3) of Table 1, the control
variables for Total Revenue and Net Income are omitted to provide a
comparison for evaluating their impact when included as shown in
regression (4). The coefficient of RD_Impact is 0.136 and is significant
at the one percent level, suggesting that an increase in the percentage
of total revenues expensed on R&D will result in an increase in the
firm's total volatility by approximately 13.6 percent--an
economically significant increase.
In the fourth and final regression, column (4) of Table 1, the
control variables for net income and total revenue are included in the
model. The coefficient on RD_Impact declines from the first regression
to 0.0469, remaining significant at the one percent level and suggesting
that an increase of 1 percent in the percentage of total revenues
expensed on R&D will increase the firm's market beta by 4.69
percent. As in regression (3), the control variables suggest a lower
level of total volatility when a firm has higher revenues or net
profits.
3. Summary of our empirical findings for the period 1996-2017
The empirical results of the four panel-studies reported in Table 2
strongly suggest a causal correlation between increases in the
percentage of revenues expended on new product R&D and significantly
higher levels of price volatility. This finding is consistent with our
hypothesis that the sequestered nature of new product R&D will lead
to greater error on the part of investors in forecasting--resulting in
greater volatility.
V. OVERALL SUMMARY
According to Austrian business cycle theory excessive expansions of
monetary credit cause malinvestment in the earliest component of the
capital structure. In this paper we have analyzed the implications of
new-product R&D in its role as the earliest uses of capital. As we
have explained, new-product R&D can be broken down into three
sequentially occurring stages: 1) a research stage that discovers
potential new products; 2) a development stage to turn the potential
products into working prototypes and productize them; and 3) a final
stage to develop (produce) pre-launch inventories. Throughout these
three stages, capital is sequestered--for these pre-production stages
laterally competing firms are in the dark about the prices and
production that will, following product launches, emerge onto the open
market. Consistent with this sequestration of capital in the earliest
stages, we find that, consistent with a previous empirical study for the
period 1975 to 1995, higher return volatility is associated with higher
R&D intensity. By identifying three stages of new-product R&D as
the earliest component of the capital structure, greater insight is
possible into what will trigger malinvestment busts and when they are
likely to occur.
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James E. McClure (jmcclure@bsu.edu) is Professor of Economics
atBall State University. David Chandler Thomas (dcthomas@bsu.edu) is
Assistant Professor of Economics also at Ball State University.
(1) "...[T]he term 'trade secret' means all forms
and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations,
program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques,
processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing
if--(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such
information secret; and (B) the information derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person who
can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the
information...." 18 U.S. Code § 1839. Definitions
accessed online at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1839.
(2) "Charles Darwin was a methodical man. Twenty-two years
after the voyage of the Beagle, he was still working on his definitive
study. Darwin, in fact, almost waited too long. In 1858, Alfred Russel
Wallace also formulated a theory of evolution, based on his studies in
Brazil and the East Indies.... [W]hen Wallace sent the manuscript of his
findings to Darwin for his opinion, Darwin was astounded. Although
Darwin's first instinct was to give Wallace full credit for the
theory the two men agreed to present their papers in the same issue of
the Journal of the Linnean Society. The next year, 1859, Darwin finally
finished his book, On the Origin of the Species by Means of Natural
Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for
Life; the popular title is The Origin of the Species." (Ritchie and
Carola, 1983, p. 509)
(3) "[T]he increase in the prices and profitability of
consumer goods diverts factors from higher stages to consumer
goods' industries, thereby restricting the supply of resources
available to add to or even replace the stock of capital goods. This is
what Austrian economists call "capital consumption/' which is
a pervasive feature of the boom." (Salerno, p. 16)
(4) Recall from our earlier discussion that: 1) products under
development are not yet on the market; and 2) in the pursuit of
"first mover" advantage entrepreneurs in new-product R&D
maintain secrecy about their activities.
(5) Similarly, Salerno (p. 22) explains:
As the boom continues, firms confront an increasing scarcity of the
resources necessary to [for example] fully utilize the new mining and
oil drilling equipment to construct the hydroelectric plant and to
engineer and mass produce the new generation of aircraft. In a strictly
metaphorical sense, then, we may say that the lengthened structure of
production cannot be 'completed.' The anticipated demands for the
products of the higher stage investment projects... do not materialize
because of the greater scarcity and costliness of the complementary
labor and capital needed to profitably transform these products into
lower order capital goods.... From an economic point of view,
malinvestment and capital consumption cause the structure of production
to disintegrate into pieces that cannot be fitted back together again
without a protracted recession-adjustment process.
(6) An anonymous referee indicated that he/she, in discussing
R&D as the earliest stage, emphasizes "the bringing to market
of new capacity as a critical trigger (rather than pre-launch
inventories)." Both are important, because both new capacity and
the pre-launch inventories hitting the market can, if of sufficiently
large magnitude, cause the price of competing products to collapse--and
the price collapse is the defining characteristic of the bust. Empirical
assessment of the relative importance of the new capacity relative to
the launch of new inventories is beyond the scope of this paper.
(7) Furthermore, studying the impact of this lack of information
upon stock market valuations is important, they argue, because of the
recent, "dazzling growth" in R&D intensive
industries--"at year-end 1999, the technology sector and the
pharmaceuticals industry together account for roughly 40 percent of the
value of the S&P 500 index." (op cit., pp. 2431-2432).
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Labels N Mean StdDev Min
Year of 32,121 2006 1993
Observation
Beta_Market Beta Against 32,121 1.281 0.876 0
Market
Tot_Volatility Total Firm 32,121 0.147 0.0935
Volatility
Net_Income Income as % 32,121 -0.0153 0.325 -2.999
of Revenue
LN_Total_Revenue Nature Log 32,121 5.872 2.176 0.00399
of Revenue
RD_Intensity Three Year 32,121 0.0759 0.107 0
Trend in RD
Variables Max
2017
Beta_Market 16.42
Tot_Volatility 2.445
Net_Income 0.996
LN_Total_Revenue 13.12
RD_Intensity 0.969
Table 2: Empirical Findings, 1996-2017; Effect of Research and
Development Intensity on Stock Volatility
(1) (2)
Variables Market Beta Market Beta
RD_Intensity 0.928 (***) 0.629 (***)
(0.0967) (0.0995)
LN_Total_Revenue -0.0139 (***)
(0.00515)
Net_Income -0.204 (***)
(0.0312)
Observations 32,121 32,121
Number of Firms 3,654 3,654
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
(3) (4)
Variables Total Vol Total Vol
RD_Intensity 0.136 (***)
(0.0117) (0.0108)
LN_Total_Revenue -0.0144 (***)
(0.000644)
Net_Income -0.0326 (***)
(0.00316)
Observations 32,121 32,121
Number of Firms 3,654 3,654
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Notes: Statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels are
indicated by (*), (**), and (***). The dependent variable for (1) and
(2) is market beta (a standard measure of stock volatility) and for
(3) and (4) total volatility, which is the volatility of each firm
considered independently. All regressions include firm and year fixed
effects and report robust errors.
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