COMMENTARY: LIGHT AT THE END OF THE FISCAL TUNNEL?
Hantzsche, Arno ; Young, Garry
COMMENTARY: LIGHT AT THE END OF THE FISCAL TUNNEL?
Introduction
In his Spring Statement, the chancellor said that he saw light at
the end of the fiscal tunnel. We are afraid that this will turn out to
have been an illusion. While public borrowing has been reduced to
sustainable levels, our analysis of the prospects for the public
finances points to severe challenges ahead. Sustainable borrowing has
been achieved by cutting back on public services and restraining public
sector pay. But 'austerity fatigue' is now setting in, and
emerging recruitment difficulties and concerns about the quality of
public services mean that there are already strong pressures for public
spending to rise. On top of that, the demand for public services is
increasing sharply to meet the needs of an ageing population. That
provides a difficult background for the 2019 Spending Review. With debt
already at an uncomfortable level, increasing public spending by
substantially more than currently planned would need to be financed with
higher taxation or more direct charging for services. The alternative
option of continued spending restraint would not be palatable unless
government can find significant ways to improve efficiency and get
better value for money.
Seven lean years
In the aftermath of the financial crisis and associated severe
recession, public sector net borrowing reached a postwar record high of
153 billion [pounds sterling] in 2009-10 alone (9.9 per cent of national
income in that year). At the time, there was widespread agreement across
the political spectrum that this borrowing needed to be brought down.
The main approach to fiscal consolidation since 2010 has been to
restrict public spending by means of pay restraint and by cutting public
services in non-prioritised areas. Adjusted for general inflation,
public spending per head of population was 6 per cent lower in 2017 than
it had been seven years earlier. As a share of spending in the whole
economy, public spending fell from 45.1 per cent of GDP in 2009-10 to an
estimated 38.9 per cent of GDP in 2016-17, and is now lower than the
postwar average of 39.3 per cent of GDP (figure 1).
The fiscal consolidation was not spread evenly across the public
sector. From the outset, certain types of spending were protected and
real spending per head on health, overseas aid and pensions (via the
so-called 'triple lock') continued to increase.
This meant that non-priority spending areas experienced severe
cutbacks. Real spending on defence was 14 per cent lower in 2016-17 than
it had been in 2010-11, spending on public order and safety was 17 per
cent lower, and spending on housing and community activities was 37 per
cent lower. While spending on schools was protected, spending on
education as a whole was 13 per cent lower, though this partly reflected
a switch in university funding to student fees.
But even some of the priority spending areas have not been able to
maintain the quality of service expected. For example, at a time when
the elderly population is increasing, it is now generally accepted that
not enough resources have been allocated to health, even though its
budget has not been cut. And this has been compounded by real cuts in
funding for adult social care that have reportedly led to delayed
discharges of elderly hospital patients and high levels of bed
occupancy.
How much spending is warranted?
This raises the important question of how to judge what level of
spending on public services is warranted?
One approach is to compare government spending in the United
Kingdom with that of other countries. Government spending as a share of
GDP in the United Kingdom was broadly in the middle of the pack of OECD
countries in 2016. (1) But one size does not necessarily fit all. And
using that yardstick does not take into account the different
preferences and characteristics of countries, as diverse as Finland, at
the top end of the range, and the United States, towards the bottom,
that lead them to choose different levels of spending.
An alternative approach is to suppose that the level of public
spending as a share of GDP has evolved over time in accordance with the
preferences of the British people, and is determined by a range of
factors. In our empirical work we consider the following factors:
existing spending commitments, the proportion of people who are over
85(as a proxy for the demand for public services associated with an
ageing population), the economic growth rate (to account for
counter-cyclical fiscal policy), and the debt to GDP ratio (as a proxy
for what is thought to be affordable. We use statistical methods to
estimate the importance of these different factors over the postwar
period. That allows us to construct an estimate of the amount of public
spending that would have been chosen by previous governments if
confronted by the circumstances of today. (2) We call this
'warranted' spending as it reflects the historic choices made
by democratically elected governments in the UK. As Pain, Weale and
Young (1997) point out, this exercise is similar to estimating a Taylor
rule for monetary policy, and does not imply that the behaviour that is
summarised in this way is in any sense optimal.
Figure 2 shows our estimates of warranted spending as a share of
GDP over the seven-year period from 2010-11 to 2016-17 in comparison to
actual spending.
On this basis, our analysis suggests that the pace of spending
reduction between 2010-11 and 2014-15 was actually a little slower than
our estimate of what was warranted (line in figure 2). However, our
analysis shows that after 2014-15, actual spending became more stringent
than our estimate of what was warranted by previous governments'
spending priorities.
We can apply the same approach to individual areas of public
spending. This shows that even in areas such as health care and social
protection, where spending was in line with our estimates in the early
years of the fiscal squeeze, it now appears that consolidation has gone
on too long. For instance, our analysis implies that in 2016-17 the
health care sector lacked around 440 [pounds sterling] per head in
funding. And any room to reduce spending on social protection appeared
to be fully exhausted by 2017.
Public sector output, costs and efficiency
What people care about is what public sector services deliver in
terms of improved health, crimes prevented and examinations passed,
rather than just the amount of money spent on providing the services.
And it is possible for the output of public services to increase even
when spending is limited. This can come about in two ways. First, when
public sector costs are kept low so that more can be purchased with
less. Second, when the efficiency of public service delivery is
improved, so that more can be achieved with less.
On the first point, public sector costs have been kept down by
public sector pay restraint. During the first two years of the fiscal
consolidation, a freeze was imposed on public sector pay. This freeze
was then followed by a 1 per cent annual growth cap. An extended period
of pay restraint has meant that a gap has built up between public sector
pay and what is available in the private sector. Recent NIESR research
has estimated that public sector wages had fallen more than 3 per cent
below their equilibrium level in 2016-17 (Dolton, Hantzsche and Kara,
2018). A consequence of the growing divergence between pay in the public
and private sectors is that the public sector has become a less
attractive place to work. This divergence has resulted in increasing
recruitment difficulties in a number of areas. For example, in February
2017 it was announced that prison officers would receive immediate pay
rises to reverse a'dangerous staffing crisis'. In January
2018, the Public Accounts Committee criticised the government for giving
'insufficient priority to teacher retention and development'.
(3) This issue was also examined by Sam Sims and Rebecca Allen in the
February issue of this Review (Sims and Allen, 2018). And shortages are
apparent in the NHS. By 2017, one in nine nursing posts in England
remained unfilled. (4) Partly as a consequence, a new pay deal for NHS
staff was announced in March 2018 to be funded by additional NHS
spending.
This pattern suggests that continued pay restraint in the public
sector is unlikely to be sustainable. Indeed, the government has now
lifted the across-the-board 1 per cent pay cap. But that does not mean
that the government will provide extra money to fund additional pay.
While the Treasury has committed to do this in the case of the NHS pay
deal, it has reportedly warned other government departments not to
regard the NHS deal as a signal that it will provide extra resources to
them to fund pay increases to their staff.
On the second point, there is little evidence of an improvement in
measured productivity in the public sector. But measuring public sector
efficiency is complex. (5) For some public service activities, the
Office for National Statistics (ONS) measures output by the activities
and services delivered. But in other areas, such as defence and police,
there is no obvious way to measure the output. It is assumed for such
services that the volume of output is equal to the volume of inputs used
to create them.
The ONS attempt to measure quality improvements in healthcare,
education, and public order and safety. The purpose is to reflect the
extent to which the services succeed in delivering their intended
outcomes and the extent to which services are responsive to users'
needs.
Figure 3 shows ONS estimates of the quality of healthcare,
education and public order and safety services up to 2015. In education
and in public order and safety there has been a marked reduction in
measured quality since the onset of the fiscal consolidation. In
education, this decline in measured quality may be misleading as it
partly reflects changes in examination passes that may not be due to
changes in the quality of education provided. In public order and safety
the measured decline was due largely to increases in the number of
reported self-harm and assault incidents in prisons. Improvements in
quality appear to have stalled in health care.
Figure 4 shows the latest official estimates of public service
inputs, outputs and productivity, after quality adjustment, covering the
period up to 2015. This shows a sharp slowdown in the growth rate of
public sector output over the years 2011-15. It is worth noting that
output growth would probably have been even weaker had it not been for
public sector pay restraint. These estimates show little evidence of an
increase in public sector efficiency in recent years, though they
pre-date the Efficiency Review that was announced in the 2016 budget.
There are a range of other indicators of the quality of public
services, many of which are not yet taken into account in the official
ONS statistics. The Institute for Government (IfG) maintains an
excellent Performance Tracker that highlights where pressures are
building in the provision of public services. (6) For example, in the
health sector, there has been a marked deterioration since 2010 in the
percentage of A&E visits being dealt with in four hours. And there
are pressures building in areas where the ONS makes no quality
adjustment. For example, continued cuts in police numbers may be having
an effect on the quality of service, with victim satisfaction with the
police having fallen since 2014.
Taken together the evidence suggests that, following a sustained
period of fiscal restraint, low levels of public spending have had a
detrimental effect on the provision of public services. To some extent
public sector pay restraint has helped to keep costs down and so allowed
the public sector to keep staff numbers and service output higher than
would otherwise have been possible. But it is very doubtful that pay
restraint can be maintained given the better rewards available in the
private sector. This suggests that the emerging pressures on public
sector service quality are likely to be stronger in the future.
Seven more lean years
The government's approach to fiscal policy and public spending
is set out in the Charter for Budget Responsibility. In his post-2017
election autumn budget, the chancellor confirmed that the government was
committed to following fiscal rules that would 'guide the UK
towards a balanced budget by the middle of the next decade'.
This is expected to mean that spending restraint will extend
further into the future. Departmental spending levels for the period up
to 2019-20 were fixed in the 2015 Spending Review, (7) and will be
agreed for the following five years in the 2019 Spending Review. The
future path of government spending will be set to achieve the
government's fiscal objective. The latest Spring Statement forecast
by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR), representing its
interpretation of the government's declared policy, shows spending
continuing to fall from 38.8 per cent of GDP in 2017-18 to 37.6 per cent
in 2022-23. But even with this level of fiscal restraint, the OBR's
central forecast of public sector net borrowing goes no lower than 0.9
per cent of GDP. (8) That means that the government would have to
tighten its purse strings even further if it wants to balance the budget
by the middle of the next decade.
In this section we set out two possible 'what-if'
scenarios to enable us to estimate the scale of the future fiscal
challenges that the government faces. In doing so we are very aware that
the future is uncertain and that circumstances may change dramatically
for good or bad. For example, there may be a surge in economic growth
and tax revenue that makes it easy to finance more public services. But
it would not be prudent to assume such an outcome. Instead, the purpose
of different scenarios is to enable us to think through the risks of
different policies in the interests of making better choices today.
Continued austerity
The first scenario we consider is the business-as-usual case given
by NIESR's February 2018 central forecast. This is our benchmark
and assumes that the government sticks to its current spending plans in
cash terms. Because the NIESR forecast for GDP is a little more
optimistic than the OBR's, public spending as a share of GDP falls
further to 36.6 per cent in 2022-23, a percentage point lower than the
OBR assumption for that year. This is shown by the black line in figure
5.
Easing austerity
The second scenario is where we look at the consequences for the
public finances of an easing of fiscal austerity, driven by the need to
deal with existing pressures on public services and, on top of that, the
consequences of further ageing of the population.
Our analysis has established that by 2017-18, spending in a number
of areas had fallen below warranted levels. These areas included
education, public order and safety, and more recently health and social
care. The government will find it hard to resist pressure to restore the
quality of public services in these areas. We have also shown that some
of the fiscal squeeze was achieved by capping public sector pay and this
has resulted in building pressures on recruitment. In order to alleviate
increasing recruitment difficulties in sectors like the NHS, pay will
need to increase by more than in comparable private sectors to catch up
with lost ground.
In addition, the pressure from further ageing of the population is
gradually building. And this will mean that extra resources will be
needed to cover rising health and care costs and serve a larger number
of pensioners.
We have created a fiscal easing scenario where to ease these
pressures spending grows in line with our estimate of its warranted
level (dotted red line in figure 5). In that case, spending would rise
to 40.2 per cent of GDP in 2022-23, thereby opening up a substantial gap
over what is currently planned.
Consequences for the public finances
Figure 6 shows public sector borrowing in the two scenarios we have
described. This is calculated on the assumption that there are no
changes to taxes, other than those which have already been announced.
In the first scenario, where the government continues with
austerity and sticks to its current spending plans, it would achieve its
objective of a balanced budget by the middle of the next decade. But,
given existing pressures on public spending, we doubt that such a path
is tolerable unless it is backed by substantial efficiency improvements
in the delivery of public services.
In the second scenario, where spending restraint is relaxed to
accommodate more spending on public services, higher public sector pay
and increased demands from an ageing population, the deficit would rise
to over 4 per cent of GDP by 2022-23, breaching the government's
fiscal rules. That clearly would not be acceptable to the government and
would mean that public sector debt would remain at uncomfortable levels.
The unpalatable consequences for government borrowing could be
avoided by raising taxes. But the increase would have to be substantial
to raise 4 per cent of GDP, currently worth around 80 billion [pounds
sterling], bearing in mind that an increase of lp in the standard rate
of income tax would currently raise only around 4 [pounds sterling]
billion.
How to deal with the challenges ahead
There are no easy answers to the fiscal challenges the government
currently faces. There certainly does not appear to be much light at the
end of the tunnel.
Of course it is possible that economic circumstances surprisingly
improve, lifting tax revenue and so the amount of public spending that
could be afforded within the existing fiscal rules. But disappointing
economic performance over the past ten years suggests that might be just
a pipe dream, and that it would be better to consider other options. It
does not appear credible to continue on the existing path of
deteriorating public services when needs are increasing.
The options available to ease fiscal austerity fall into three main
categories:
Amending the fiscal rules
There is widespread acceptance across the political spectrum that
debt levels are uncomfortably high and so there is a reluctance to
increase borrowing significantly. Nevertheless the government's
fiscal objective of balancing the budget in the medium term is seen by
many experts as overly stringent. There are other rules that would allow
more borrowing and still maintain fiscal sustainability in the medium
term.
For example, the government could adopt the so-called 'golden
rule' that it borrows no more than it invests. On current trends
that would allow public spending to be sustained at 39 per cent of GDP,
rather than falling to 37.6 per cent of GDP by 2022-23 as in the
government's current plans.
But that would provide relatively limited scope for additional
spending and still leave public sector debt at an uncomfortably high
level. High debt levels would be less of a concern if real interest
rates were certain to remain at currently low levels. One possible
approach would be to carry out debt management operations to lock in
more borrowing at current low real interest rates.
Raising tax revenue in new ways
There appears to be little appetite for a significant increase in
general taxation to fund higher spending. But there are other ways to
increase revenue such as charging users for more parts of services
provided, or changing the nature of services provided by shifting some
functions currently carried out by government further down the delivery
chain. Any moves in that direction would need to be clearly communicated
in advance to give people time to prepare for their introduction.
In addition, there have been renewed calls for a hypothecated tax
to fund the NHS. There are good reasons to be wary of such taxes. (9)
Nevertheless, if they are the only politically feasible way of raising
extra revenue then they should be considered as an alternative to
continued austerity. That said, the amount of money that could be raised
in this way without such taxes coming to be seen as identical to general
taxation is probably limited.
Improving public sector efficiency
The third option is to improve the efficiency with which public
services are delivered. As we have seen, measured public sector
productivity gains have been relatively modest in the past, despite
attempts over many years to get more from less. But that does not mean
that efficiency gains are not available, nor that they would be
associated with worse services. Productivity improvements in the private
sector are generally achieved by a process of 'creative
destruction' where competition from new businesses with new ideas
and using new technologies forces incumbent businesses to keep up or
close down. That process may not be appropriate throughout the public
sector, but its absence may explain why ideas to improve public sector
efficiency are not adopted more readily.
That would suggest a range of options be investigated that might
help improve public sector efficiency by transforming public services.
These would include providing incentives to make changes, innovate and
improve efficiency; encouraging private sector discipline and incentives
to appropriate parts of public services; changes to organisation and
workforces, including adopting best management practices; redesigning
services and providing alternative delivery mechanisms that empower
users to choose most efficient providers; using technology and data to
target or deliver services; more widespread sharing of best practices.
These three options for ending fiscal austerity are not mutually
exclusive. But in the context of ongoing Brexit negotiations and the
associated elevated level of uncertainty, the government is unlikely to
want to consider introducing new taxes or amending the fiscal rules.
That suggests that seeking radical ways to improve public sector
efficiency may be the only palatable option for ending fiscal austerity
in current circumstances and should be urgently considered.
NOTES
(1) OECD (2018), general government spending indicator.
(2) The estimated relationship is:
[mathematical expression not reproducible]
where TME/Y and Debt/Y are total managed expenditure and UK
national debt, both as a share of GDP, Age 85+/Pop is the proportion of
the population who are over 85, and growth is the annual GDP growth
rate.
N=65, [R.sup.2]=0.86, Newey-West standard errors in brackets.
(3) 'Retaining and developing the teaching workforce',
Public Accounts Committee.
(4) Estimates by Royal College of Nursing, May 2017.
(5) Methods of improving estimates of public sector productivity
are being considered as part of the research programme of the Economic
Statistics Centre of Excellence at NIESR.
(6) https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/performance-tracker-autumn-2017.
(7) An exception was made for those departments whose overall
budgets are protected. Their Resource DEL was set to 2020-21. Capital
budgets for every department were set to 2020-21.
(8) Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2018.
(9) See Peter Dolton's blogpost
https://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/realremedies-or-hypothetical-hypothecation-fund-nhs.
REFERENCES
Dolton, P., Hantzsche, A. and Kara, A. (2018), 'Follow the
leader? The interaction between public and private sector wage growth in
the UK', presented at Royal Economic Society annual conference,
March 2018.
Pain, N., Weale, M. and Young, G. (1997), 'Britain's
fiscal problems', Economic Journal, 107 (403), pp. 1142-56.
Sims, S. and Allen, R. (2018), 'Identifying schools with high
usage and high loss of newly qualified tecahers', National
Institute Economic Review, 243, February, R27-36.
Arno Hantzsche and Garry Young, NIESR. E-mail:
a.hantzsche@niesr.ac.uk, g.young@niesr.ac.uk. We are grateful to Jagjit
Chadha and Philip Craig for comments on an earlier version, and to Sopra
Steria for funding the underlying research.
Caption: Figure 1. Total managed expenditure as per cent of GDP
Caption: Figure 2. Warranted public spending as a share of GDP
Caption: Figure 3. Quality of public services
Caption: Figure 4. Growth in public service outputs, inputs and
productivity
Caption: Figure 5. The outlook for public spending under different
assumptions about austerity
Caption: Figure 6. The outlook for public borrowing under different
assumptions about austerity
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