The continuous struggle of journalists with the autocratic, personalistic styles of governance in Africa forms one of the most prominent aspects of journalistic cultures in Africa (Diamond, 2010). With every stroke of the computer, the journalist asks, "Will this get by the editor who represents the interests of the newspaper owner linked in with the political elite? Will my article bring down personal reprisals from the presidential security agents? Dare I allude to the corruption and mismanagement caused by the latest party appointees in the ministry I am analyzing?"

A culture consists of the values, folkways, and daily routines of the inhabitants of a given community. All journalists learn the fundamental values to represent truthfully what the public should know about public affairs that affect the well being of the public and enable the public to form an opinion about those affairs. Though fear, bad pay, harsh editors, and the daily living a lie and silence about the corruption in public life may dull the commitment to these values, they always remain present in the minds of journalists (White, 2008, 2010). Why are these values so present for journalists in Africa?

Journalists and the press stood in the forefront of the independence movements in Africa, but from the beginning of the press in Africa representing the truth has remained a struggle. From the earliest initiatives of the press in Africa, journalists represented various forms of independence movements, affirming the value of native African culture, native economic activity, and indigenous political goals (Omu, 1978). Colonial founders formed governments around the virtually absolute power of the colonial governors, and those governors clung to a commitment to maintain continued colonial political and economic control. From the earliest years of colonial rule there was continuous confrontation between the press and colonial rule. Journalism came into the independence movements with a strong commitment to challenging autocratic governance (Hyden & Leslie, 2002).

Journalists can only write about the people, their action, and views of the people. In spite of scattered strong independence movements, colonial rule did not permit or cultivate a widely rooted citizen commitment to the interests of representation and organization. Into this vacuum of civic culture came the strong men leaders who not only built upon and continued the autocratic, highly centralized colonial governance, but added to this their personalistic, neo-patrimonial style (Diamond, 2010). The presidential figures built a structure of power based on patronage stretching down to the village elders and gaining loyalty through familistic, ethnic ties and flows of money from the public treasury. Journalists who had developed a culture of protest against the colonial injustices quickly turned their skills against the neo-patrimonial governments that came into power. Those journalists most open to issues of human rights and justice to the marginal and poor linked up with and became the voice of the civil society movements contesting dictatorial, self-serving governments.

Over the 50 years since independence journalistic cultures of protest and critical analysis in Africa have taken on a variety of facets and emphases that many have researched and extensively commented on. This essay attempts to gather some of this research and describe some of these dimensions of the journalistic culture.

A. Reforming the personalistic discourse of governance

In Africa, "patrimonial rule" means literally the pretension of "fatherly authority." Many simply expect the media to treat the actions of presidential figures with unthinking, childlike obeisance (Schmitz, 2006, pp. 33-34). In cultivating this image of ceremonial elegance, heads of state put themselves above the rule of law, and their officials make anyone questioning this kingly, arbitrary governance suffer the punishment of disobedient children (Gonzion, 2011, p. 307). A good example of this comes from the expectations of the head of state in Cote d'Ivoire, Felix Houphet-Boigny. During his long reign from 1960 to 1993, he adopted the title as the "Le Vieux," the "Old Man," or, better, "Our loving father." Widely known as "The grand old man of Africa" or "The sage of Africa," Houphet-Boigny became a model for Hastings Banda in Malawi, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, and Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi in Kenya. Journalists in Cote d'Ivoire not echoing this kingly praise of the president or showing the slightest disrespect were taken out to the military camp of Seguela for a week of "mental straightening out" (Gonzion, 2011, p. 309). Journalists referred to the reprisals of Houphet-Boigny as "paternalistic repression." Later presidents in Cote d'Ivoire ordered critical journalists to be whipped like naughty boys.

Unfortunately, the journalistic response to this familistic style often becomes just as personalistic. The journalists in the Cote d'Ivoire and in many African countries responded to this self-serving governance by forming professional associations to monitor the cases of irresponsible, emotional journalism (Gonzion, 2011, pp. 310-315). At the same time, journalists in many Africa countries took the lead in fostering a responsible, accurate public discourse based on universal human rights and universal norms of good governance.

The Minister of Information banned the newspaper MwanaHalisi in Tanzania for a period in 2008 for reporting the clearly evidenced disreputable behavior and illegal trading by President Jakaya Kikwete's son because it showed disrespect for the president and his family (Masanja, 2012, pp. 288-389). The journalist establishment in Tanzania responded by trying to raise the level of critical, responsible public discourse. The journalist associations working with the Media Council of Tanzania developed the "Dar es Salaam Declaration on Editorial Freedom, Independence, and Responsibility" which has set down norms and guidelines for introducing an objective and accurate evaluation of government and other public services.

B. Defending the right of objective, critical reporting

The 40 years of military rule in Nigeria from the early 1960s to 1999 marked a period of continued plunder of the national treasury and brutal repression of any protest. The military dictators of Nigeria demanded of journalists above all a reverence for the personalistic "dignity" of the presidential figure (Ogbondah, 1994). Journalists, however, followed their own mandate. They carried on a relentless revelation of the violations of imprisonment without trial, the enormous theft of national resources, and the use of public office for personal gain. During this time virtually all editors and senior journalists suffered interrogation sessions and even torture. A letter bomb killed Dele Giwa, one of the founders of the news magazine Newswatch that introduced a tradition of investigative journalism, but he became a major inspiration of the unswerving criticism of the military dictatorship. This continual keeping the repression before the public eye and supporting human rights groups proved an important factor in the return to democratic elections in 1999.

The journalists of Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa have sought legal protection for the right to carry out responsible investigation of governance and public services on behalf of the public. Fortunately, the more recent constitutions have introduced much more explicit protections of journalists (Kiptinness, 2012), but journalists must still carry on a continual effort to get the practical application of these legal defenses (Diraba & O'Donnell, 2012).

C. Challenging the "universal control" of a neo-patrilineal power structure

One of the characteristics of neo-patrilineal systems is that the central ruler and his immediate clique attempt to link the leadership of all the major institutions into their personalistic control system: local political bosses, ethnic icons, leaders of major economic enterprises, the church hierarchy, the educational system (especially the universities), and, of course, the media. The heads of these sectors receive rewards for collaboration: they become "friends" and "comrades" with privileged access to the leader and receive lavish monetary outlays and other forms of corruption. Media owners and top editors of collaborating media usually become an integral part of the presidential circle (Ugangu, 2011).

Although neo-patrilineal rule may succeed in bringing the leadership of all the sectors into their control system, the universities, the churches, professional associations, and especially the media also have their internal dissident traditions which attempt to insist on freedom of aspirations, human rights, social justice, truthfulness, and equal opportunities. This constant conflict with political control systems within media organizations forms a central aspect of the journalistic culture of Africa.

A typical example of challenging political control within a newspaper comes from the Rawlings era in Ghana in the 1980s and 1990s. The brilliant journalism of Paul Ansah created a general discourse of public questioning of Jerry Rawlings' dictatorial actions. Ansah knew how to crystallize public opinion with language that brought widespread questioning of Rawlings' actions. Ansah's famous phrase, "I am going to go to town on that fellow," eventually found its way into the book. Going to Town, which brought out the journalistic skill of Ansah in coalescing support for more democratic governance.

The questioning of the actions of the Rawlings' regime became at times a confrontation of journalists with editors of leading newspapers such as the Daily Graphic, a government-owned newspaper. The willingness to risk even one's employment in contesting editors reveals much ofjournalistic culture. Yaw Boadu Ayeboafo, a journalist with the Daily Graphic, according to his own account, chose to support the right of opposition parties to form and campaign even when the government board of elections was officially reluctant to allow opposition parties this right to begin campaigning. This brought him into violent confrontation with the editor of the Daily Graphic. Day after day Yaw Boadu Ayeboafo brought to the editorial planning meetings articles on the demand of the opposition parties to begin campaigning. Finally, after a furious battle of words in the editorial meeting, Yaw Boadu Ayeboafo submitted a letter of resignation. Shocked at this show of values, the editor wrote a letter supporting Boadu Ayeboafo, "Of all the senior journalists at this newspaper, you are the one I feel so much confidence in." But once the editor knew that he had the united support of the staff, he was ready to risk taking an independent stand.

In other occasions Boadu Ayeboafo wrote news articles openly challenging the growing business interests and open corruption of Rawlings. In fact, Boadu Ayeboafo helped to articulate the feelings of Ghanaians who deeply resented the oppressive governance of Rawlings.

Boadu Ayeboafo had so much influence because of another important value: He had a reputation of being politically independent, not in the hire of any particular political strong man or political party. He could point out freely and honestly how a particular political leader violated the principles of the Ghanaian constitution. He thus became much more credible, popular, and widely read by the Ghanaian public. In all of this he remained aware of the risks for his career and even to his life, but he was willing to take the risks because of his conviction of the importance of public debate for the country. Because of his wide popularity he claimed that he was never arrested because obviously that would only increase his credibility with the public (Diedong, 2008, p. 219).

Boadu Ayeboafo emphasized his freedom, but was aware of the responsibility that freedom brings:

It is good to be free. But as a journalist, how are you using the freedom to the benefit of the larger society. Are you using the freedom simply because it is freedom and you can do as you wish or because you are free you can do a lot of things for the people. (Diedong, 2008, p. 21)

Where do the cultural values of journalists willing to confront autocratic rule come from? Boadu Ayeboafo had read widely the major thinkers and writers of Africa. He was particularly influenced by Chinua Achebe.

My fundamental belief is underlined by what Chinua Achebe said about the individual who owns the cock in the community. When it crows in the morning, it becomes the property of all. In Achebe's words, "The cock that crows in the morning belongs to one household, but its voice is the property of the whole neighborhood." So my belief is that regardless of who owns the cock, it serves the good of the community in which it is found. This is the core belief that I have canvassed and shared with the people. Their interests are the things that should inform (us journalists) on the things we write about. The primary interest of every journalist must be the public interest. (Diedong, 2008, p. 217)

Boadu Ayeboafoh promoted the solidarity of journalists in the face of attempts by politicians to separate and buy off. He served as executive secretary of the National Media Commission from 1999 to 2003. For years he was a major supporter of the Ghana Journalist Association and was vice-president of the GJA from 1999 to 2003 (Diedong, 2008).

Membership in the GJA enables journalists to learn from each other. It also enables me to reach out to my colleagues because, as you interact with them, you are not regarded as an alien. The seminars and workshops organized by the GJA on pertinent topics are useful in enhancing the standards of media performance. Exposure to all these seminars has had a very positive influence on me. (Diedong, 2008, p. 220)

Many journalists in Africa remain manipulated by their economic dependency, but Boadu Ayeboafoh claims that he generally did not care about his personal support because people widely recognized him as competent and honest and he had many side jobs such as part-time teaching, lecturing, writing for magazines, and special work with media councils and other organizations.

D. Introducing the language and convictions of human rights into the public discourse

The culture of neo-patrilineal governance highlights several values: might makes right, using control of wealth to buy compliance regardless of legal procedures, and bullying the opposition into submission. Again, a case from the experience of Yaw Boadu Ayeboafo illustrates the readiness ofjournalists to challenge minor officials who perpetrate the violation of human rights.

Boadu Ayeboafo heard of the accusations of witchcraft against a group of women in a rural area in northern Ghana, false accusations against frail old women whose red eyes and cracked voices raised suspicions. So he went up to the area and heard the beating of a gong in the silence of the night. The District Chief Executive of the area judged the situation with the norms of patrilineal governance and accepted the belief that the sounding of the gong called out the witches to carry out malevolent threats against the local people to extort money. This indeed was the world of beliefs of the governance in that time of Rawlings. When Boadu Ayeboafo spoke to the official about the rumors of the harmful intentions of the so-called witches, the official noted immediately that this journalist did not share his belief that the people should torture or even kill the women. Instead of joining the official plan to punish these elderly women on unfounded suspicion, Boadu Ayeboafo returned to the main editorial office and wrote a feature article referring to the accusations against old women but described the fact that many false accusations arose against elderly women simply because they had bad eyes, walked with a limp, were often toothless because they could not afford proper dental care, and talked with a hoarse voice. The article called for compassion and argued the need to help these elderly women, not immediately call for punishment that the officials of the Rawlings government seemed only too willing to implement. The article was widely read and two weeks later Boadu Ayeboafo got a call from the Department of Social Welfare in the area inquiring about the location of the elderly women whom the government officials accused of witchcraft. Boadu Ayeboafo's reporting led to the introduction of a program to assist the so-called witches who were simply elderly women with problems of illness, and lack of proper food and shelter. The article caught the attention of many in Ghana at the time and started a kind of movement to assist elderly women falsely accused of witchcraft. It was a case of the culture of journalists asserting itself against the culture of authoritarian officialdom.

E. The media culture of radical protest

Most journalists realize that the information that governments put out is a cover up or outright lie. This gives rise to a deep commitment quietly running through newsrooms to search for ways to reveal to the public the untruth of most of what governments claim. Yet the neo-patrimonial governance has built up such a convincing discourse that journalist find it difficult to unmask its falsity.

Journalists do not make the news, but from time to time civil society groups can create an event that reveals the falsity and even the absurdity of autocratic governance, and journalists can then draw out the evident meaning. The demonstration of the bare breasted women in Uhuru park against the Moi regime led by Wangari Mathaai provided the opportunity which brought the Kenyan nation to rebuke Moi and eventually de-legitimate his pretensions to continued dictatorial governance (Maathai, 2006) The impact of this event could not have had its effect if the journalists had not drawn out its full symbolic meaning.

An even more striking example comes from the role of the investigative journalism of the Nigerian news magazines in de-legitimating the claim of the military governments that they constituted the only force for peace, order, and economic progress in Nigeria and led toward the restoration of democratic governance in 1999. The Nigeria news magazines do not lack their academic critics, but a number of studies, especially that of Torwel (2008) have brought out the journalistic strategies that can reveal the falsity of the government defenses of unjust governance.

The labor unions, together with most other sectors of the civil society, argued the falsity of the claim that the government had to increase petrol prices and pointed that the pricing would cause serious economic hardship to the mass of commuters and would in the end fill the coffers of President Olusegun Obasanjo's friends. But the investigative journalism created a language that de-legitimated the autocratic reasoning of Obasanjo and forced him to back down from the fuel price increases. Neo-patrimonial rule attempts to defend its self-enriching forms of governance by inventing a discourse of appeal to national emergency, security, and need for social order. This insistence on obedience to a higher authority covers over their violation of constitutions, silencing the voice of parliaments and civil society and the protests against their corruption. Journalists have the role of attempting to develop a contrary discourse of democratic representation, defense of human rights, and promotion of social justice. The news magazines in Nigeria brought in a new vocabulary of accountability of governance by showing that Obasanjo had not consulted the congress regarding the increase of fuel prices, that the president did not inform or consult the National Council of State or the National Economic Council, that most political leaders and economic advisors thought it a wrong and ill-advised move, that the president ignored the Speaker of the House of Representatives, that he overrode his own vice president, and that he refused to allow the evidence of economic advisors in meetings. The news magazines convinced the public that Obasanjo was continuing with his usual style of military governance that he introduced under the guise of national crisis. At the same time the news magazines legitimated the democratic voice of the labor unions emphasizing the guidance of economic experts, the support of leading intellectuals in the country, and the supporting opinion of major experienced political leaders.

The second discursive battle with neo-patrimonial regimes occurs over the question of benefits of autocratic, self-serving action. Obasanjo typically argued that the hike in the cost fuel would channel resources into long-term national development, but, of course, not indicating any specific development project or plan. In fact, in most African countries autocratic regimes benefit the immediate circle of friends and stifle the growth of the most promising productive industries. The news magazines brought out the fact that the increase in fuel prices would benefit the local fuel importers and would hurt the growth of local refineries and other local petroleum-related industries. By taking money out of the pockets of ordinary Nigerians to pay for increase in petrol prices people would have faced increased transport costs, leaving less resources for the education of their children, health needs, or decent housing. Obasanjo's measures would help his friends in the fuel importing business, but it would not create a stronger market for Nigerian products. The news magazines attempted to create a discourse of analysis of the benefits to the public so lacking in much public discussion of economic planning in Africa.

Neo-patrimonial regimes, because they often control the content of most major media, can create a series of major falsehoods that protect their interests. Journalists typically become aware of these falsehoods and, given the basic commitment to public truth instilled in their education and professional standards, attempt to create a much more truthful public discourse. However the general public finds it difficult to recognize the falsehood of many of the government claims. The news magazines examined each of the government's main arguments for hiking fuel prices and provided clear evidence in a language understandable to the general public that these claims lacked merit. More importantly, the news magazines revealed the half truths, smoke screens, and other strategies used to get the public to systematically believe the falsehoods of the government propaganda; in other words, they gave the people the tools to continually reject the false government claims and find counter evidence. What is particularly devastating about the dishonesty of governments is that it cultivates a general culture of dishonesty in the nation. The news magazines also revealed the immorality and injustice of a false public discourse in order to build in the public a desire and commitment to truth.

F. The struggle against the repressive legal system

Journalists in Africa work with the constant fear that an article will cause an outburst of anger and hurt pride by some leading politician resulting in an invocation of the laws restricting media freedom. These laws discourage attempts to inform the public of the corruption and other forms of unjust governance.

One of the most notorious cases of this use of repressive laws held over from the colonial period comes from Tanzania. The independence government in Tanzania not only kept the colonial legislation against the press, but in 1968 amended it to include the power of the president to stop publication of any newspaper if it acted, in his opinion, against public policy. In 1976 the government of Tanzania introduced the Newspaper Act which not only retained the Penal Code establishing as criminal acts of publication of false news, incitement to violence, contempt of court, obscenity and criminal libel, but added the offenses of abusive and insulting language, contempt of court, and obscenity. The Act lumps all these so-called offenses together under the general offense of "seditious language." The government of Tanzania has the power to register, deregister, refuse circulation, or ban circulation of a newspaper (Masanja, 2012, p. 387). However, the Act creates a problem in that it lacks a precise definition of what is seditious (Masanja, 2012, p. 387). Over the last 20 years the government has invoked the law of sedition frequently on points that have wounded public officials emotionally. For example, in 1999 it banned the Majira newspaper for one week all over Tanzania for publishing proposed "salaries of government ministers and members of parliament" (Masanja, 2012, p. 338). In spite of protests against the sedition law by newspaper associations, the Media Council of Tanzania, and other communication organizations, the parliament of Tanzania, controlled by the CCM Party for 55 years, will not make any changes.

In general, the media and the association of journalists in Tanzania consider the law courts and the legal profession as hostile to the freedom of expression in Tanzania (Matumaini, 2011). Tanzania does not have among its legal parliamentary statutes specific legal protection of free expression in the media (Matumaini, 2011, p. 226). In a 2010 survey of media houses, media owners, training institutions, the Media Council of Tanzania, the offices of Information Services of the government, and the advocacy organizations MISATAN and TAMWA, 81% of the respondents affirmed their fear of continued legal threats and intimidation of journalists. Most respondents responded that they are continually afraid to protest the continued threats and harassment from branches of the government.

G. The influence of money on journalism products and journalism styles

The typical characteristics of neo-patrimonial governance to buy personal support also invades the newsroom. Many argue that direct payment to slant news is not only rather widespread but also increasingly common. However, the top most respected persons in the journalistic field are professionals intelligent enough to find ways to maintain their integrity and commitment to express what they think they must say to protect rights and democratic processes in given situations (Maugo, 2012). This esteem for outstanding integrity, we would argue, is a dominant value in the journalistic culture in African contexts. At the same time, many journalists recognize that they do not live up to this ideal, and they find ways to justify their lack of ability to reach the ideal, especially the failure to find just remuneration (Mpagze & White, 2010) .

Widespread criticism exists of the pervasive bribery in countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda, or Zimbabwe where there is an extremely high degree of concentration of power. A few serious evaluations of journalism ethics in these countries lament the complete breakdown of journalism norms (Diraba & O'Donnell, 2012). But the majority of journalists simply resign themselves to the political situation as it exists now

One of the most widely debated issues bordering on bribery is whether a journalist should accept monetary or other assistance to cover a public event of some public interest that will obviously favor the interests of the sponsor (Skjerdal, 2010). Classical journalism ethics holds that a journalist should never take any assistance from the sponsors of an event because inevitably it will influence the objectivity of the reporting. Not a few newspapers in Africa proudly say that they will provide their own financial assistance to give journalistic coverage to an event considered important, and they absolutely forbid their journalists to take any assistance from the sponsors of the event. However, many African journalists now say that they see no violation of ethics to take this assistance because their employer cannot provide them assistance, and without the help of the sponsor the event would never receive public coverage (Nwabueze, 2010). Many journalists now readily admit that when they accept some kind of hospitality or other outright assistance in covering an event, they will cover the event in way reasonably favorable to the sponsor. This, in their view, constitutes only common courtesy. They expect that the public will recognize that the coverage advertises the public event and can make up their own mind about the validity of the claims.

Journalists often take the announcements of programs of government ministries, major business enterprises, professional organizations, or other public institutions such as hospitals as promotions of dubious validity. But the media for whom they work often do not regard themselves in a position to start a debate about the claims made. Every development effort in a struggling continent such as Africa is fragile. Many have questioned the validity of "development journalism" in Africa. Yet, the continent fosters a widespread commitment to promote "development communication," keeping hopes high and avoiding pessimism (Skjerdal, 2011).

H. The significance of journalism education, media councils and investigative journalism

Africa has developed a wide variety of institutions to improve the role of the media in the process of political democratization (Rioba, 2012). Have these reformist institutions had an impact on the practice and values of journalists? Although the newspapers, radio and television stations, and numerous magazines may have as their higher goal to further education, democratic participation, uplifting entertainment, and general law-abiding life of the public, the immediate goal of all media remains the return on the investment that the owners, including public service media, try to obtain from all of this.

The universities training personnel for the media generally devise a curriculum to prepare people to provide a public service in the media, and often the graduates can successfully provide the news that enables the public to evaluate their elected representatives. On the whole, however, young people in the media do not have the training to bring about the transition from a power-centered society to a more democratic society. They learn instead how to produce the kind of media that will sell newspapers, attract people to tune into their radio or television stations, or buy their magazines. Their universities train them to treat the public as entertained spectators not as people active in a democratic governing process in their place of work, their community, or in the nation. Most graduates will move up in an organization if they can improve the sales of newspapers, gain more advertising, stimulate more conversations about the content, and not disturb political or economic leaders too much.

Guy Berger (2011), in his summary of the accomplishments in African journalism since the Windhoek Declaration on press freedom in 1991 concludes that the press councils, the continual assessment of agencies such as MISA [Media Institute of South Africa], and the greater legal protection of journalists mark important advances in journalistic freedom. Berger also places great hope in the continued improvement of the professional university education of media personnel. But one must ask whether the university education of journalists really makes that much of a contribution. Much depends on the skill of the journalistic establishment in discovering the key political issues of concern to leaders in the civil society and being able "orchestrate" a challenge to the concentration of power in the hegemonic leadership of a country by bringing into play the deep-felt symbols of public protest.

The media in Africa form the site of two conflicting cultures: the site of a search for an African form of democratization of society and culture and the site of economic survival. However, economic survival in the media depends so much on the small closely linked controllers of political and economic power that, in the final analysis, journalistic values are determined by the search for ways to get along with neo-patrilineal political lords.

I. Is the "freedom of information" movement an important value for African journalists?

A general belief holds that if journalists could get the proper information about what governments are doing and inform the public, this would help the public to elect good governments. No country in Africa suffered more from bad governance than Nigeria, and these corrupt governments managed to stay in power in part by the way they managed to conceal from the people their catastrophic governance. Leaders in the Nigerian civil society believed that if they could force the governments to reveal their activities through a "right to information" legislation, good governance would come to Nigeria.

The movement to enact "freedom of information" legislation, made up of three major civil society groups, the Nigeria Union of Journalists, the Media Rights Agenda, and the Civil Liberties Organization, began in 1993 to draft a document entitled "Draft Access to Public Records and Official Information Act (Ojebode, 2011, pp 269-270).With the help of international organizations such as the Article 19 Centre, the movement presented its first draft of legislation in 2000. Legislation was approved finally by the Senate in 2006 but vetoed by President Obasanjo. A new bill was finally approved by the Nigerian House and Senate and signed by President Goodluck Jonathan in May, 2011.

The bill provides elaborate detailed procedures to enable every Nigerian to request information from any public official or agency and, if refused access, gives the applicant the right to institute legal actions to compel the public official, agency, or institution to supply the requested information. The legislation also protects the person or agency from any recrimination for supplying information (Ojebode, 2011, pp. 270-276). Once the legislation was enacted, efforts to obtain information began almost immediately by five or six civil society organizations, though, surprisingly, journalists did not stand in the forefront of the action. In almost every case, the action became bogged down in seemingly endless court litigation. Unfortunately, there no government supervisory body exists to force the agencies to provide the information, and the litigants must shoulder the expenses.

An evaluation of the impact of the legislation (Ashong & Udoudo, 2012) reveals that to this day virtually no person or institution has successfully obtained the information they sought. The first reason, suggested above, is that no party has envisaged the long court process and expenses needed to obtain the information. One of the most surprising results appears in the fact that journalists have made little effort to use the legislation. Most journalists said that the legislation did not make the public agencies more willing to reveal information. Some 82% of the journalists surveyed said they never requested information under the legislation, and those who did request met stiff resistance and were told that they had no right to the information! No journalists decided to go further and take the matter to court. Asked why they did not go to court, the journalists questioned said they do not trust the courts, the long duration of the court process, and the sheer lack of political will to make the government respond. The holders of public information seem unaware of the legislation as do the great majority of journalists (Ashong & Udoudo, 2012, p. 352). One wonders what happened to the civil society organizations who worked so hard to formulate the legislation when the implementation of the legislation began.

J. The demands of profitability as an obstacle to critical journalism

Rising production costs have particularly hit African journalism, which also has little or no funding for investigative journalism. Most of the newspaper space relies on inexperienced graduates of journalism schools who have little training in the critical journalism that would dig out the injustices and violation of human rights that most of the African populace faces. Some research has termed the process "juniorization," the reliance on young and inexperienced "correspondents" (Wasserman, 2010). Criticism of government scares away advertising, most of which comes from the government or sources close to governments. The trend has moved toward light, glamorous life-style journalism, travel, health tips, interior decoration, and other feature journalism that attracts advertising The continual revelation and personalistic attacks on the corruption of political leaders appears as more sensationalism than serious analysis of good governance The media do not report the major political decisions (or lack of such decisions) by parliaments and ministries that affect the basic conditions of education, health, housing, and employment, but instead relate internal personalistic squabbles among political leaders (Nyabuga, 2012). The increasing concentration of political power and economic wealth has brought newspapers into close association with governments and blocked the reporting on the neo-patrimonial impoverishment of countries (Ugangu, 2011).

Still, African journalists have not given up their critical, investigative analysis and revelation of the systematic injustice by autocratic governments, but have migrated to more effective media in reaching leaders in civil society organizations. Examples include the news magazines referred to above and other specialized newspapers with greater freedom of expression and the chance to work with teams skilled in research and political analysis.

The new forms of radio that allow direct expression of public opinion with call in and ongoing discussion also provide important avenues. A study in Malawi (Kaufulu & Burton, 2013) reports the combination of open discussion radio, mobile phone, and social media that opens up issues of bad public services, injustices, and public problems and then gradually builds widespread support of public opinion that eventually forces government or private agencies to respond. This form of communication allows for much more direct democratic influence. However, much depends on how this formation of opinion links with advocacy groups that have the skills to put pressure on centers of decision social decision making

Social media which allow for interchange without direct intervention of powerful political-economic control also can contribute to the formation of movements for political change.

K. Conclusion: Will the African journalistic culture of protest against neo-patrimonial governance persist?

Much depends on the vigor of the civil society and advocacy groups in a given moment in the history of a country. Advocacy groups generate protest, make contact with journalists, and furnish analytic skills. The likelihood of advocacy groups seeking out journalists depends largely on the degree of unhappiness of middle class, professional groups with the state of their economic welfare and life possibilities and the ability to see that autocratic, personalistic governance blocks their aspirations. This happened in the 1990s in many African countries and brought a return to constitutional rule in many countries, though the structure of neopatrimonial governance has persisted and civil society has generally returned to quiescence.

The growing concentration of political-economic power has given autocratic rule even greater power over the big media, but alternative media exist and remain available to civil society advocacy groups. Unfortunately, leadership in the middle class, professional groups finds its own solutions through personal upward mobility and fears damaging personal opportunities by association with advocacy groups.

Finally, the alternative media--especially social media--offer possibilities for forming civil society groups. They feature much communication of opinions, but this often does not translate into political-economic action (Kamau, 2012).

The will of journalists in Africa to vindicate freedoms and rights which began in the confrontation against colonial regimes and has developed new tactics with the growth of neo-patrimonial governments remains very much alive and ready to cooperate if African civil society proves ready to work toward more definitive social transformation.

References

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Robert A. White

whitesaut@yahoo.com