Did TARP distort competition among sound unsupported banks?
Koetter, Michael ; Noth, Felix
Did TARP distort competition among sound unsupported banks?
I. INTRODUCTION
Did the financial support of distressed U.S. banks by the Capital
Purchase Program (CPP) affect loan and funding rates, as measures of
price competition? The CPP, the largest single element of the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP), dispersed around $204.9 billion to 707 U.S.
banks between q4/08 and q4/09. As of July 31, 2014, the Treasury
recovered $225.9 billion of this CPP support in the form of repayments,
dividends, and interest, turning the program into a positive return for
taxpayers. Timothy Masad, deputy Secretary of the Treasury in charge,
accordingly called TARP a success in the final hearing of the
Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) on March 4, 2011 (see
http://cop.senate.gov), and Liu et al. (2013) agreed in their analysis
of the substantial financial and return recovery of banks that received
CPP funds. However, on an economic cost-benefit basis, it is not clear
whether taxpayers had a net positive return (Calomiris and Khan 2015).
Yet in its final assessment, the COP (2011) paints a more nuanced
picture: Although the cost of TARP was much lower than anticipated, it
might also have induced distortions of market mechanisms, in the form of
increased risk taking and reduced competition. The former issue has
received considerable attention in recent studies (Black and Hazelwood
2013; Dam and Koetter 2012; Duchin and Sosyura 2014; Gropp et al. 2011),
whereas evidence about competitive distortions due to TARP is rare.
Bailout schemes can distort competition in two ways: directly, by
subsidizing rescued banks, and indirectly, by inducing undesirable
market conduct by unsupported banks. Specifically, government bailouts
directly distort banking competition because insurance schemes treat
banks differently depending on the size of the subsidy (Beck et al.
2010), which upsets any existing level playing field. Empirical evidence
about the direct effect of bailouts on competition is mixed. Calderon
and Schaeck (2015) show, with a sample of 46 banking crises in 138
countries, that government support of troubled banks led to more banking
competition and lower interest margins after a crisis. The main benefits
accrue to borrowers in already financially well-provided segments. In
contrast, Berger and Roman (2015b) show that TARP-supported U.S. banks
exhibited higher Lerner margins and market shares compared with
unsupported banks in the period after q4/09, driven by banks that repaid
early. While suppliers of funds require lower risk premiums, TARP
capital infusions required a dividend yield of 5% in the first 5 years
of support, increasing to 9% thereafter. In addition, TARP infusions
were tied to executive compensation caps (Bayazitova and Shivdasani
2012). Berger and Roman (2015b) conclude that the safety net benefits of
TARP outweighed the cost disadvantages. Even if bailouts are allocated
on perfectly equal terms to all banks, the provided insurance creates
socially undesirable, additional risk taking (Keeley 1990). Consistent
with this view, the Congressional Oversight Panel (2011) voiced concerns
that TARP equity provisions provided supported banks with a competitive
advantage that could lead to consolidation and further concentration, to
the detriment of small or local community banks in particular. In turn,
these subsidized survivors, with their increased market power, could
invoke additional welfare losses by charging higher interest rates to
borrowers that represent poor credit risks.
Theoretically, Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) emphasize the importance
of indirect effects of government bailouts on unsupported peers too. The
increased protection of banks that anticipate bailouts reduces the
margins and charter values of competing, unsupported banks. Prospective
bailouts also induce depositors to require lower default premiums, such
that the reduced funding costs imply more lending by protected banks,
which translates into increased competitive pressure on unsupported
incumbents. Depositors instead require higher risk premiums from
unprotected banks, which reduces margins at given loan rates or could
encourage higher risk taking by the banks in an attempt to increase
expected returns and thus margins.
We focus on the latter effect and use political indicators in the
banks' home markets and Congressional voting behavior on TARP to
identify bailout expectations. In turn, we assess how unsupported banks
responded, in terms of pricing power, to the bailout scheme. To our
knowledge, this study is the first to analyze these indirect effects of
prospective bailouts, or bailout expectations, among unsupported banks.
They accounted, on average, for 40% of cumulative banking assets during
the TARP disbursement period (q4/08-q4/09). We test whether the
expectation of capital support affects unsupported banks' interest
margins and loan and deposit growth. This approach complements the focus
by Berger and Roman (2015b) and Li (2013) on differences between TARP
and non-TARP banks in terms of markups and loan supply, respectively,
such that we identify within the group of unsupported banks the presence
and magnitude of competitive distortions.
The empirical challenge is that bailout expectations usually are
not observable. The joint occurrence of bank support during the TARP
disbursement period and bank failures is an important exception that
enables us to estimate the likelihood that a distressed bank will be
rescued, relative to the probability it will fail, according to
banks' risk and size traits. In the spirit of Dam and Koetter
(2012), we extrapolate bailout expectations for sound banks based on
parameter estimates that can separate banks that received TARP support
from those that exited the market due to failures with high accuracy.
Proper identification of competition effects due to bailout expectations
rather than other determinants requires factors that can discern between
failing and supported banks but that are uncorrelated with the interest
margins of unsupported banks. Similar to Duchin and Sosyura (2012, 2014)
and Li (2013), we consider information of whether Congressional
representatives of the banks' counties were on the subcommittee of
financial services, their voting behavior in Congress about TARP, and
their party membership. On the basis of these parameter estimates, we
extrapolate the bailout expectations for sound banks. Controlling for
risk taking, we regress the generated bailout expectations revealed
during the TARP disbursement period on the loan rates charged, deposit
rates incurred, and corresponding volume changes after the end of the
subsidy program (q1/10-q4/13). These measures match the main channels
Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) cite to describe how bank bailouts distort
competition among unsupported peers.
Our results show that higher bailout expectations increase loan
rates and reduce deposit rates in the post-TARP period q1/10-q4/13. This
increase of interest rate margins is consistent with theory and robust
to matched sampling tests that seek to ensure comparability across the
TARP recipients we used to generate bailout expectations. These price
effects are most pronounced in the immediate aftermath of the TARP
disbursement, then turn insignificant after 2010. Any price distortions
due to changed bailout expectations among unsupported banks thus appear
to have been short lived. We find no evidence that banks that are
perceived as particularly likely to receive a bailout exhibit
significantly larger loan or deposit growth. This result mitigates
concerns by the COP that small, unsupported banks were particularly at
risk to lose market share. Overall, the increasing (decreasing) effect
on loan (deposit) rates is amplified in states where competitive
restrictions were more pronounced.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section II
outlines the empirical strategy, presents the data, and explains the
identification methods we used to estimate bailout expectations due to
government intervention via TARP. In Section III, we present the
estimation results for the bailout expectation effects after 2009 before
we conclude in Section IV.
II. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
A. Sampling
Following Hakenes and Schnabel (2010), we test the hypothesis that
higher bailout expectations increase interest margins and possibly loan
and deposit growth. But the likelihood of receiving a bailout, that is,
bailout expectations are usually not observable. The simultaneous
occurrence of both TARP support and bank failures between q4/08 and
q4/09 is exceptional, because regulators revealed which banks they
considered important enough to rescue. Selected banks received equity
support, while many banks that did not receive TARP support failed. To
test the indirect channel of competitive distortions due to bailout
expectations, we use observed failures and TARP bailouts during q4/08
and q4/09 (t = 1) to generate bailout expectations for sound banks
during q1/10 and q4/13 (t = 2). It is important to note that this
approach does not assume implicitly that the TARP program as such would
be extended, neither in terms of timing nor scope and volume. Instead,
we assume that the regulator is not equally likely to rescue any given
bank, but that there exists a latent implicit bailout propensity that
varies in the cross section of banks and is inherently unobservable
during normal times. All we exploit here is that the regulator had to
(unexpectedly) reveal this latent variable in response to the threat of
a system meltdown by admitting some banks to the TARP program while
letting others fail. Figure 1 illustrates the empirical strategy and
sampling.
In the upper part of Figure 1, we find that at the end of q3/08,
banks were either distressed and in need of support or sound. The
latter, sound banks should have no incentives to apply for TARP funds,
for three reasons: the funds were expensive, receiving support meant
limiting the compensation of managers, and TARP carried a potential
stigma cost (Bayazitova and Shivdasani 2012; DeYoung et al. 2013; Wall
Street Journal 2009). The regulator decides in period t = 1 which
distressed banks to rescue. Sound banks are sampled as all other
commercial banks that survived at least until q4/09, the end of the TARP
disbursement period. Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of
supported, failed, and sound banks per quarter during the crisis period
q4/08-q4/09 and for the period q1/10-q4/12.
Corresponding with the columns in Table 1, we sampled 548 of the
707 banks that received TARP and observed 136 failures as reported by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). In nine cases, banks
failed even after the holding company received TARP funds. We excluded
these cases from our analysis, leaving 127 failures and a failure rate
conditional on distress of around 22% during t = 1. Conditional on
distress, as revealed by the observable outcomes of bailout versus
failure, banks had to apply for TARP funds, though with only light
formal requirements.
The indirect competitive distortions of Hakenes and Schnabel (2010)
hinge on depositors' expectations that an unsupported bank they
supply with funds will be protected by a prospective bailout. (1) We
assume that agents form expectations about the likelihood of a bailout
relative to failure during t = 1 and extrapolate expectations to
nontreated banks after the TARP disbursement period ended, that is, to t
= 2.
Table 2 shows that the relatively small number of rescued banks
accounted for an average of 60% of aggregate (commercial) banking assets
in the United States, relative to the approximately 5,800 sound banks in
t = 1. More than half of the aggregate assets among TARP recipients
accrued to what Li (2013) calls the eight mega banks (Citigroup, JP
Morgan, Bank of America [including Merrill Lynch], Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, State Street, Bank of New York Mellon, and Wells Fargo
[including Wachovia]), which neither the government nor the Fed would
let fail, such that they were forced to take TARP funds. The columns
labeled "Forced" in Table 2 show that the mean size difference
between supported and unsupported sound banks was driven by this group,
such that the mean bank size of supported sound banks was $11 billion,
whereas that for the unsupported sound banks was $0.5 billion. The
COP's concern that smaller, unsupported banks would suffer from
distortions thus seemed justified. Furthermore, the 40% share of total
assets managed by sound banks warrants an analysis of potential
competitive distortions within this group.
The lower panel in Figure 1 shows the four possible scenarios that
banks faced in t = 2 (q1/10-q4/13). First, TARP recipients could fail or
survive in t = 2. Only one TARP recipient failed. The remaining 547 TARP
banks survived until q4/13, representing the distressed sample, as
depicted by the branches inside the dashed box in Figure 1. Second,
sound banks from t = 1 either failed or survived in t = 2, as noted in
the solid box in Figure 1. Of the 5,900 sound banks in q4/09, 275 failed
during t = 2, and 5,177 non-TARP recipients survived through q4/13.
A test of direct distortion effects (Berger and Roman, 2015b;
Calderon and Schaeck 2015; Li 2013) would seek to identify the
differential effect of bailout support in the full sample, as indicated
in Figure 1 by the dotted box between TARP and non-TARP banks (dashed
vs. solid boxes). We test the effect that heterogeneous bailout
expectations have on unsupported banks only, sampled in the solid box in
Figure 1. With this setup, we can determine whether government rescue
schemes exert obvious effects on rescued banks relative to nonrescued
ones but also affect the group of supposedly sound banks.
B. Specification
In the first stage, we approximate bailout expectations at t = 1 by
using a probit model to estimate the probability of receiving TARP
relative to failing, while controlling for bank traits X that gauge risk
and importance, as well as regional economic conditions (Dam and Koetter
2012). The dependent variable TARP is an indicator variable equal to 1
if a bank i received equity in a quarter t between q4/08 and q4/09 or 0
if the bank failed:
(1) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
Control variables capturing the bank characteristics and regional
control variables X are lagged by one-quarter and explained in detail in
Section II.C and Table 3. However, the decision to bailout a bank is
unlikely to be independent of the bank's market power, as reflected
by its ability to set prices. Therefore, we need to deal with a
potentially endogenous relationship between generated bailout
expectations, loan rates [R.sup.L], and deposit rates [R.sup.D]. To
identify the effect of bailout expectations on interest rates, we
specify exclusion restrictions P that are uncorrelated with rates but
that effectively distinguish between failing and rescued banks.
We follow Duchin and Sosyura (2012, 2014) and Li (2013) when
specifying P and use four political variables, reflecting our allocation
of each bank i to Congresspeople representing the region d where the
bank resides. First, we define two dummy variables (SC0709 and SC0911)
if a Congressperson was on the subcommittee of financial services during
2007-2009 and 2009-2011. As Li (2013) argues, members of this
subcommittee should possess expert knowledge and qualifications that
enhance their ability to judge the rescue program and the decision to
provide funds to certain banks. Second, we use a dummy variable (2nd
Vote) that shows whether a Congressperson voted yes (1) or no (0) for
the second vote on TARP. The idea behind this variable is that
representatives' opinions might have changed between the two votes
on TARP if his or her region had been granted specific concessions, such
as financial support in the form of government projects. We therefore
regarded the second vote on TARP as more important for our analysis but
find that our results do not change if we specify the first vote on TARP
instead or use both simultaneously. Third, we identify the party of each
Congressperson (Party0709 and Party0911) for the respective session,
equal to 1 if the representative was a Democrat and 0 otherwise. This
variable acknowledges that ideology differs systematically, such that
conservative Republicans tend to oppose government interventions more
categorically than Democrats Li (2013). We provide the descriptive
statistics in the top panel of Table 4.
In the second stage, we assess the effect of bailout expectations
[E[TARP = 1].sub.it] on price competition, as reflected by the interest
rates that banks received on loans [R.sup.L] and paid for (deposit)
funding [R.sup.D]. Note that we estimate parameters to predict bailouts
in Equation (1) only for those banks that are distressed and applied
(successfully) for TARP funding or failed during t = 1. To predict
bailout expectations for sound banks in each quarter of t = 2, we use
the estimated parameters of Equation (1), [??] and [??]. That is, we
extrapolate bailout expectations to sound banks (Dam and Koetter 2012).
These descriptive statistics appear in the third panel of Table 4.
We estimate a fixed effects regression for t = 2, q1/10 to q4/13.
With our interest in the indirect effects of government bailouts, we
estimate the relationship for sound banks only, that is, the sample
indicated by the solid box in Figure 1. Formally,
(2) [R.sub.it] = [b.sub.0] + [b.sub.1] E [[TARP = 1].sub.it] +
[R.summation over (r=2)] [b.sub.r] [X.sub.rit-1] + [[tau].sub.t] +
[[mu].sub.i] + [[gamma].sub.year] x [[theta].sub.state] + [e.sub.it].
With this approach, we derive results for five dependent variables:
interest rates on total loans ([R.sup.TL]), real estate loans
([R.sup.RE]), commercial and industrial lending ([R.sup.CI]), deposit
rates ([R.sup.DI]), and total funding ([R.sup.TF]). All interest rates
reflect the annualized quarterly yield a banks receives on loans or pays
on funding (for the descriptive statistics, see the second panel of
Table 4). Asset yields reflect interest and fee income for the
respective asset class divided by the average of this asset class. The
funding yields reflect all costs associated with the funding item
divided by the average of the funding volume. (2) In addition to the
identical vector of control variables X in Equation (1), we specify
quarterly dummies [[tau].sup.t], bank-fixed effects [[mu].sub.i], and
cluster standard errors at the bank level. The term [[gamma].sub.year] x
[[theta].sub.state] reflects interacted year and state effects that
capture additional time-varying differences on the state level.
The variable Bailout expectation in Table 4 describes E[[TARP =
1].sub.it] during and after TARP. During the TARP disbursement period,
bailout expectations are significantly higher for banks that received
TARP compared with the (extrapolated) bailout expectations of sound
banks. This difference is statistically insignificant for the
postdisbursement period. However, especially in the post-TARP period,
the dispersion of bailout expectations is highest within the group of
sound banks. This heterogeneity in agents' expectations about
prospective bailouts should affect required risk premiums, and thus
prices (Hakenes and Schnabel 2010), for both supported and especially
unsupported banks.
C. Data Sources
We obtained data from five different sources. First, we used
financial accounts and failed bank data from the FDIC. Second, we
obtained TARP recipient identities from the Department of the U.S.
Treasury. Third, we gathered data to measure the voting behavior of
Congressional representatives and their party affiliations from the
website of the U.S. House of Representatives. Fourth, county-level
unemployment rates came from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the
state-level Case-Shiller indices came from the FRED database provided by
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Fifth, we used data on loan and
funding interest rates for U.S. banks obtained from the Uniform Bank
Performance Reports of the Federal Financial Institution Examination
office.
We started with 8,231 banks for the period q4/08-q4/13 but cleaned
these data. First, we restricted the sample to commercial banks, leaving
7,191 banks. (3) Second, we dropped all banks with headquarters outside
the U.S. mainland and the District of Columbia, resulting in a sample of
7,177 banks. Third, by requiring complete observations for all variables
used in the analysis, we reduced the sample to 7,165 banks. (4) Fourth,
to exclude mergers and voluntary exits, we followed Kashyap and Stein
(2000) and required that all banks not recorded as failures by the FDIC
survived until q4/13. This culling left 6,172 banks. Fifth, we required
that the remaining banks have consecutive years, so the final sample
included 6,135 banks.
We followed Wheelock and Wilson (2000) and Cole and White (2012) in
our choice of control variables; the descriptive statistics for TARP,
failed, and sound banks during and after the crisis period appear in
Table 4.
To control for risk buffers, we used the equity-to-asset ratio
(EQ). The variable Loans reflected the ratio of total loans to total
assets, so as to control for the relative importance of credit business
to the bank. The Cash variable indicated banks' cash, standardized
by total assets. We control for profitability using the pre-tax return
on assets, RoA. The share of nonperforming assets over assets (NPA) also
controlled for asset risk. To address the differences between small and
large banks, we used Size, the natural logarithm of total assets. In
addition, to capture differences in funding structure, we specified
Deposits as the share of total deposits to total assets. For the local
economic conditions, we specified the county-level rate of unemployment
UR. For each bank and quarter, this variable equaled the mean of county
unemployment rates from the bank's business regions, as indicated
by the summary of deposits weighted by the bank's deposits in each
county. The variable CS index was the state-level Case-Shiller index.
The bottom panel of Table 4 provides descriptive statistics.
III. RESULTS
A. Identification of Bailout Expectations
To assess the effect of prospective bank bailouts on price
competition, we must identify bailout expectations accurately. Valid
exclusion restrictions must explain bailout expectations as well as be
weakly correlated with the endogenous variables, asset, and liability
interest rates. Table 5 shows the estimated marginal effects of Equation
(1) for each instrument, specified both individually and jointly.
The joint specification in column (1) shows that the instruments
correlate significantly with bailout expectations and thereby confirms
the relevance of political factors as means to discern between rescued
and failed banks: Banks in districts with a Congressperson who voted
"yes" on the second TARP vote were more likely to receive
bailout funds. Banks in districts with a representative who also sat on
the subcommittee of financial services were more likely to be bailed out
during the 2007-2009 period. Banks in districts whose representatives
were members of the subcommittee during 2009-2011 were less likely to
receive TARP support. Party membership in both periods significantly
predicted whether a bank would be bailed out or fail too. For example,
banks operating in a region represented by a Democrat in the first
session (2007-2009) were more likely to receive TARP funding, whereas
this relation flips in the second session (2009-2011), indicating a
shift in the assessment of Democratic Congresspersons about which banks
were eligible for TARP. All instruments in column (1) differed
individually significantly from 0. An E-test statistic larger than 15
corroborated the joint significance of all five variables, in support of
the instruments' validity. The specifications in columns (2)
through (6) show that most instruments also correlate significantly with
bailout expectations on an individual basis. The coefficients for the
subcommittee dummy of 2007-2009 and party membership of 2009-2011 change
signs in columns (3) and (6) compared with column (1) but are
insignificant in the individual specifications.
The average marginal effects of bank characteristics and the
regional unemployment rate in Table 5 show that banks with larger equity
buffers, banks acting in states with a higher Case-Shiller index, and
more profitable banks were more likely to be bailed out. This result is
broadly in line with the intention of the U.S. Treasury to rescue only
those banks that had the potential to repay their TARP support (Duchin
and Sosyura 2014; Li 2013). In contrast, banks with high loan ratios,
lots of troubled assets, and with high cash ratios were less likely to
receive TARP funds.
Regarding the orthogonality requirement between instruments and
interest rates, we cannot use conventional tests, because we use
extrapolated bailout expectations from t = 1 to explain the
price-setting behavior of sound banks during t = 2. This instrumental
variable setting is nonstandard, in that the first and second stages
pertain to different samples at different time horizons. To test whether
political indicators P are only weakly correlated with the interest rate
outcome variables, we instead regressed the full set of controls X
together with the instruments P on our main dependent variables, after
the disbursement of TARP funds, for the sample of sound banks only
(Table 6). Thus we can test if bailout expectations revealed during
q4/08 and q4/09 affected asset and liability interest rates after the
TARP disbursement period for the group of sound banks. Valid instruments
should exhibit very weak correlations with the dependent variables
during the disbursement period, but also after 2009.
Each column in Table 6 confirms that for each dependent variable,
most of the instruments exhibited no correlation after the TARP
disbursement period. Only party membership and sitting on the financial
services subcommittee were significant and only in some cases. The
F-tests in the bottom panel also indicate the joint insignificance for
all interest rates except commercial and industrial lending after TARP
stopped. In summary, these results supported the validity of the
exclusion restrictions to identify bailout expectations.
B. Bailout Expectation Effects on Interest Rates
Table 7 reports the estimation results for the baseline
specification of Equation (2), designed to explain the impact of bailout
expectations on interest rates as a measure of banking market
competition. The variable of interest is the contemporaneous bailout
expectation calculated from the estimates of Equation (1). We also
specify the same control variables as in Equation (1) to account for
bank characteristics, and risk in particular, and regional economic
factors. These variables are lagged by one-quarter, as indicated by the
prefix L. Finally, we control for bank, quarter, and interacted
year-state fixed effects.
The five columns in Table 7 reflect each of the five asset and
liability interest rates. For column (1), which shows the results for
interest rates on total loans, recall that the sample comprises banks
that never received TARP support after the program stopped in q4/09, or
the solid box in Figure 1. Sound banks that were considered more likely
to receive a bailout, should they face distress, realized significantly
higher yields. An increase of bailout expectations by 1 percentage point
increased yields by 0.0014 basis points. This is minuscule and shows
that despite being significant, the economic effect of higher bailout
expectations absent for the sample of sound banks. Put into perspective,
an increase of bailout expectations by one standard deviation (0.1899,
see Table 3) would increase loan interest rates by 2.65 basis points. In
light of an average loan yield of about 6% between q1/10 and q4/13, this
reflects an increase of loan rates of about 4%.
Columns (2) and (3) confirm both the direction and the significance
of these results for real estate and commercial and industrial lending,
respectively. Banks with higher bailout expectations generated higher
yields for real estate loans and commercial and industrial loans. In
terms of economic magnitudes, the effects were comparable for real
estate loans and total lending. The increase in commercial and
industrial loan rates in response to an increase in bailout expectations
was approximately around twice as large as the total loan rates.
These positive effects on loan rates, and thus markups as a measure
of market power, are in line with the findings by Berger and Roman
(2015b) and might indicate that loan customers consider a stable credit
relationship important. While the failure of a bank for previously
conducted credit disbursements to a company may not be disruptive, most
companies rely on irrevocable credit commitments and credit lines from
these banks as well. Therefore, they may be willing to incur somewhat
higher loan interest rates with banks they consider more likely to be
rescued in case of distress. However, our setting also differs in
important ways from Berger and Roman (2015b), who study the
contemporaneous effects of TARP support between recipients and
nonrecipients on (generated) measures of market power. Because we
consider solely the reactions of banks that were not directly rescued,
we explain the within-group variation of interest rates among sound
banks. If bailout policies do not alter competitive conditions, as
reflected by loan prices, differences in bailout expectations should be
uncorrelated. The reported positive significant effect therefore offers
important evidence that the dominant safety net effect reported by
Berger and Roman (2015b), that is, rescued banks are considered safer,
also extends to banks for which suppliers of funds anticipate bailouts
to be more likely.
Positive bank asset interest rates are not the primary channel by
which prospective bailouts reduce markups, according to the theoretical
model of Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) though. Instead, they propose bank
market power, manifested as interest margins, increases because
depositors are willing to accept a lower risk premium, which implies
lower funding costs for implicitly protected banks. Columns (4) and (5)
in Table 7 show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
relationship among bailout expectations, deposits, and total funding
interest rates for the whole period, q1/10-q4/13.
In unreported results, we find very similar results when we use
banks' Lerner indices as in Berger and Roman (2015b) and Li (2013)
to approximate markups. Here, an increase of bailout expectations leads
to significantly higher Lerner indices which are driven by a reduction
of marginal cost. Average revenues seem to be unaffected by bailout
expectations in our analysis. For four other loan categories (customer,
credit card, agricultural, and foreign), we cannot estimate these
effects with sufficient precision to obtain statistical significance,
mostly because of much smaller sample sizes.
C. Extrapolation of Bailout Expectations Revisited
Both the absence of reduced required interest rates on the funding
side and the positive correlation between lending rates and bailout
expectations may be spurious results, due to the extrapolation of
bailout expectations after q4/09 from observed bailout behavior between
q4/08 and q4/09. We address these concerns with a series of robustness
tests and report the results in Table 8. Out of space considerations, we
only provide coefficients for the variable of interest, bailout
expectations: we suppress the estimates for the other controls and fixed
effects in Equation (2). To begin, in the first panel of Table 8, we
replicate the baseline results from Table 7 for comparison. Next, in the
second panel, we provide the results for a sample that excludes banks
that were sound in t = 1 but failed in t = 2 (275, see Figure 1).
According to Hakenes and Schnabel (2010), unsupported banks respond to
competition from subsidized peers by taking riskier lending activities
to increase their expected returns. We explicitly control for risk
taking, but such formerly sound banks may be exactly those in the
bold-outlined sample in Figure 1 that did not experience reduced funding
costs and (over)compensated for the competitive pressure from their
rescued peers by seeking high yield, high risk projects that eventually
led to failure during t = 2. Because excluding these failing banks did
not reduce the marginal effect significantly though, this test confirmed
that our baseline results were not driven by (excessively) risky,
unsupported banks.
The third panel of Table 8 features on the sample indicated by the
dotted line in Figure 1, namely, both TARP and non-TARP banks considered
jointly (Berger and Roman, 2015b; Li 2013). As Figure 1 shows, only one
TARP bank failed after q4/09. With this robustness test, we still found
a positive, significant effect for the interest rates of asset-side
yields but no effect on the funding side. It remains unclear whether the
lower risk premiums required by banks' financiers reflect a
differential effect of TARP or variation in the within-sound bank group
of formerly sound, unsupported banks' bailout expectations in the
post-TARP period. This ambiguity motivated us to consider asset and
liability interest rates in t = 2 among only those banks that were sound
in t = 1. (5)
The specification of Equation (2) for the TARP-only sample in the
fourth panel of Table 8, equivalent to the dashed box in Figure 1,
illustrates that variation in the within-sound bank group drove the
positive effect of bailout expectations on bank yields. During
q1/10-q4/13, the 548 banks that received TARP funds and operated during
period t = 2 did not exhibit any significant correlation with yields.
The absence of this result affirms the theoretical prediction of Hakenes
and Schnabel (2010) that the direct effect of support should be
ambiguous and even potentially negative in terms of risk taking. In our
study setting, we controlled for the level of risk taking using
bank-specific covariates, which exhibited similar magnitudes,
significance, and directions across the four samples. The variation of
risk-controlled interest rates between TARP and non-TARP banks thus
appeared to hinge on the relationship between bailout expectations and
loan and funding rates.
Our approach also allows for the extrapolation of bailout
expectations from the TARP disbursement period to sound banks to the
subsequent period, with the crucial assumption that distressed banks
during q4/08-q4/09 are comparable to sound banks as of q1/10. We
challenge this assumption though by presenting, in the bottom panel of
Table 8, results based on matched samples between bailed out and sound
banks. To ensure that we calculated bailout expectations for sound banks
that shared similar characteristics with banks that received TARP funds,
we ran propensity score matching. The matching process relied on the
vector of bank characteristics and regional control variables X from
Equation (1). We specified a 1:1 matching, such that for each distressed
bank, we linked one sound bank with the highest propensity score between
q4/08 and q4/09. Formally, our propensity score matching method used a
logit regression, E[[DIS = 1].sub.i] = [[lambda].sub.0] +
[[summation].sup.C.sub.c-1] [[lambda].sub.c] [X.sub.ci] +
[[phi].sub.it], to differentiate between TARP recipients from failing
banks, whether distressed banks (DIS = 1) or sound ones (DIS = 0),
during the crisis period of q4/08-q4/09. Using a nearest neighbor
matching without replacement, we required that each pair was not
different at a 1% level, according to the matrix of bank and regional
variables X. We present the effect of the matching process and the
resulting size of the treatment and control groups in Table 9, revealing
both bias before and a significant reduction in bias after matching.
A comparison of distressed and sound banks that were matched (M)
and unmatched (U) revealed the importance of an appropriate
counterfactual sample when extrapolating bailout expectations.
Specifically, unmatched sound banks were significantly better
capitalized, more profitable, riskier, larger, more liquid, more retail
funding oriented, and more loan-based in their asset composition. They
tended to operate in regional markets with less unemployment and higher
real estate prices. Thus, extrapolation of bailout expectations to any
sound banks would appear overly optimistic.
Using only the sample of matched banks to assess the effect of
bailout expectations on interest rates in the bottom panel of Table 8,
we confirmed our baseline results for two of the three loan rates we
considered. Specifically, the rows indicated by "M" in Table 9
show the comparability of these institutions with distressed banks.
Higher bailout expectations generated higher yields on total loans and
commercial and industrial loans, whereas the effect on real estate loan
rates was insignificant for the matched sample. The magnitude of
positive interest rate effects due to higher rescue probabilities
reached twice as high for total and commercial and industrial loans.
These results emphasized the importance of extrapolating bailout
prospects only to sufficiently similar, sound banks.
Perhaps more important is the result showing that funding costs and
deposit interest rates fell by approximately 1 basis point in response
to a one standard deviation increase in bailout expectations. Thus, the
reduction in required risk premiums predicted by Hakenes and Schnabel
(2010) was statistically significant for this matched sample. Although
lower than the effect on loan rates, the effect on deposit rates was
economically more pronounced, given the average funding cost of 2%
instead of 6% for the average loan rates (see Table 3).
The effects on interest margin components thus appear driven by
within-sound bank differences in bailout prospects, rather than
differences between TARP and non-TARP recipients. Generating bailout
expectations also requires the careful construction of an appropriate
counterfactual sample of sound banks that are sufficiently comparable to
distressed banks during the TARP disbursement period. With this sample,
we found statistically and economically significant effects of increased
bailout expectations, in line with theory, including larger loan
interest rates and reduced funding rates for banks.
D. Timing Differences
Most of the concerns about the potentially distortionary effects of
bailouts on banking market competition were voiced shortly after TARP
was terminated in q4/09 (Beck et al. 2010; Congressional Oversight Panel
2011). Beyond this focus, another critical question is whether emergency
rescues affected interest rates only in the short run or if any
potential distortions exhibited a longer duration.
In Table 10, we present the results of an interaction of generated
bailout expectations with year dummies for the years 2010, 2011, 2012,
and 2013 when estimating Equation (2). Given our preceding results in
Tables 8 and 9, we consider only the matched sample. The baseline
results did differ significantly across the 3 years after the TARP
period, q4/08-q4/09. Regarding loan rates, we found significantly
positive effects on total loan rates for the first 2 years after TARP
stopped. Magnitudes declined from the 6 basis point hike in response to
the one standard deviation increase in bailout expectations to 3.6 basis
points in 2011. Thereafter, the estimated coefficients remained positive
but no longer statistically significant. Contrary to the results across
all post-TARP years in Table 8, both real estate and commercial and
industrial loans exhibited significantly larger interest rate effects in
2010. After the initial increases in loan rates though, bailout
expectations no longer had any impact on credit costs. The predicted
reduction of funding rates similarly was significant only immediately
after TARP stopped. After 2010, we found no significantly reduced
deposit or total funding rates among the sample of matched, sound U.S.
banks.
Our results thus suggest that the effect of TARP on nonrescued
banks' loan rates was short lived. As such, we find no support for
the concerns of the COP that competitive distortions, in the sense of
more expensive credit, prevailed over a longer period of time.
E. Loan and Deposit Growth
In addition to the predicted effects on loan and deposit rates,
Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) anticipate volume effects in response to
differences in the likelihood of prospective bailouts. In their model,
banks subjected to higher prospective bailouts can use their funding
advantages to gain loan and deposit market shares from unprotected
competitors. The intuition is that protected banks can afford to attract
more deposits at given funding rates, because savers perceive those
banks as safe havens. On the credit side, protected banks can offer more
competitive interest rates on loans and thereby expand their lending
faster than unprotected banks at a given risk level.
To test for possible volume effects, we detail quarterly changes in
the level of loans and deposits during q1/10 and q4/13 in Table 11. The
first columns show quarterly changes in total loans, real estate loans,
and commercial and industrial loans as dependent variable. Increasing
bailout expectations exerted no statistically significant effect on loan
growth in our sample. Any competitive distortions to credit markets in
response to TARP thus appear confined to markup pricing (Berger and
Roman, 2015b) rather than creating an expansion of inefficient lending
(Dell'Ariccia and Marquez 2004). For deposit growth, we again found
no evidence that more protected banks enjoyed stronger inflows of
deposits. (6)
One possible explanation for the absence of any volume effects
could stem from the different timing of bailout expectation effects. In
the immediate aftermath of the crisis, savers may have been eager to
seek safe havens, but then they "forgot" about the real
possibility of bank failures when determining their required deposit
rates (regarding bounded rationality in the subprime crisis, see
Gennaioli and Shleifer 2011). Table 12 shows the effects of bailout
expectations on loan and deposit growth over time: We find no
significant loan growth effects in any of the post-TARP periods and only
a very weak immediate reduction in deposits in 2010.
Overall, these results indicated no crowding out of deposit taking
or loan granting by banks that were more protected, in terms of higher
bailout expectations. Thus, competitive distortions among U.S. banks due
to TARP apparently were confined to markup pricing in the immediate
aftermath of the support program.
F. Bailout Expectations Across Capitalization and Size Classes
Berger and Roman (2015a, 2015b) show that larger and better
capitalized TARP recipients were able to reap competitive advantages and
changed their lending patterns differently. Therefore, Tables 13 and 14
reproduce the results of the matched sample in Table 8 with interaction
terms for well-capitalized banks and banks of different size classes,
respectively. (7) We define well-capitalized banks according to Berger
and Roman (2015b) as those that exhibit a total equity ratio of at least
7%. When we specify an according interaction term the results in Table
13 show that the direct positive effect of bailout expectations on loan
rates reported in Table 8 is qualitatively confirmed for low-capitalized
banks, but not statistically discernible from zero. The interaction
terms for both total loans and real estate loans indicate, in turn, that
especially well-capitalized banks that are considered more likely to
receive support are also able to charge higher loan rates. The
differential effect for commercial and industrial loans is also
positive, but not statistically significant. Overall, the results are
consistent with the finding of Berger and Roman (2015b) that better
capitalized banks were able to realize market power due to the TARP
program.
The result for deposit rates highlights that the coefficient
estimate for bailout expectation in Table 8 is potentially driven by
well-capitalized banks because the single term of bailout expectations
is insignificant while the interaction effect is negative and
significant. The single effect of being a well-capitalized bank, that
is, with a bailout expectation of zero, is significantly positive. But
with higher bailout expectations, well-capitalized banks can reduce the
rates banks offer on deposits significantly in comparison to
low-capitalized banks. In summary, higher perceived rescue outlooks
seems to render depositors satisfied with lower risk premia for
well-capitalized banks.
The stratification of different size classes is based on gross
total assets. We distinguish three groups (small, medium, and large) as
in Berger and Roman (2015b). Thereby, banks are categorized as small if
they have less than $1 billion of total assets. Banks with more than $3
billion of total assets are classified as large banks. Banks with total
assets between $1 billion and $3 billion are categorized as medium
banks. Small banks are the reference group for the regressions in Table
14. The positive effect of bailout expectations on total loan yields
remains intact and is not significantly different for medium or large
banks. However, for commercial and industrial lending we find a
differential effect of bank size on bailout expectations, namely a
mitigating one for banks in the largest size class. Moreover, Table 14
shows that the specification of size class dummies implies that we can
estimate the effect of bailout expectations on deposit rates and overall
funding cost more precisely. We find that large banks have to pay
significantly higher rates for deposits than small and medium banks. The
coefficient on total funding yields is significantly negative as in
Table 8 and thus in line with theoretical predictions of Hakenes and
Schnabel (2010). The interaction terms further suggest that medium and
large banks are not different to small banks and also enjoy benefits
from lower bailout expectations in terms of having to offer reduced risk
premia to suppliers of funding, a result also in line with Berger and
Roman (2015b).
G. Branching Restrictions
As noted by Beck et al. (2010), a major challenge to any bailout
scheme, even one with perfectly equal disbursement terms, is that banks
already operate under distinct competitive conditions. For example,
competitive conditions vary widely across U.S. states: Rice and Strahan
(2010) even offer an index to gauge states' various implementations
of the Riegle-Neal Act, permitting interstate and intrastate branching.
Differences in the timing of states' regulation choices to ease
entry by out-of-state banks affected lending to small and medium
enterprises. Koetter et al. (2012) also show that these differences in
branching restrictions after Riegle-Neal can explain differences in
Lerner indices across U.S. banks from different states. Similarly, TARP
interventions may have led to more pronounced price competition effects
in regional banking markets that already were less competitive. By
distinguishing three groups of regional banking markets by their values
of state-specific branching restrictions, we derive a model of the
interaction of bailout expectations with the three indicator variables
for markets with low, medium, and high restriction levels.
Regarding the effects on total loan rates, the results in Table 15
indicate an increasing effect of larger bailout expectations. A one
standard deviation increase in bailout expectations in a comparably
competitive state (e.g., Michigan, with zero restrictions according to
Rice and Strahan 2010) prompts a 6.5 basis point hike in mean total loan
rates; this increase was 11 basis points in the least competitive
states, such as Texas and Iowa. The significance of this pattern varies
for real estate and commercial versus industrial lending, but it remains
qualitatively intact. Banks that operated in more competitive
environments prior to TARP, which presumably already faced thin economic
margins, experienced the weakest hikes due to higher bailout
expectations. In addition, higher bailout expectations reduced the
funding costs in the regional banking markets that were least regulated.
Banks operating in increasingly uncompetitive markets instead exhibited
no significant reduction in deposit rates.
Overall, the concern that equity support for certain banks could
aggravate existing differences in the level of market power seems
justified for credit markets. Higher bailout expectations increased loan
rates, especially in less competitive markets. With respect to deposit
taking, only the least regulated states suffered the negative effect of
bailout expectations on interest rates.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have investigated if bank bailouts between q4/08 and q4/09
affected the pricing and growth of loans and deposits among U.S. banks
after the program stopped. Specifically, we used political indicators to
identify the bailout expectations of U.S. banks through observed TARP
equity support, relative to failure, between q4/08 and q4/09. From this
revealed assessment of regulators about which types of banks warrant a
bailout, we extrapolate bailout expectations among sound banks after
TARP stopped.
This empirical test therefore addresses whether bank rescue schemes
affected the competitive behavior of not only rescued but also sound
banks. Political indicators of the voting behavior on TARP, party
membership, and membership on the financial subcommittee are appropriate
exclusion restrictions for explaining the probability that a bank will
receive a bailout. After controlling for risk differences across banks
and local macro conditions, these covariates effectively explain TARP
support, but they remain uncorrelated with key measures of pricing
power, namely interest rates on loans and deposits.
Using our model parameters to explain TARP support, we generate
bailout expectations for the group of sound banks after q4/09. The
differences in loan and deposit rates can be explained by these
expectations, though doing so requires an adequate counterfactual sample
of sound banks that is sufficiently similar to distressed banks until
q4/09. After matching distressed banks with sound banks, we demonstrate
that an increase in bailout expectations by one standard deviation has a
statistically significant effect on loan rates. However, the economic
effect on total loan rates is small on the order of 4.5 basis points.
Deposit rates fall by around I basis point, which may reflect lower risk
premiums required by savers for protected banks. The small economic
effects indicate that TARP, despite being statistically significantly
related to loan and deposit yields after 2009, did not distort loan and
deposit rates of sound banks economically.
Further tests indicate that the interest rate effects of bailout
expectations pertain primarily to the immediate aftermath of TARP but
become insignificant after 2010. Likewise, we find little indication
that protected banks expanded either their lending or deposit taking at
the expense of less protected banks. The concerns of the Congressional
Oversight Panel (2011), about creating sustained differences in regional
banking market competition, to the detriment of smaller banks, thus
appear unfounded. However, loan rate increases were largest for
well-capitalized banks and banks in states that had been most
restrictive in the implementation of interstate branching. Thus, TARP
might have aggravated differences in banking competition that existed
prior to the rescue period.
doi: 10.1111/ecin.12281
Online Early publication October 30, 2015
ABBREVIATIONS
COP: Congressional Oversight Panel
CPP: Capital Purchase Program
TARP: Troubled Asset Relief Program
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MICHAEL KOETTER and FELIX NOTH *
* We thank two anonymous referees and the editor Martin Gervais for
their valuable input. We are grateful for the feedback received at the
2013 meetings of the European Economic Association, the German Finance
Association, the Financial Management Association, and the 2014
SUERF/FinLawMetrics conference. We also received valuable feedback at
the seminar series of the Universities of Cologne and Diisseldorf as
well as the European Central Bank. Without implicating them, we thank
Allen Berger, Philipp Hartmann, Marie Hoerova, Gunter Loffler, Stephen
Karolyi, Andrea Tiseno, and Michael Wedow for questions, discussions,
and input. This paper has been prepared by the authors under the Wim
Duisenberg Research Fellowship Programme sponsored by the ECB. Any views
expressed are only those of the authors and do not necessarily represent
the views of the ECB or the Eurosystem. All errors are our own.
Koetter: Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, 60314,
Frankfurt am Main, Germany; Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH),
06017, Halle (Saale), Germany. Phone +49 69153008446, Fax +49
691530084446, E-mail m.koetter@fs.de
Noth: Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), 06017, Halle
(Saale), Germany; Otto-von-Guericke University, 39114, Magdeburg,
Germany. Phone +49 345 7753 702, Fax +49 345 7753 820, E-mail
felix.noth@iwh-halle.de
(1.) Note that this mechanism also holds in the presence of deposit
insurance, given insurance caps of $250,000 for deposits that apply to
all banks equally (Lambert et al. 2015) since October 2008 and $100,000
before that date. During the period when we extract bailout
expectations, only around 60% of deposits are insured in our sample,
thus leaving a substantial uninsured portion of retail funding.
Moreover, Huang and Ratnovski (2011) show that the share of generally
uninsured wholesale funding dominated retail borrowing in recent years.
(2.) Details on the exact data items from UBPR and the calculation
are in Table 3.
(3.) We consider a bank a commercial bank if the FDIC's data
item "charter class" is either "N," "NM,"
or "SM." That excludes all state chartered savings banks and
thrifts and OCC (OTS) supervised federally chartered thrifts.
(4.) We winsorize all bank variables at the 0.5% and 99.5% levels.
(5.) In unreported tests, we confirmed that our results did not
reflect only those banks regarded as "too big to fail," by
estimating Equation (2) without the very big banks (Duchin and Sosyura
2014).
(6.) In unreported robustness checks, we leave out lagged loan and
deposit shares as explanatory variables to account for the fact that
both variables are very likely to be correlated with growth rates of
loans and deposits. As for the baseline, we find no significant effects
of bailout expectations on credit growth. But the negative effect on
deposit growth is significant.
(7.) Note that we leave out the continuous control variable for
equity in Table 13 and size in Table 14. Both variables are highly
correlated with the introduced dummy variables. However, the results are
not qualitatively different when we leave the continuous terms in the
regressions.
TABLE 1
Distressed and Sound Banks
TARP Fail Entry Sound Survivor
q4/08 171 12 0 5,837 6,008
q1/09 239 24 1 5,745 5,985
q2/09 81 21 33 5,883 5,997
q3/09 30 42 9 5,925 5,964
q4/09 27 37 0 5,900 5,927
q1/10 0 35 0 5,892 5,892
q2/10 0 36 6 5,856 5,862
q3/10 0 31 1 5,831 5,832
q4/10 0 27 0 5,805 5.805
q1/11 0 24 2 5,781 5,783
q2/11 0 19 10 5,764 5,774
q3/11 0 24 7 5,750 5,757
q4/11 0 17 4 5,740 5.744
q1/12 0 13 8 5,731 5,739
q2/12 0 11 14 5,728 5,742
q3/12 0 10 2 5.732 5,734
q4/12 0 6 6 5,728 5,734
q1/13 0 3 7 5,731 5,738
q2/13 0 11 2 5,727 5,729
q3/13 0 6 3 5,723 5,726
q4/13 0 2 0 5,724 5,724
Notes: The columns of Table 1 list the number of banks that received
assistance from the trouble asset relief program (TARP), failed
(Fail), entered the sample (Entry), or were sound, not in distress at
a particular point in time. The last column shows the number of banks
that survived at the end of a quarter between q4/08 and q4/13. In
this table, we include the nine banks that failed during the crisis
period while their holding company received TARP, though we exclude
these cases in our regression analysis.
TABLE 2
Size of TARP Banks
Sum of Total Assets ($billion)
TARP
All Forced Other Sound
q4/08 4,023.59 2,532.19 1,491.39 2,940.18
q1/09 4,118.00 2,466.66 1,651.35 2,727.04
q2/09 4,122.16 2,443.76 1,678.40 2,687.32
q3/09 4,253.08 2,468.62 1,784.46 2,687.33
q4/09 4,425.83 2,479.84 1,946.00 2,687.34
q1/10 4,913.99 2,987.70 1,926.29 2,687.35
q2/10 4,823.35 2,890.65 1,932.70 2,687.36
q3/10 4,933.49 2,973.26 1,960.23 2,687.37
q4/10 4,937.41 2,980.60 1,956.81 2,687.38
q1/11 5,063.04 3,075.87 1,987.17 2,687.39
q2/11 5,218.12 3,176.24 2,041.87 2,687.40
q3/11 5,356.53 3,264.77 2,091.76 2,687.41
q4/11 5,425.53 3,210.25 2,215.28 2,687.42
q1/12 5,451.84 3,233.67 2,218.17 2,687.43
q2/12 5,508.04 3,216.00 2,292.04 2,687.44
q3/12 5,614.10 3,370.17 2,243.92 2,687.45
q4/12 5,880.63 3,491.13 2,389.50 2,687.46
q1/13 5,904.50 3.540.57 2,363.92 2,687.47
q2/13 5,961.98 3,567.85 2,394.13 2,687.48
q3/13 6.084.01 3,659.43 2,424.58 2,687.49
q4/13 6,185.00 3,689.88 2,495.12 2,687.50
Average of Total Assets ($billion)
TARP
All Forced Other Sound
q4/08 23.53 422.03 9.04 0.54
q1/09 10.04 411.11 4.09 0.52
q2/09 8.40 407.29 3.46 0.52
q3/09 8.16 411.44 3.46 0.53
q4/09 8.08 413.31 3.59 0.55
q1/10 8.97 497.95 3.55 0.56
q2/10 8.80 481.78 3.57 0.57
q3/10 9.00 495.54 3.62 0.58
q4/10 9.01 496.77 3.61 0.59
q1/11 9.24 512.64 3.67 0.60
q2/11 9.52 529.37 3.77 0.62
q3/11 9.77 544.13 3.86 0.64
q4/11 9.90 642.05 4.08 0.65
q1/12 9.95 646.73 4.09 0.66
q2/12 10.05 643.20 4.22 0.69
q3/12 10.24 561.70 4.14 0.70
q4/12 10.73 581.85 4.41 0.71
q1/13 10.77 590.10 4.36 0.71
q2/13 10.90 594.64 4.43 0.71
q3/13 11.12 609.90 4.48 0.72
q4/13 11.31 614.98 4.61 0.74
Notes: The columns of Table 2 show the sum (average) of total assets
in $billion per quarter between q4/08 and q4/13 for the groups of
TARP and sound banks. We further split the sample of TARP banks
according to those that were forced to accept TARP: Citigroup, JP
Morgan, Bank of America (including Merrill Lynch), Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, State Street, Bank of New York Mellon, and Wells
Fargo (including Wachovia).
TABLE 3
Variable Description
FDIC Variables Calculation by
Variable Name FDIC Codes Description
Size ln(asset) Total assets: Log of total
assets. Total assets
comprise the sum of all
assets owned by the
institution including cash,
loans, securities, bank
premises, and other assets.
This total does not include
off-balance-sheet accounts.
EQ eqtot/asset Total equity over assets:
Banks' total equity
capital.
NPA (p3asset + p9asset Nonperforming assets over
+ naasset)/asset total assets: Total assets
past due 30-90 days and
still accruing interest
(p3asset). Total assets
past due 90 or more days
and still accruing interest
(p9asset). Total assets,
which are no longer
accruing interest
(naasset). Total assets
include real estate loans,
installment loans, credit
cards and related plan
loans, commercial loans and
all other loans, lease
financing receivables, debt
securities, and other
assets.
Loans lnlsgr/asset Total loans over assets:
Total loans and lease
financing receivables, net
of unearned income.
RoA roaptx Return on assets: Profits
before taxes over total
assets.
Deposits dep/asset Total deposits over assets:
The sum of all deposits
over total assets.
Cash cbal/asset Total cash balances over
assets: The sum of all
cash balances over total
assets.
[DELTA]total ln(lnlsgr)--ln(L. Growth rate of total loans:
loans lnlnlsgr) One-quarter growth rate of
loans secured primarily by
real estate, whether
originated by the bank or
purchased.
[DELTA]real ln(lnre)--ln(L. Growth rate of real estate
estate loans Lire) loans: One-quarter growth
rate of total loans and
lease financing
receivables, net of
unearned income.
[DELTA]C&I loans ln(lnci)--ln(L. Growth rate of C & l loans:
lnci) One-quarter growth rate of
loans other than loans
secured by real estate,
loans to individuals, loans
to depository institutions
and foreign governments,
and loans to states and
political subdivisions and
lease financing
receivables.
[DELTA]deposits ln(dep)--ln(L. Growth rate of deposits:
dep) One-quarter growth rate of
total deposits.
CAPH eqtot/asset Capitalization dummy: This
dummy is one if a bank has
a larger equity-to-total
assets ratio than 7% and
zero otherwise.
Size () asset Size dummy: The three dummies
(Size (small), Size
(medium), Size (large))
indicate banks with total
assets of less than $1
billion (small), more than
$3 billion (large), and
medium if total assets are
between $1 billion and $3
billion.
Further
variables
Variable Name UBPR Data Item Description
[R.sup.TL] UBPRE686 Interest rate on total loans:
Quarterly (annualized)
yield on total loans for
each bank, which reflects
the ratio of interest and
fees on loans and income on
direct lease financing
receivables (including tax
benefit on tax exempt on
loan and lease income) to
average total loans and
lease financing
receivables.
[R.sup.RF] UBPRE688 Interest rate on real estate
loans: Quarterly
(annualized) yield on real
estate loans for each bank,
which reflects the ratio of
interest and fees on
domestic office loans
secured primarily by real
estate to average domestic
real estate loans.
[R.sup.CI] UBPRE689 Interest rate on commercial
and industrial loans:
Quarterly (annualized)
yield on commercial and
industrial loans for each
bank, which reflects the
ratio of interest and fees
on domestic office
commercial and industrial
loans to average domestic
commercial and industrial
loans.
[R.sup.DEP] UBPRE701 Interest rate on total
deposits: Quarterly
(annualized) cost of total
interest-bearing deposits
for each bank, which
reflects the ratio of
interest on all
interest-bearing time and
savings deposits in
domestic and foreign
offices to average
interest-bearing time and
savings deposits in
domestic and foreign
offices.
[R.sup.TF] UBPRE710 Interest rate on total
funding: Quarterly
(annualized) cost of all
interest-bearing funds for
each bank, which reflects
the ratio of interest on
all interest-bearing
deposits in domestic
offices, interest-bearing
foreign office deposits,
demand notes issued to the
U.S. Treasury, other
borrowed money,
subordinated notes and
debentures, and expense on
federal funds purchased and
securities sold under
agreements to repurchase,
interest expense on
mortgage and capitalized
leases to the average of
the liabilities or funds
that generated those
expenses.
UR Quarterly rate of
unemployment per county:
Using county-level
information provided by the
Bureau of Labor Economics,
we weighted the
unemployment rates for each
bank by its county
presence, according to the
summary of deposits.
Bailout Bailout expectation:
expectation Predicted probability from
regression coefficients
that result from probit
regression of Equation (1).
Branching index Branching restriction index:
According to Rice and
Strahan (2010), an index
that separates states
according to their
branching restrictions. A
higher value indicates more
restrictions.
Case-Shiller CS index: The Case-Shiller
index house price index per state
provided by the economic
research center of the Fed
of St. Louis.
SubC Member of subcommittee: A
dummy variable that
indicates whether the
Congressperson is part of
the financial services
subcommittee. The ending
0709 indicates membership
for the period between 2007
and 2009 and the ending
0911 indicates membership
between 2009 and 2011.
2nd Vote Second vote on TARP: A dummy
variable indicating the
Congressperson's vote in
the second Congressional
TARP vote.
Party Party of member: A dummy
variable that indicates the
party membership of each
Congressperson. The ending
0709 indicates membership
for the period between 2007
and 2009, and the ending
0911 indicates membership
between 2009 and 2011.
Notes: The source for all FDIC variables and their descriptions is
the FDIC Statistics on Depository Institutions website. For more
details, refer to http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/main.asp.
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics
q4/08-q4/09
TARP Fail
Mean SD Mean SD
Exclusions restrictions first stage: political variables
2nd Vote 0.5124 0.5000 0.3971 0.4898
SC0709 0.1200 0.3251 0.1408 0.3481
SC0911 0.1191 0.3240 0.1492 0.3566
Party0709 0.4717 0.4993 0.3571 0.4797
Party0911 0.5096 0.5000 0.4118 0.4927
Dependent variables second stage: loan and funding interest rates
[R.sup.TL] 0.0601 0.0089 0.0552 0.0119
[R.sup.RE] 0.0593 0.0088 0.0546 0.0097
[R.sup.CI] 0.0616 0.0183 0.0626 0.0228
[R.sup.DEP] 0.0205 0.0068 0.0312 0.0077
[R.sup.TF] 0.0213 0.0067 0.0307 0.0080
Main explanatory variable second stage: bailout expectations
Bailout expectation 0.9842 0.0813 0.2492 0.3882
Independent variables first/second stage: bank and regional
characteristics
EQ 0.1028 0.0323 0.0594 0.0295
RoA -0.0005 0.0098 -0.0266 0.0194
NPA 0.0340 0.0243 0.1246 0.0594
Size 13.3297 1.5316 12.7946 1.5477
Cash 0.0495 0.0576 0.0635 0.0641
Deposits 0.7862 0.0779 0.8361 0.1255
Loans 0.7210 0.1250 0.7279 0.1250
CS index 346.4701 86.0662 345.3248 68.8263
UR 0.0860 0.0251 0.0822 0.0257
q4/08-q4/09 q1/10-q4/13
Sound TARP
Mean SD Mean SD
Exclusions restrictions first stage: political variables
2nd Vote 0.4769 0.4995
SC0709 0.0765 0.2658
SC0911 0.0692 0.2539
Party0709 0.4455 0.4970
Party0911 0.4621 0.4986
Dependent variables second stage: loan and funding interest rates
[R.sup.TL] 0.0654 0.0099 0.0567 0.0090
[R.sup.RE] 0.0642 0.0097 0.0557 0.0085
[R.sup.CI] 0.0664 0.0200 0.0599 0.0190
[R.sup.DEP] 0.0213 0.0068 0.0094 0.0050
[R.sup.TF] 0.0219 0.0067 0.0105 0.0053
Main explanatory variable second stage: bailout expectations
Bailout expectation 0.9082 0.2663 0.9350 0.2171
Independent variables first/second stage: bank and regional
characteristics
EQ 0.1082 0.0497 0.1034 0.0255
RoA 0.0015 0.0120 0.0021 0.0086
NPA 0.0374 0.0430 0.0414 0.0342
Size 11.8519 1.1376 13.2748 1.4703
Cash 0.0630 0.0637 0.0753 0.0688
Deposits 0.8262 0.0765 0.8253 0.0631
Loans 0.6633 0.1512 0.6688 0.1295
CS index 304.9202 76.1083 318.3926 76.3886
UR 0.0782 0.0293 0.0848 0.0233
q1/10-q4/13
Fail Sound
Mean SD Mean SD
Exclusions restrictions first stage: political variables
2nd Vote
SC0709
SC0911
Party0709
Party0911
Dependent variables second stage: loan and funding interest rates
[R.sup.TL] 0.0532 0.0081 0.0608 0.0095
[R.sup.RE] 0.0529 0.0093 0.0595 0.0090
[R.sup.CI] 0.0611 0.0230 0.0634 0.0203
[R.sup.DEP] 0.0162 0.0057 0.0098 0.0049
[R.sup.TF] 0.0171 0.0057 0.0104 0.0051
Main explanatory variable second stage: bailout expectations
Bailout expectation 0.1012 0.2729 0.9501 0.1899
Independent variables first/second stage: bank and regional
characteristics
EQ 0.0498 0.0210 0.1095 0.0348
RoA -0.0217 0.0179 0.0043 0.0076
NPA 0.1513 0.0473 0.0303 0.0323
Size 12.2225 1.0087 11.9338 1.1373
Cash 0.1018 0.0674 0.0951 0.0825
Deposits 0.8912 0.0542 0.8469 0.0588
Loans 0.7040 0.0940 0.6051 0.1533
CS index 299.5813 53.4818 286.0212 68.6227
UR 0.0983 0.0218 0.0783 0.0270
Notes: Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for banks that received
assistance from TARP, failed (Failed), or did not have severe
troubles (Sound), and thus received no money from TARP and did not
fail. The table presents descriptive statistics (mean and standard
deviation) for the crisis period between the last quarter of 2008 and
the last quarter of 2009 and for the subsequent period until the last
quarter of 2013. Variable definitions are in Table 3.
TABLE 5
Bailout Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Tarp/Fail-Dummy
(1) (2) (3)
2nd Vote 0.0222 ** 0.0226 **
(0.0104) (0.0099)
SC0709 0.0294 * -0.0097
(0.0163) (0.0075)
SC0911 -0.0372 ***
(0.0139)
Party0709 0.0230 **
(0.0092)
Party0911 -0.0164 **
(0.0078)
L.EQ 1.5688 *** 1.4085 *** 1.3041 ***
(0.4347) (0.3580) (0.3558)
L.RoA 0.8323 *** 0.9762 *** 0.8671 ***
(0.3190) (0.3006) (0.2606)
L.NPA -0.5744 *** -0.5675 *** -0.6072 ***
(0.1156) (0.1188) (0.1281)
L.Size 0.0042 0.0032 0.0029
(0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0030)
L.Cash -0.1893 *** -0.1998 *** -0.1852 ***
(0.0722) (0.0674) (0.0708)
L.Deposits -0.0372 -0.0305 -0.0573
(0.0653) (0.0619) (0.0702)
L.Loans -0.1121 ** -0.1042 ** -0.0745 **
(0.0513) (0.0420) (0.0366)
L.CS index 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0002 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
L.UR 0.0963 0.0484 0.0775
(0.1443) (0.1291) (0.1591)
Observations 675 675 675
Pseudo [R.sup.2] 0.9330 0.9258 0.9179
Log likelihood -21.87 -24.20 -26.78
F-value 15.53
p Value 0.0083
Dependent Variable: Tarp/Fail-Dumim
(4) (5) (6)
2nd Vote
SC0709
SC0911 -0.0162 **
(0.0074)
Party0709 0.0160 *
(0.0084)
Party0911 0.0108
(0.0074)
L.EQ 1.3120 *** 1.3750 *** 1.3426 ***
(0.3537) (0.3483) (0.3366)
L.RoA 0.8670 *** 0.8425 *** 0.9317 ***
(0.2545) (0.2708) (0.2914)
L.NPA -0.5998 *** -0.6488 *** -0.6375 ***
(0.1254) (0.1276) (0.1276)
L.Size 0.0031 0.0034 0.0032
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0029)
L.Cash -0.1787 *** -0.2108 *** -0.2121 ***
(0.0693) (0.0729) (0.0754)
L.Deposits -0.0625 -0.0524 -0.0538
(0.0737) (0.0641) (0.0664)
L.Loans -0.0700 ** -0.0956 ** -0.0900 **
(0.0356) (0.0402) (0.0397)
L.CS index 0.0002 *** 0.0001 ** 0.0002 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
L.UR 0.0831 0.0869 0.0677
(0.1625) (0.1549) (0.1565)
Observations 675 675 675
Pseudo [R.sup.2] 0.9201 0.9211 0.9188
Log likelihood -26.08 -25.77 -26.50
F-value
p Value
Notes: Table 5 contains the results for regressions explaining
whether a bank received assistance from TARP between q4/08 and q4/09
(1) or failed (0), as outlined in Equation (1). Only banks that
received TARP or failed during this period are considered. The prefix
"L" indicates that a variable was lagged by one-quarter. Coefficients
are marginal effects. The first column shows results with bank
characteristics, all political variables, and the regional
unemployment rate and Case-Shiller index on U.S. state level as
explanatory variables. The remaining columns show results for each
political variable separately. The F-value and reported p value
denote whether all political variables are jointly significant in
explaining whether a bank receives government support or fails.
Variable definitions are in Table 3. Clustered (bank level) standard
errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 6 Weak Correlation Test of Political Instruments and Yields
Interest Rates R
Total Loans Real Estate Loans C&I Loans
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
2nd Vote 0.0007 -0.0031 0.0034
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0037)
SC0709 -0.0008 -0.0040 * 0.0019
(0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0062)
SC0911 0.0011 0.0040 * -0.0053
(0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0066)
Party0709 0.0020 * 0.0011 0.0117 ***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0040)
Party0911 -0.0032 ** -0.0012 -0.0161 ***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0045)
L.EQ 0.0099 ** 0.0083 * 0.0142
(0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0109)
L.RoA 0.0385 *** 0.0279 *** 0.0453 ***
(0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0134)
L.NPA -0.0253 *** -0.0283 *** -0.0026
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0078)
L.Size -0.0012 -0.0016 *** -0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0016)
L.Cash 0.0018 * 0.0021 ** 0.0035
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0025)
L.Deposits 0.0043 ** 0.0036 ** -0.0066
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0053)
L.Loans -0.0109 *** -0.0082 *** -0.0107 ***
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0028)
E CS index 0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
L.UR 0.0004 -0.0029 0.0002
(0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0065)
Constant 0.0765 *** 0.0822 *** 0.0718 ***
(0.0091) (0.0082) (0.0193)
TE Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes Yes
No. of Banks 5,416 5,416 5,416
Observations 83,550 83,550 83,550
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.84 0.70 0.55
E-value 1.12 1.10 2.80
p Value 0.3492 0.3591 0.0158
Interest Rates R
Deposits Total Funding
Dependent Variable (4) (5)
2nd Vote -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004)
SC0709 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0005)
SC0911 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Party0709 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0008)
Party0911 0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0009)
L.EQ -0.0038 *** -0.0102 ***
(0.0013) (0.0015)
L.RoA -0.0142 *** -0.0155 ***
(0.0017) (0.0017)
L.NPA -0.0046 *** -0.0036 ***
(0.0010) (0.0010)
L.Size 0.0010 *** 0.0009 ***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
L.Cash -0.0005 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003)
L.Deposits 0.0008 -0.0053 ***
(0.0007) (0.0010)
L.Loans 0.0011 *** 0.0007 **
(0.0003) (0.0004)
E CS index 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
L.UR 0.0020 *** 0.0021 ***
(0.0007) (0.0008)
Constant -0.0010 0.0065 ***
(0.0022) (0.0023)
TE Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes
No. of Banks 5,416 5,416
Observations 83,550 83,550
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.93 0.93
E-value 0.68 0.52
p Value 0.6404 0.7582
Notes: Table 6 represents a panel regression with bank (FE), quarter
(TE), and interacted year-state (YE x SE) fixed effects for the
period q1/10-q4/13. The F-values and the reported p values indicate
whether all political variables are jointly significant in explaining
yields on loans and funding in the period after q4/09. The prefix "L"
indicates that a variable is lagged by one-quarter. Variable
definitions are in Table 3. Clustered (bank level) standard errors
are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 7
Bailout Expectation Effects on Lending and Funding Rates
Interest Rates R
Ttotal Loans Real Estate Loans C&I Loans
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Bailout expectation 0.0014 *** 0.0012 ** 0.0025 **
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0011)
L.EQ 0.0073 0.0058 0.0096
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0113)
L.RoA 0.0321 *** 0.0220 *** 0.0335 **
(0.0050) (0.0063) (0.0136)
L.NPA -0.0223 *** -0.0256 *** 0.0031
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0080)
L.Size -0.0012 * -0.0017 *** -0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0016)
L.Cash 0.0022 ** 0.0025 ** 0.0043 *
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0025)
L.Deposits 0.0043 ** 0.0036 ** -0.0065
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0053)
L. Loans -0.0107 *** -0.0081 *** -0.0105 ***
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0028)
L.CS index 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
EUR 0.0001 -0.0031 -0.0005
(0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0065)
Constant 0.0756 *** 0.0811 *** 0.0691 ***
(0.0091) (0.0082) (0.0191)
TE Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes Yes
No. of Banks 5,416 5,416 5,416
Observations 83,550 83,550 83,550
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.84 0.70 0.55
Interest Rates R
Deposits Total Funding
Dependent Variable (4) (5)
Bailout expectation -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001)
L.EQ -0.0037 *** -0.0102 ***
(0.0013) (0.0015)
L.RoA -0.0139 *** -0.0155 ***
(0.0017) (0.0018)
L.NPA -0.0047 *** -0.0036 ***
(0.0010) (0.0011)
L.Size 0.0010 *** 0.0009 ***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
L.Cash -0.0005 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0004)
L.Deposits 0.0008 -0.0053 ***
(0.0007) (0.0010)
L. Loans 0.0011 *** 0.0007 **
(0.0003) (0.0004)
L.CS index 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
EUR 0.0020 *** 0.0022 ***
(0.0007) (0.0008)
Constant -0.0009 0.0066 ***
(0.0022) (0.0023)
TE Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes
No. of Banks 5,416 5,416
Observations 83,550 83,550
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.93 0.93
Notes: Table 7 shows regression results for Equation (2). Each
regression includes bank (FE), quarter (TE), and interacted
year-state (YE x SE) fixed effects for the period q1/10-q4/l2. The
prefix "L" indicates that a variable is lagged by one-quarter.
Variable definitions are in Table 3. Clustered (bank level) standard
errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 8
Validity of Extrapolated Bailout Expectations
Interest Rates R
Total Loans Real Estate Loans C&I Loans
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Baseline
Bailout expectation 0.0014 *** 0.0012 ** 0.0025 **
Adj. [R.sup.2] (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0011)
0.8408 0.7022 0.5494
No. of banks 5,416 5,416 5,416
Observations 83,550 83,550 83,550
Without failures
Bailout expectation 0.0013 *** 0.0011 ** 0.0023 **
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0011)
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.8413 0.7026 0.5504
No. of banks 5,177 5,177 5,177
Observations 82,268 82,268 82,268
With TARP
Bailout expectation 0.0013 *** 0.0011 ** 0.0027 ***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0010)
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.8370 0.7000 0.5515
No. of banks 5,964 5,964 5,964
Observations 92,315 92,315 92,315
TARP only
Bailout expectation 0.0005 0.0005 0.0039
Adj. [R.sup.2] (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0025)
0.7777 0.6415 0.5737
No. of banks 548 548 548
Observations 8,765 8,765 8,765
Matched sample
Bailout expectation 0.0024 ** 0.0024 0.0043 *
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0025)
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.8454 0.6934 0.6226
No. of banks 597 597 597
Observations 8,654 8,654 8,654
TE Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Interest Rates R
Deposits Total Funding
Dependent Variable (4) (5)
Baseline
Bailout expectation -0.0001 0.0000
Adj. [R.sup.2] (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.9262 0.9256
No. of banks 5,416 5,416
Observations 83.550 83.550
Without failures
Bailout expectation -0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.9245 0.9238
No. of banks 5,177 5,177
Observations 82.268 82.268
With TARP
Bailout expectation -0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.9246 0.9234
No. of banks 5,964 5.964
Observations 92.315 92.315
TARP only
Bailout expectation -0.0002 0.0000
Adj. [R.sup.2] (0.0003) (0.0004)
0.9170 0.9106
No. of banks 548 548
Observations 8.765 8.765
Matched sample
Bailout expectation -0.0006 * -0.0007 **
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.9332 0.9332
No. of banks 597 597
Observations 8,654 8,654
TE Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Notes: Table 8 shows regression results for Equation (2) for
different samples. The first block shows results for the baseline
sample that resembles the solid box on the right side in t = 2 of
Figure 1. The second block excludes failed banks from this sample.
The third block comprises all banks after q4/09, as appear in the
dotted box. The fourth block includes TARP banks only. The fifth
block includes only banks from the baseline sample that are 1:1
matches with the distressed banks in the crisis period, according to
propensity score matching. Each regression includes bank (FE),
quarter (TE), and interacted year-state (YE x SE) fixed effects, as
well as all other control variables from the baseline regression for
the period q1/10-q4/13. Variable definitions are in Table 3.
Clustered (bank level) standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 9 Covariate Differences Matched versus Unmatched Samples
Mean
Unmatched/
Variable Matched Distressed Sound Bias (%)
L.EQ U 0.0942 0.1126 -44.10
M 0.0959 0.0944 3.70
L.RoA U -0.0050 0.0028 -68.70
M -0.0037 -0.0033 -3.40
L.NPA U 0.0493 0.0309 46.70
M 0.0460 0.0458 0.50
L.Size U 13.06 11.82 93.90
M 12.97 12.96 0.50
L.Cash U 0.0500 0.0617 -22.40
M 0.0500 0.0509 -1.60
L.Deposits U 0.7986 0.8219 -30.70
M 0.7998 0.7978 2.70
L.Loans U 0.7268 0.6582 50.50
M 0.7257 0.7328 -5.20
L.CS index U 344.33 304.85 49.90
M 341.31 345.72 -5.60
L.UR U 0.0816 0.0773 19.90
M 0.0815 0.0815 -0.10
T-test
Unmatched/
Variable Matched Reduction of Bias (%) T-test p Value
L.EQ U -9.40 0.0000
M 91.50 0.81 0.4200
L.RoA U -20.46 0.0000
M 95.00 -0.59 0.5580
L.NPA U 13.78 0.0000
M 98.90 0.08 0.9360
L.Size U 25.32 0.0000
M 99.50 0.08 0.9370
L.Cash U -5.05 0.0000
M 93.00 -0.33 0.7380
L.Deposits U -7.51 0.0000
M 91.40 0.39 0.6940
L.Loans U 11.27 0.0000
M 89.60 -1.08 0.2810
L.CS index U 12.43 0.0000
M 88.80 -0.89 0.3750
L.UR U 4.55 0.0000
M 99.40 -0.02 0.9810
Notes: Table 9 shows the outcome of a 1:1 propensity score matching
between sound and distressed banks in the crisis period, including
the mean for each variable for the treated and control group and for
the sample of matched (M) and unmatched (U) banks. It further shows
the reduction in bias for each variable between the groups and
significant differences in means before and after matching.
TABLE 10
Bailout Expectation Effects on Interest Rates Over Time
Interest Rates R
Total Loans Real Estate C&I Loans
Dependent Variable (1) Loans (2) (3)
Bailout expectation (2010) 0.0037 ** 0.0039 ** 0.0058 **
(0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0028)
Bailout expectation (2011) 0.0019 ** 0.0016 0.0046
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0029)
Bailout expectation (2012) 0.0012 0.0017 0.0016
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0031)
Bailout expectation (2013) -0.0004 -0.0009 0.0008
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0035)
L.EQ 0.0159 ** 0.0140 0.0357
(0.0071) (0.0097) (0.0227)
L.RoA 0.0253 ** 0.0030 0.0366
(0.0126) (0.0196) (0.0338)
L.NPA -0.0302 *** -0.0364 *** 0.0022
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0226)
L.Size 0.0032 0.0037 0.0045
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0039)
L.Cash 0.0087 0.0042 0.0065
(0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0110)
L.Deposits 0.0120 *** 0.0101 ** 0.0019
(0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0132)
L.Loans -0.0074 *** -0.0069 *** 0.0000
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0069)
L.CS index -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
L.UR 0.0052 0.0066 -0.0026
(0.0053) (0.0068) (0.0170)
Constant 0.0118 0.0006 -0.0004
(0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0568)
TE Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes Yes
No. of Banks 597 597 597
Observations 8,654 8,654 8,654
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.85 0.70 0.62
Interest Rates R
Deposits Total Funding
Dependent Variable (4) (5)
Bailout expectation (2010) -0.0011 *** -0.0012 ***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Bailout expectation (2011) -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Bailout expectation (2012) 0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Bailout expectation (2013) 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0005)
L.EQ 0.0010 -0.0060
(0.0032) (0.0045)
L.RoA -0.0085 ** -0.0074 **
(0.0037) (0.0034)
L.NPA -0.0059 * -0.0072 **
(0.0031) (0.0031)
L.Size 0.0012 ** 0.0011 **
(0.0005) (0.0005)
L.Cash -0.0023 * -0.0020
(0.0012) (0.0012)
L.Deposits 0.0047 ** -0.0025
(0.0021) (0.0037)
L.Loans 0.0004 -0.0001
(0.0011) (0.0012)
L.CS index 0.0000 ** 0.0000 **
(0.0000) (0.0000)
L.UR 0.0031 0.0027
(0.0022) (0.0023)
Constant -0.0060 0.0033
(0.0070) (0.0077)
TE Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes
No. of Banks 597 597
Observations 8,654 8,654
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.93 0.93
NOTES: Table 10 shows regression results for Equation (2), in which
bailout expectations are interacted with year dummies for 2010, 2011,
2012, and 2013. Each regression includes bank (FE), quarter (TE), and
interacted year-state (YE x SE) fixed effects for the period
q1/10-q4/12. The prefix "L" indicates that a variable is lagged by
one-quarter. Variable definitions are in Table 3. Clustered (bank
level) standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 11
Loan and Deposit Growth
Loan and Deposit Growth
[DELTA] Total Loans [DELTA] Real Estate Loans
Dependent Variable (1) (2)
Bailout expectation -0.0010 -0.0089
(0.0075) (0.0086)
L.EQ 0.7346 *** 0.7026 ***
(0.1521) (0.1644)
L.RoA -0.5042 *** -0.3610 **
(0.1701) (0.1642)
L.NPA -0.4375 *** -0.4754 ***
(0.0570) (0.0626)
L.Size -0.0444 *** -0.0409 ***
(0.0148) (0.0145)
L.Cash 0.0150 -0.0119
(0.0363) (0.0412)
L.Deposits -0.0557 * -0.0378
(0.0332) (0.0383)
L.Loans -0.1599 *** -0.1323 ***
(0.0300) (0.0313)
L.CS index 0.0002 0.0003 *
(0.0001) (0.0002)
L.UR -0.0286 0.1375
(0.0733) (0.1179)
Constant 0.5783 *** 0.4693 **
(0.2003) (0.2089)
TE Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes
No. of Banks 597 597
Observations 8,654 8,654
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.27 0.26
Loan and Deposit Growth
[DELTA] C&I Loans [DELTA] Deposits
Dependent Variable (3) (4)
Bailout expectation 0.0051 -0.0114
(0.0168) (0.0078)
L.EQ 0.8178 *** 0.6364 ***
(0.1478) (0.1440)
L.RoA -0.2675 -0.3460 *
(0.3074) (0.1897)
L.NPA -0.3885 *** -0.1941 ***
(0.1352) (0.0649)
L.Size -0.0590 ** -0.0972 ***
(0.0251) (0.0106)
L.Cash 0.0539 -0.1245 **
(0.0712) (0.0574)
L.Deposits -0.0738 -0.4455 ***
(0.0757) (0.0548)
L.Loans -0.1914 *** 0.2264 ***
(0.0551) (0.0423)
L.CS index -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0001)
L.UR -0.3583 * -0.1055
(0.2046) (0.0768)
Constant 1.0096 *** 1.4506 ***
(0.3803) (0.1675)
TE Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes
No. of Banks 597 597
Observations 8,653 8,654
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.07 0.22
Notes: Table 11 shows regression results for Equation (2) and uses
quarterly growth rates of total loans, real estate loans, commercial
and industrial loans, and deposits as dependent variables. Each
regression includes bank (FE), quarter (TE), and interacted
year-state (YE x SE) fixed effects for the period q1/10-q4/12. The
prefix "L" indicates that a variable is lagged by one-quarter.
Variable definitions are in Table 3. Clustered (bank level) standard
errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 12
Loan and Deposit Growth Over Time
Loan and Deposit Growth
[DELTA] Total [DELTA] Real Estate
Dependent Variable Loans (1) Loans (2)
Bailout expectation (2010) -0.0033 -0.0092
(0.0078) (0.0089)
Bailout expectation (2011) -0.0052 -0.0133
(0.0079) (0.0091)
Bailout expectation (2012) 0.0028 -0.0116
(0.0106) (0.0112)
Bailout expectation (2013) 0.0132 0.0071
(0.0135) (0.0150)
L.EQ 0.7159 *** 0.6875 ***
(0.1640) (0.1758)
L.RoA -0.4853 *** -0.3448 **
(0.1704) (0.1657)
L.NPA -0.4317 *** -0.4723 ***
(0.0574) (0.0639)
L.Size -0.0486 *** -0.0443 ***
(0.0168) (0.0163)
L.Cash 0.0195 -0.0082
(0.0361) (0.0409)
1..Deposits -0.0593 * -0.0412
(0.0334) (0.0383)
L.Loans -0.1620 *** -0.1343 ***
(0.0300) (0.0311)
L.CS index 0.0002 0.0003 *
(0.0001) (0.0002)
L.UR -0.0302 0.1383
(0.0732) (0.1178)
Constant 0.6412 *** 0.5206 **
(0.2279) (0.2318)
TE Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes
No. of Banks 597 597
Observations 8,654 8,654
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.27 0.26
Loan and Deposit Growth
[DELTA] C&I Loans [DELTA] Deposits
Dependent Variable (3) (4)
Bailout expectation (2010) -0.0001 -0.0167 *
(0.0185) (0.0089)
Bailout expectation (2011) -0.0050 -0.0090
(0.0181) (0.0092)
Bailout expectation (2012) 0.0177 -0.0086
(0.0232) (0.0083)
Bailout expectation (2013) 0.0328 -0.0000
(0.0242) (0.0117)
L.EQ 0.7773 *** 0.6202 ***
(0.1602) (0.1493)
L.RoA -0.2270 -0.3311 *
(0.3042) (0.1898)
L.NPA -0.3762 *** -0.1843 ***
(0.1358) (0.0666)
L.Size -0.0680 ** -0.1009 ***
(0.0278) (0.0109)
L.Cash 0.0637 -0.1210 **
(0.0715) (0.0578)
1..Deposits -0.0814 -0.4488 ***
(0.0758) (0.0548)
L.Loans -0.1955 *** 0.2246 ***
(0.0548) (0.0425)
L.CS index -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0001)
L.UR -0.3632 * -0.1079
(0.2045) (0.0767)
Constant 1.1586 *** 1.5097 ***
(0.4104) (0.1745)
TE Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes
No. of Banks 597 597
Observations 8,653 8,654
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.07 0.22
Notes: Table 12 shows regression results for Equation (2) and uses
quarterly growth rates of total loans, real estate loans, commercial
and industrial loans, and deposits as dependent variables. Bailout
expectations are interacted with year dummies for 2010, 2011, 2012,
and 2013. Each regression includes bank (FE), quarter (TE), and
interacted year--state (YE x SE) fixed effects for the period
q1/10-q4/12. The prefix "L" indicates that a variable is lagged by
one-quarter. Variable definitions are in Table 3. Clustered (bank
level) standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 13
Bailout Expectation Effects on Lending and Funding Rates
Stratified by Equity
Interest Rates R
Total Loans Real Estate Loans
Dependent Variable (1) (2)
Bailout expectation 0.0015 0.0013
(0.0012) (0.0015)
CAPH -0.0002 -0.0008
(0.0006) (0.0008)
CAPH x Bailout expectation 0.0016 ** 0.0021 *
(0.0008) (0.0011)
L.RoA 0.0286 ** 0.0072
(0.0135) (0.0206)
L.NPA -0.0276 *** -0.0330 ***
(0.0072) (0.0073)
L.Size 0.0020 0.0025
(0.0024) (0.0025)
L.Cash 0.0101 0.0056
(0.0068) (0.0064)
L.Deposits 0.0077 ** 0.0063
(0.0030) (0.0049)
L.Loans -0.0081 *** -0.0077 ***
(0.0022) (0.0024)
L.CS index -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
L.UR 0.0043 0.0056
(0.0053) (0.0069)
Constant 0.0328 0.0220
(0.0320) (0.0368)
TE Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes
No. of Banks 597 597
Observations 8,654 8,654
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.85 0.69
Interest Rates R
C&I Loans Deposits Total Funding
Dependent Variable (3) (4) (5)
Bailout expectation 0.0044 -0.0001 -0.0004
(0.0037) (0.0004) (0.0004)
CAPH 0.0008 0.0009 ** 0.0007 *
(0.0029) (0.0004) (0.0004)
CAPH x Bailout expectation 0.0006 -0.0010 ** -0.0011 **
(0.0036) (0.0004) (0.0005)
L.RoA 0.0395 -0.0106 *** -0.0087 ***
(0.0330) (0.0037) (0.0033)
L.NPA 0.0050 -0.0072 ** -0.0086 ***
(0.0213) (0.0030) (0.0030)
L.Size 0.0024 0.0014 *** 0.0014 ***
(0.0032) (0.0005) (0.0005)
L.Cash 0.0091 -0.0025 ** -0.0024 **
(0.0117) (0.0012) (0.0012)
L.Deposits -0.0079 0.0044 ** -0.0007
(0.0100) (0.0019) (0.0027)
L.Loans -0.0010 0.0004 0.0001
(0.0069) (0.0011) (0.0012)
L.CS index 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 **
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
L.UR -0.0041 0.0035 0.0033
(0.0169) (0.0022) (0.0023)
Constant 0.0355 -0.0087 -0.0032
(0.0434) (0.0064) (0.0065)
TE Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes
No. of Banks 597 597 597
Observations 8,654 8,654 8,654
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.62 0.93 0.93
Notes: Table 13 shows regression results for our baseline
regression. In each regression, we interact Bailout expectation with
CAPH. CAPH indicates banks with a total equity ratio of more than 7%.
Each regression includes bank (FE), quarter (TE), and interacted
year-state (YE x SE) fixed effects for the period q1/10-q4/12. The
prefix "L" indicates that a variable is lagged by one-quarter.
Clustered (bank level) standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 14
Bailout Expectation Effects on Lending and Funding Rates Stratified
by Size
Interest Rates R
Real Estate
Total Loans Loans C&I Loans
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Bailout expectation 0.0025 * 0.0023 0.0059 **
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0028)
Size (medium) 0.0001 -0.0012 0.0042
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0054)
Size (large) 0.0051 * 0.0032 0.0131 *
(0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0070)
Size (medium) x Bailout 0.0013 0.0034 -0.0057
expectation (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0055)
Size (large) X Bailout -0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0137 ***
expectation (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0049)
L.EQ 0.0084 0.0054 0.0244
(0.0076) (0.0131) (0.0206)
L.RoA 0.0297 ** 0.0076 0.0440
(0.0146) (0.0209) (0.0349)
L.NPA -0.0282 *** -0.0336 *** 0.0030
(0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0219)
L.Cash 0.0105 0.0063 0.0075
(0.0074) (0.0072) (0.0117)
L.Deposits 0.0106 *** 0.0082 * 0.0003
(0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0132)
L.Loans -0.0073 *** -0.0066 *** -0.0002
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0071)
L.CS index -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
L.UR 0.0051 0.0066 -0.0022
(0.0054) (0.0069) (0.0169)
Constant 0.0547 *** 0.0501 *** 0.0597 **
(0.0075) (0.0080) (0.0283)
TE Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes Yes
No. of Banks 597 597 597
Observations 8,654 8,654 8,654
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.84 0.69 0.62
Interest Rates R
Deposits Total Funding
Dependent Variable (4) (5)
Bailout expectation -0.0005 -0.0006 *
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Size (medium) -0.0003 -0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Size (large) 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0010) (0.0011)
Size (medium) x Bailout -0.0001 0.0001
expectation (0.0005) (0.0005)
Size (large) X Bailout 0.0009 ** 0.0009
expectation (0.0004) (0.0007)
L.EQ -0.0001 -0.0069
(0.0031) (0.0044)
L.RoA -0.0098 *** -0.0087 **
(0.0038) (0.0034)
L.NPA -0.0066 ** -0.0080 **
(0.0031) (0.0031)
L.Cash -0.0020 -0.0017
(0.0012) (0.0012)
L.Deposits 0.0044 ** -0.0027
(0.0022) (0.0038)
L.Loans 0.0009 0.0005
(0.0011) (0.0012)
L.CS index 0.0000 ** 0.0000 **
(0.0000) (0.0000)
L.UR 0.0037 * 0.0034
(0.0022) (0.0023)
Constant 0.0084 *** 0.0163 ***
(0.0025) (0.0039)
TE Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes
No. of Banks 597 597
Observations 8,654 8,654
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.93 0.93
Notes: Table 14 shows regression results for our baseline regression.
In each regression, we interact Bailout expectation with dummy
variables for size indicating small, medium, and large banks. Small
banks have total asset of less than 1$ billion while large banks have
more than $3 billion of total assets. Medium banks have more than $1
billion but less than $3 billion of total assets. Each regression
includes bank (FE), quarter (TE), and interacted year--state (YE x
SE) fixed effects for the period q1/10-q4/12. The prefix "L"
indicates that a variable is lagged by one-quarter. Clustered (bank
level) standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 15
Branching Restrictions
Interest Rates R
Real Estate
Total Loans Loans C&I Loans
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Bailout expectation 0.0034 * 0.0037 0.0022
(restriction low) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0049)
Bailout expectation 0.0040 ** 0.0051 *** 0.0112 ***
(restriction medium) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0038)
Bailout expectation 0.0059 ** 0.0060 ** 0.0064
(restriction high) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0041)
L.EQ 0.0328 ** 0.0362 *** 0.0658 **
(0.0134) (0.0096) (0.0271)
L.RoA 0.0360 * 0.0025 -0.0014
(0.0184) (0.0228) (0.0367)
L.NPA -0.0154 * -0.0176 * 0.0034
(0.0092) (0.0106) (0.0253)
L.Size 0.0040 0.0036 0.0098 *
(0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0054)
L.Cash 0.0106 * 0.0080 0.0087
(0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0115)
L.Deposits -0.0018 0.0074 -0.0051
(0.0103) (0.0056) (0.0126)
L.Loans -0.0080 ** -0.0052 0.0022
(0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0069)
L.CS index -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
L.UR 0.0002 -0.0065 -0.0167
(0.0079) (0.0095) (0.0233)
Constant 0.0127 0.0124 -0.0643
(0.0398) (0.0358) (0.0697)
TE Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes Yes
No. of Banks 597 597 597
Observations 24,097 24,097 24,097
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.91 0.84 0.80
Interest Rates R
Deposits Total Funding
Dependent Variable (4) (5)
Bailout expectation -0.0010 ** -0.0013 ***
(restriction low) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Bailout expectation -0.0003 -0.0004
(restriction medium) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Bailout expectation 0.0001 -0.0001
(restriction high) (0.0009) (0.0009)
L.EQ 0.0039 -0.0030
(0.0033) (0.0044)
L.RoA -0.0061 -0.0040
(0.0062) (0.0060)
L.NPA -0.0099 *** -0.0106 ***
(0.0036) (0.0036)
L.Size 0.0022 *** 0.0021 ***
(0.0005) (0.0005)
L.Cash -0.0033 ** -0.0033 **
(0.0014) (0.0015)
L.Deposits 0.0052 ** -0.0017
(0.0020) (0.0035)
L.Loans 0.0014 0.0008
(0.0012) (0.0013)
L.CS index 0.0000 ** 0.0000 *
(0.0000) (0.0000)
L.UR 0.0008 0.0014
(0.0034) (0.0038)
Constant -0.0241 *** -0.0150 *
(0.0073) (0.0078)
TE Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes
YE x SE Yes Yes
No. of Banks 597 597
Observations 24.097 24,097
Adj. [R.sup.2] 0.96 0.96
Notes: Table 15 shows regression results for Equation (2) while
interacting bailout expectation with dummies that reflect whether a
banks resides in a state with low, medium, or high restrictions on
banking and branching, according to (Rice and Strahan 2010). Each
regression includes bank (FE), quarter (TE), and interacted
year--state (YE x SE) fixed effects for the period q1/10-q4/12. The
prefix "L" indicates that a variable is lagged by one-quarter.
Variable definitions are in Table 3. Clustered (bank level) standard
errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
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