ABSTRACT

Though previous research on negotiation has focused the choices of strategies by third parties, not many of them looked at the consequences of those most-preferred strategies on negotiator behavior and attitudes. This study based on theories like procedural justice theory, attribution theory, naive realism cognitive theory, and previous studies on mediation strategies to form hypotheses for future research. These hypotheses look to find whether concession in mediation with a trusting opponent will occur; whether negotiators make larger concessions when their mediators use various strategies when the opponent is distrustful; and whether trust and mediation strategy affect fairness judgments. In recognition of the broad theories involved in these issues, cross-cultural theories and group-value model are also discussed.

INTRODUCTION

In 1986 Peter Carnevale first offered his Strategic Choice model of mediation (Carnevale, 1986)--a model that has received substantial empirical support (e.g., Carnevale and Henry, 1989; see Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992 and Carnevale, Conlon, Hanisch, and Harris, 1989 for reviews). This model posits that mediators tend to rely upon strategies such as "pressing" the parties to resolve their dispute, "seeking integrative solutions," "inaction," and "compensating" one or both parties. Not intended as a comprehensive model of mediation (Carnevale, 1992), the strategies that are described in the model may be used in conjunction with other strategies that have been advocated by other theorists (e.g., Kressel's 1972 "reflexive" rapport-building strategy). Because this model was designed to predict mediator strategy, it is understandable that most research has been confined to investigating the choice of strategies by third parties; relatively little work has been done looking at the consequences of those most-preferred strategies upon negotiator behavior and attitudes.

Using the Carnevale framework, previous research has also looked at the impact of a variety of situational factors such as time pressure upon mediator strategy (Carnevale, O'Connor, and McCusker, 1993; Carnevale and Conlon, 1988). One important situational factor for a mediator to consider is whether the parties trust each other. Ross and Wieland (1996) have investigated the role that "trust" plays in the selection of strategies by informal mediators. The researchers report that of the strategies listed above, informal mediators relied heavily upon three: (1) "pressing," (2) "inaction," and (3) "rapport-building" when the negotiators did not trust each other--and "pressing" was particularly common when there was high time pressure. However, their research does not indicate whether these commonly-used strategies are actually effective under these conditions. Nor have researchers examined the reactions of disputants to various mediation strategies when the opposing negotiator is distrusting vs. trusting. The present study seeks to test the effects of "pressing," "inaction," and "rapport-building" mediator strategies upon negotiator behavior and attitudes under trust and distrust conditions.

THE CONSEQUENCE OF TRUST AND DISTRUST

It is important that we define "trust." Although many definitions exist (see Bigley and Pearce, 1998; Deutsch, 1958; Kee and Knox, 1970), and there is some debate as to whether "trust" and "distrust" are polar opposites or qualitatively different (see Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, 1998), many definitions are similar to that offered by Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998): "Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another" (p. 395). Similarly, Kramer (1999) states that, "trust entails a state of perceived vulnerability or risk that is derived from individuals' uncertainty regarding the motives, intentions, and prospective actions of others on whom they depend". Other researchers, instead of emphasizing what trust is, argue that if the level of trust and the level of interdependence match is the most important (Wicks, et. al., 1999). Many scholars agree that, in a negotiation context, trust involves the interrelated components of (a) goodwill, (b) predictability, and (c) a problem-solving orientation (Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992; Friedman, 1993; Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, and Carnevale, 1980; Johnson-George and Swap, 1982). One very important consequence of trust in negotiation situations is vulnerability or risk-taking (Rousseau et al., 1998; Pruitt, 1981). In this study we emphasized negotiator risk-taking as a consequence of trust as described by Pruitt (1981). Based on Pruitt's discussion (and consistent with the Ross and Wieland, 1996 study), we expect bargainers who trust the other person to be more willing to (a) make direct statements of trust directed toward the other negotiator, (b) forfeit opportunities to compete with the other and to express faith that the other will not compete either (what Pruitt calls the loss of opportunity for competitive behavior), (c) share accurate information (what Pruitt calls risking information loss), (d) make unilateral concessions and express faith that the other will behave likewise (what Pruitt calls risking position loss), and (e) offer concessions even at the risk of appearing weak (what Pruitt calls image loss). Even if scholars disagree on specific definitions of trust and distrust, most would probably agree that a negotiator who indicates that he or she is willing to risk these various types of loss is more trusting that a negotiator who indicates that he or she is unwilling to take these types of risk.

Understanding the effectiveness of specific mediator strategies (e.g., "pressing," "inaction," and "rapport-building") under specific situational conditions (e.g., one negotiator is either trustful or distrustful) is important for third party training and development. Several authors have noted that there are multiple criteria available for measuring the effectiveness of third-party interventions (e.g., McGrath, 1966; Kochan & Jick, 1978). One set of criteria of interest is whether both the mediator and the mediation procedure are seen as fair (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Wittmer, Carnevale, and Walker, 1991). If the parties feel that the third party is unfair or that the mediation procedure is unjust, then the negotiators are unlikely to rely upon that procedure or third party for future disputes. Therefore, issues pertaining to procedural justice and the fairness of the mediator are of interest in the present study. Another criterion of interest to many professionals and researchers is the level of negotiator concession making; this is because concession making is often predictive of settlement (Rubin and Brown, 1975). The present study will also consider this dimension of effectiveness.

EFFECTS OF MEDIATOR STRATEGY ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE BELIEFS

The beliefs that disputants have regarding the fairness of a third party procedure and of the third party's actions have significant implications for the future use of any dispute resolution procedure as well as the acceptance of and compliance with any procedural outcomes (Sheppard, Lewicki, & Minton, 1992; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Therefore, it is important to investigate whether the variables of interest have significant effects upon procedural justice beliefs. When negotiators participate in a third-party procedure such as mediation, the enactment of that procedure can influence disputant evaluations of the third party (Ross, Conlon, and Lind, 1990). Other research also suggest that the process and decision control have great impact on evaluations of procedural neutrality, the trustworthiness of authorities and the degree to which people involved in the procedures feel that their status is recognized (Tyler and Blader, 2000). Further, research on third-party bias has demonstrated that a third party will be perceived as fair if he or she acts in an even-handed manner (Conlon & Ross, 1993). As mediators employ different strategies to enact the procedure, they may be perceived differently by the individual negotiators. Let us consider the three widely-used strategies from the Ross and Wieland study.

Putting pressure on the parties ("pressing") was frequently chosen by informal mediators when the parties did not trust each other. How is pressing perceived by the negotiators? A negotiator who faces a distrustful opponent may recognize that the negotiation task is very difficult due to the distrust and that a strong form of third-party intervention is appropriate. This may even be inferred after the fact: a negotiator may say, "my opponent was not very trusting; if my mediator was using this 'heavy-handed' tactic, there must have been a need for it." Such inferences are consistent with attribution theory. Attribution theory suggests that people search for the causes of others' behaviors as they seek to make sense of the world (Kelley, 1971). If negotiators infer that the opposing negotiator is not trusting, or they make other internal attributions about their opponent, then they may believe that stronger responses, such as "pressing," are warranted. Previous research has found that people endorse the use of "heavier" tactics against an opponent when they make internal attributions about the other person (Pruitt, Rubin, and Kim, 1994; Holmes and Miller, 1976). This leads to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Negotiators whose mediators use a "pressing" strategy will report a greater need for the mediator's assistance when they face a distrusting opponent than when they face a trusting opponent.

However, this strategy may have mixed consequences. While the individual negotiator may feel that the mediator is appropriate in using pressing on an opponent, the negotiator may generally feel that it is unfair for the mediator to use this strategy on him or her. This is consistent with "naive realism" cognitive theory where people tend to describe themselves in positive terms and believe that they are taking reasonable positions on the issues (Ross and Ward, 1996). Heavy-handed tactics such as "pressing" are not only unwarranted, but may even be seen as unfair when applied to themselves (e.g., "pressing" may signal that the mediator is biased in favor of the other party and is therefore acting unfairly). This may be true regardless of whether the opponent is trusting. By contrast, if a mediator relies upon an "inaction" strategy, or attempts to "build rapport" between the disputants, he or she is probably perceived as acting in an even-handed (if somewhat uninvolved) manner. This suggests a second hypothesis:

Hypothesis #2: Subjects whose mediators use a "pressing" strategy believe the mediator is less fair than subjects whose mediators use "inaction" and "rapport-building" strategies.

THE EFFECTS OF MEDIATOR STRATEGY ON CONCESSION MAKING

Mediator strategies also can have a significant impact upon negotiator concession making (Wall, 1981). Harris and Carnevale (1990) report that if negotiators learned that their third parties stood ready to significantly lower their payoffs (a very powerful form of "pressing"), then the negotiators generally made greater concessions to their opponents--apparently in an attempt to keep the third party from executing this threat. Lim and Carnevale (1990) also observed that the "pressing" strategy is effective when negotiator hostility is high and trust is low. Finally, Carnevale, Lim, and McLaughlin (1989) determined that mediator strategies aimed at building trust and rapport between the parties were effective for both increasing the likelihood of settlement and for improving the relationship between the disputants when hostility was high. We discovered no such findings in the published literature for an "inaction" strategy. Together, these findings suggest the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis #3: Subjects with mediators who follow a "pressing" strategy or a "rapport-building" strategy will make larger concessions to the opponent than subjects whose mediators pursue an " inaction" strategy.

EFFECTS OF TRUST ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE BELIEFS

In addition to investigating the effects of mediation strategies generally, we wish to compare these strategies under different trust conditions. Will identical mediation interventions be viewed differently when the opponent indicates that he or she trusts the subject relative to when the opponent communicates distrust? The literature suggests that when the opponent distrusts the subject, conflict intensity is heightened; under such conditions subjects may be more receptive to mediation (see Pruitt, Rubin, and Kim, 1994 for a review). Under such conditions, subjects may be more likely to view the mediation procedure as satisfactory and fair. However, if subjects already trust their counterpart, they may believe that mediation is an unnecessary intrusion. Such beliefs may generate resentment toward the procedure. This logic suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis #4: Subjects who bargain with a trusting opponent will view the mediation procedure as less fair and satisfactory than subjects who face a distrusting opponent.

THE EFFECTS OF TRUST ON NEGOTIATION CONCESSION MAKING

In a mediation setting, one important measure of third-party effectiveness is whether the mediator persuades a disputant to abandon his or her initial bargaining position and makes the concessions necessary to conclude an agreement (Carnevale, Putnam, Conlon, and O'Connor, 1991). Do statements of trust or distrust between negotiators influence concession making? The literature offers two competing hypothesis. On one hand, dyadic bargaining studies suggest that trust may be a facilitating condition for cooperative concession making, and higher joint profits (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, and Carnevale, 1980; Kee, 1970). Pruitt and Rubin (1986) also suggest that negotiation may more effective when the negotiators trust each other because conditions have been created for effective integrative bargaining. Finally, Carnevale, et al. (1991) surveyed community mediators and found that the dispute characteristics, "One or both did not trust the other party," and "One or both parties were very hostile to the other party" helped distinguished successful from unsuccessful community mediation.

But are expressions of mutual trust necessary for mediation to be successful? Perhaps not. Consider a situation where one negotiator offers a series of modest, unilateral concessions. According to Osgood (1962; 1966), this series of concessions is a key component in eliciting concessions from the other side (also see Lindskold, 1978 and Lindskold, Bentz, and Walters, 1986). Perhaps it is the series of unilateral concessions--not expressions of trust or distrust in the other--that elicits concessions from the other party. Research investigating "trust" sometimes finds no difference in negotiated outcomes due to trust (Kee, 1970; Butler, 1995). While high levels of distrust may make mediation more difficult, the fact that one side "trusted enough" to make modest concessions may outweigh any accompanying statements. The opponents' past concessions may have a large effect on the negotiator when the negotiator decided how much to concede. If indeed, "actions speak louder than words," then there should be no difference between trust, distrust, and (no-message) control conditions when the opponent makes identical concessions.

Together, these studies suggest two competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis #5a: Subjects who bargain with a trusting opponent will make larger concessions to that opponent than bargainers who face a distrusting opponent.

Hypothesis #5b: Subjects who bargain with a trusting opponent will not make larger concessions to that opponent than bargainers who face a distrusting opponent.

To summarize, in this study we seek to determine whether subjects will make larger concessions in mediation with a trusting opponent; we also investigate whether negotiators make larger concessions when their mediators used either "pressing" or "rapport-building" strategies, particularly when the opponent was distrustful of the subject. We also seeks to determine whether trust and mediation strategy affect fairness judgments.

DISCUSSION

This study, based in part on the Control Model of Procedural Justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 1978) and rooted in social exchange theories, presents six hypotheses, including two competing hypotheses. Other literatures rooted in an ongoing relationship with an actual group could be used for future study. For example, theoretical models such as the Group-Value model (Tyler and Lind, 1992), which is based on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1969; 1978) can be explored. That is, people are sometime not perfectly rational in an economic sense; they do not always seek to maximize their own utilities but are affected by their relationship with, and identification with the group; trust may be a more salient variable in a study that incorporated such variables more extensively than did the present study (Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Messick and Brewer, 1983).

In the future, the proposed six hypotheses can be tested in a cross-cultural setting in the future too. In other words, procedural preferences differ across culture because different cultures foster different beliefs and values. A future study in different cultural contexts can be conducted because 1: the group value model should be able to supplement the control model most successfully in the aspect of cross-cultural differences. 2: culture differences also may impact people's perceived procedural fairness (Brockner et al., 2000).

Finally, the experiment to be conducted to test these effects only under high time pressure conditions. Although this is the most interesting time pressure condition, based on previously-published results, it nevertheless remains for future research to test whether similar effects would be obtained when time pressure was low; "pressing" may be seen as acceptable to use under high time pressure conditions, but may be unacceptable to negotiators under low time pressure.

In summary, we hypothesize that mediator strategy significantly influences negotiators' perceptions of justice for both the mediation procedure and for the mediator's actions. These effects shall be independent and support other research (e.g., Ross, Conlon, and Lind, 1990) suggesting that the enactment of a dispute resolution procedure is as important as the procedure itself. This is important for mediators to know because disputants' beliefs regarding the fairness of both the procedure and the mediator's actions may influence the extent to which disputants cooperate with their mediator. Future research might look at other forms of cooperation (such as revealing information such as one's "limits" to the mediator; truthfully answering a mediator's queries, etc.).

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William H. Ross, University of Wisconsin--La Crosse

Jeng-Chung V. Chen, University of Wisconsin--La Crosse