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  • 标题:Evaluation of Process Risks in Industry 4.0 Environment.
  • 作者:Svingerova, Michaela ; Melichar, Martin
  • 期刊名称:Annals of DAAAM & Proceedings
  • 印刷版ISSN:1726-9679
  • 出版年度:2018
  • 期号:January
  • 出版社:DAAAM International Vienna
  • 摘要:1. Introduction

    In today's industrial production, process risk assessment by means of PFMEA is one of the cornerstones of control processes in most companies. The earlier automotive standard version, ISO TS 16949, merely recommended FMEA as an appropriate tool for companies involved in the automotive supply chain to master their preventive measures. Its revision and transformation into IATF 16949 and linking to an equally updated version of ISO 9001:2015, the role of risk management was greatly strengthened. IATF-certified companies are required to identify and assess the risks of all company processes on a regular basis as part of their internal management system. Now, the FMEA or PFMEA tool is not just recommended but expressly required by this standard.

    The history of FMEA goes back to the 1940s when the U.S. Army sought a technique for eliminating errors in the machines and equipment in use. 1960s saw the the first non-military use of this method when NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) began to use FMEA to identify potential risks in Apollo and Gemini programmes. The truly civilian era of risk assessment began 10 years later when the method was adopted by the automotive industry, particularly the Ford company in an attempt to address the low quality of its Ford Pinto model.

    PFMEA is a team-based approach to potential risk assessment where the multidisciplinary team is usually led by the engineer who is responsible for the product design. Active involvement of representatives of all areas concerned is expected, including assembly, production, design, testing and others [7]. It is advisable to begin risk mapping with a flow chart of the process in order to map it clearly and identify its boundaries. The customer is typically the end user but, depending on the definition, it may comprise the downstream operation or subsequent assembly operation.

Evaluation of Process Risks in Industry 4.0 Environment.


Svingerova, Michaela ; Melichar, Martin


Evaluation of Process Risks in Industry 4.0 Environment.

1. Introduction

In today's industrial production, process risk assessment by means of PFMEA is one of the cornerstones of control processes in most companies. The earlier automotive standard version, ISO TS 16949, merely recommended FMEA as an appropriate tool for companies involved in the automotive supply chain to master their preventive measures. Its revision and transformation into IATF 16949 and linking to an equally updated version of ISO 9001:2015, the role of risk management was greatly strengthened. IATF-certified companies are required to identify and assess the risks of all company processes on a regular basis as part of their internal management system. Now, the FMEA or PFMEA tool is not just recommended but expressly required by this standard.

The history of FMEA goes back to the 1940s when the U.S. Army sought a technique for eliminating errors in the machines and equipment in use. 1960s saw the the first non-military use of this method when NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) began to use FMEA to identify potential risks in Apollo and Gemini programmes. The truly civilian era of risk assessment began 10 years later when the method was adopted by the automotive industry, particularly the Ford company in an attempt to address the low quality of its Ford Pinto model.

PFMEA is a team-based approach to potential risk assessment where the multidisciplinary team is usually led by the engineer who is responsible for the product design. Active involvement of representatives of all areas concerned is expected, including assembly, production, design, testing and others [7]. It is advisable to begin risk mapping with a flow chart of the process in order to map it clearly and identify its boundaries. The customer is typically the end user but, depending on the definition, it may comprise the downstream operation or subsequent assembly operation.

Once the process and its boundaries have been clearly defined, brainstorming, Ishikawa diagram or other tools are used to identify as many risks as possible which may threaten the process[2;6]. These risks are then evaluated according to a consistent method from three aspects: severity of consequences in respect of the customer, occurrence of consequences in respect of the customer and the chance of detection. Each of these aspects is assigned a score on a scale from 1 to 10 as indicated in the tables below.

After the assessment, risk priority numbers (RPN) are determined for individual risks by simple multiplication of values for all three aspects. Risks with RPN values higher than an internal or contractual limit and those with the greatest severity are addressed on a priority basis as part of prevention measures.

2. Experimental Procedure

2.1. Real case study

This paper describes an assessment of automation of production using real-world data from a company which operates in the automotive industry. The data comes from serial production of canned catalysts. Two production lines were compared. Both of them are currently used in production. The one which has not been automated yet has been in operation for several years with minor improvements gradually introduced. one year ago, an automated line was installed next to it[2;3;4]. In this new line, most operations which used to be performed by a worker/operator are done by a robot. Even this automated line, though, requires the operator to carry out basic infeed and outfeed tasks. The automated line is monitored continuously and its processes are being refined. Such preparations may eventually lead to full automation.

2.2. Finished product

The finished products of both lines are canned catalysts. They consist of the monolithic catalyst, a support mat and a steel tube. It should be pointed out that for the purposes of this paper, the canned catalyst is considered the final product, although this only applies to the production lines described here. The end use requires its incorporation into the exhaust system of a vehicle.

The monolithic catalyst is the single most important and most expensive part of the catalytic converter. It is a ceramic cylinder which contains elements such as platinum, rhodium and palladium. It is a very brittle part. In the catalytic converter, its role is to reduce the amount of harmful products in the exhaust gases. This is provided by its sophisticated inner structure which is not identical in all monolithic catalysts. Every car manufacturer and every car model has its specific monolithic catalyst structure and size. The figure below shows various cell structures as seen from the top or bottom side of the monolithic catalyst[1;5;7].

The sizes of monolithic catalysts differ as well, with diameters of approximately 15 cm and heights around 15 cm in passenger vehicles. The typical appearance of a monolithic catalyst is shown in the figure below.

The support mat in the canned catalyst is made of glass wool. It provides both thermal and noise insulation and protects the brittle monolithic catalyst from damage. Shapes of the support mat can differ, as illustrated below, but the insulation effect must remain.

To give an idea of the glass wool texture, the diagram below shows the classification of fibres of which the insulation is composed.

The last part of the canned catalyst is its outer shell. It is in fact an iron tube. The first step involves rolling up sheet metal to a cylinder shape and laser welding it together in the machine. The resulting tube is cut by laser to the desired lengths to be used as "cans" for the catalytic converter. This part is shown in the figure below, on the left. The article in the centre is the monolithic catalyst and the one on the right is the rolled-up support mat. The figure below them shows a 3D rendering of the completed canned catalyst.

2.3. Production process

The sequence for making the canned catalyst is obvious from the parts used. The process flow below indicates the individual steps.

The automated line will be considered first. The boxes to the right of and below the dotted rectangle in the process flow chart indicate the operations which are done by human operator even in the automated line. They include feeding individual parts to the machine, final inspection, and transfer to downstream lines for final processing. Inside the dotted rectangle, there are the operations which are performed by the machine.

The photograph (Fig. 9) below the flow chart shows the "Kirschenhofer Maschinen" automated canning line.

In the conventional canning line, all the operations indicated in the flow chart are carried out by a human operator in several work stations with production machines and respective control computers [8]. Today, this conventional line is only used occasionally, on a customer request, typically for making small batches of canned catalysts. Due to confidentiality restrictions, the photograph of this conventional line--referred to as "shrinking line"--cannot be shown.

3. FMEA analysis

3.1. Manual operator

3.2. Automated process

3.3. Summary

An FMEA analysis based on a previous SPC analysis of process stability has clearly shown that substitution of manual operations with an automated process considerably reduced RPN values. The reduction was in the range from 33% to 84%. The only area where the risk priority number has not changed was the packaging of the part which remained a manual operation even after process automation. The most interesting item in the analysis is the number of critical processes, i.e. the potentially critical ones.

Like its many automotive counterparts, the company has defined its internal RPN acceptance level as 100. As the analysis shows, appropriately configured automation eliminated seven critical processes which are of major importance to the end user.

4. Conclusions

Research team of university of West Bohemia had the goal to analyse influence of risk management connected with replacement human work.

As mentioned in the introduction, today's automotive industry relies in its mandatory risk assessment activities exclusively on the FMEA method which is required by the IATF standard. The method was also used for experimental analysis of a production process, i.e. a substitution of a manual assembly workplace with a robotic cell, an upgrade which can undoubtedly be classified under Industry 4.0. Effects of a specific robotisation step were evaluated in collaboration with researchers from the University of West Bohemia/Regional Technological Institute.

Both processes were evaluated by a multidisciplinary team comprising members from all areas of the production process. Using brainstorming and data from real-world production (which were also utilized in the previous contribution [9]), risks were identified for each process. Each of the risks was classified by the FMEA team from three perspectives: severity/occurrence/detection. Since supply chain experience suggests that setting internal limit RPN values is not effective, this calculation was only use for statistical evaluation and for comparing both groups of results.

The results clearly show that despite the high initial investment costs for introducing an Industry 4.0 workplace, this investment pays off, at least from the risk management perspective. One general finding is that although the robotic cell comprises elements for active detection of errors and integrates a number of features of poka-yoke philosophy, the outcomes are virtually incomparable. RPN values become lower by an order of magnitude, on account of a drop in the detection and occurrence aspects.

The results achieved are in agreement with an earlier experiment, in which this process was assessed from the perspective of capability and stability. Next step in this analyse will be evaluation of risk during mass production inspection.

DOI: 10.2507/28th.daaam.proceedings.142

5. Acknowledgements

This paper was created due to the project GA ZCU v Plzni: SGS-2016-005 "Research and development for innovation in field of Manufacturing processes--Technology of metal cutting II.

6. References

[1] Melichar M., Kubatova D., Kutlwaser J.: (2016). CMM measuring cycle and human factor, Proceedings of the 27th DAAAM International Symposium, ISBN 978-3-902734-08-2

[2] Sahno J., Shevtshenko E., Zahharov R.:(2015) Framework for Continuous Improvement of Production Processes and Product Throughput, Procedia Engineering, Volume 100, Pages 511-519, ISSN 1877-7058, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2015.01.398.

[3] Hiltmann K.: Predicting Unknown Failures,(2015) Procedia Engineering, Volume 131, Pages 840-849, ISSN 18777058, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2015.12.392.

[4] Hak Soo Mok, Hyun Su Song, Deuk Jung Kim, Jin Eui Hong, Seung Min Lee, Jung Tae Ahn: Determination of Failure Cause in Remanufacturing,(2015) Procedia Engineering, Volume 100, Pages 14-23, ISSN 1877-7058, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2015.01.337.

[5] Chandrajit P., Anand S.: Correlating Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) & Overall Equipment Effectiveness (OEE), (2012) Procedia Engineering, Volume 38, Pages 3482-3486, ISSN 1877-7058, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2012.06.402.

[6] Xiaoli Zhang, Zhen He, Liangxing Shi, Process Quality Metrics for Mechanical and Electrical Production Lin, (2011), Procedia Engineering, Volume 24, Pages 6-11, ISSN 1877-7058, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2011.11.2592. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877705811054440)

[7] Vladimir Filaretov, Alexander Zuev, Anatoly Khvalchev, Development of Approach to Automatic Machining of Composite Parts without their Rigid Fixing by Means of Multilink Manipulators, (2014) Procedia Engineering, Volume 69, Pages 4-12, ISSN 1877-7058, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2014.02.196. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877705814001982)

[8] Qi Guo, Kuangjie Sheng, Zheng Wang, Xilin Zhang, hengyi Yang, Rui Miao, Research on Element Importance of Shafting Installation Based on QFD and FMEA,(2017), Procedia Engineering, Volume 174, Pages 677-685, ISSN 1877-7058, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016Zj.proeng.2017.01.205.

[9] Faurecia's internal sources

[10] Svingerova M., Melichar M., Evaluation of automated production, (2017) Pro-tech-ma

Caption: Fig. 1. Flow chart [10]

Caption: Fig. 2. Example of cell structures [9]

Caption: Fig. 3. Monolithic catalyst Source: Internal company documents

Caption: Fig. 4. Detail of isolation [9]

Caption: Fig. 5. Fibres classification [9]

Caption: Fig. 6. Canned catalyst [9]

Caption: Fig. 7. Making catalyst schema [9]

Caption: Fig. 8. Robotics work place [9]
Table 1. FMEA--severity [10]

Consequence                  Severity in respect of        Score
                             the customer

Failure to meet safety       Affects safe operation         10
of regulatory requirements   without warning                 9
                             Affects safe operation
                             after warning

Impaired or lost primary     Vehicle disabled                8
function                     Vehicle drivable, reduced       7
                             power

Impaired or lost secondary   Loss of comfort                 6
function                     Reduced comfort                 5

Inconvenience                Noticed by 75% of customers     4
                             Noticed by 50% of customers     3
                             Noticed by 25% of customers     2

No consequence               No perceptible consequence      1

Table 2. FMEA--occurrence [10]

Consequence   Occurrence in respect of the customer    Score

Major                       100000ppm                   10
Medium                       50000ppm                    9
                             20000ppm                    8
                             10000ppm                    7
Medium                       2000ppm                     6
                              500ppm                     5
                              100ppm                     4
Low                           10ppm                      3
                               1ppm                      2
Very low             Eliminated by prevention            1

Table 3. FMEA--identification [10]

Chance of detection       Probability of identification        Score
                                   of the cause

Detection impossible            Cannot be detected              10
Near impossible            Low probability of detection          9
Negligible                    E.g. visual inspection             8
                         Detection of the problem in the         7
Very low                             workplace
Low                    Measurement after the operation was       6
                             completed by the operator
Medium                    Detection by operator with the         5
                              aid of automated tools
Medium to high           Inspection with automated tools         4
                                  and separation
High                     Inspection with automated tools         3
                                  and separation
Very high               Automated tools for error detection      2
Fault prevention                 Error prevention                1

Fig. 9. FMEA analysis--manual operator [10]

         Process
Step     Function       Requirements
number                                 Potential Failure
                                       Mode
         Operation      Item.

1        Components                    Wrong part
         loading into                  orientation
         the machine

                                       Insuficient
                                       part position

                                       Insufficient part
                                       position (

                                       missing component

                                       extra component

2        clamping       clamping       clamp quality
                        parts

3        part           assy           Part damage
         unloading
         from the
         machine

4        packaging      Box            Wrong Container type

                                       Wrong number of
                                       parts in container

                                       Missing label

                        part           skipped operation
                        condition

Step     Potential Effects(s)   Severity   Class   Potential Cause(s)/
number    of Failure                                Mechanism(s) of
                                                    Failure

1        Improper fit                              Operator mistake,
         to vehicle              7                 Standardize working
                                                   instruction not
                                                   followed

         Tooling damage,                           Operator mistake,
         time loss                                 Standardize working
                                                   instruction not
                                8                  followed

         Tooling damage,                           Operator mistake,
         time loss                                 Standardize working
                                8                  instruction not
                                                   followed

         Improper fit to                           Operator mistake,
         vehicle                7                  Standardize working
                                                   instruction not
                                                   followed

         Improper fit to                           component inserted
         vehicle                                   twice
                                7

                                                   components sticked
                                                   with oil
                                7

2        Part may not meet                         parts weren't
         system design          7                  clamped
         requirements
                                                   parts weren't
                                7                  clamped

                                                   parts weren't
                                7                  clamped

         Part may not meet                         unsifficient
         system design          7                  clamping
         requirements
                                                   unsifficient
                                7                  clamping

3        Improper fit                              Falling of the part
         to vehicle
                                6

4        Time loss, wrong                          Material handler
         number of parts        3                  mistake

         Inventory                                 Operator mistake,
         discrapency            3                  packaging
                                                   instruction not
                                                   followed

         Lost of                                   Operator did not
         tracebility            4                  print label or
                                                   forget to place
                                                   printed label on box
         Improper fit                              operator mistake
         to vehicle             7

         Occurence   Current Process         Current Process Controls
Step                  Controls                Detection
number                Prevention

                     Process steps           sensors control correct
1         4          description in          orientation
                     Standardize work
                     instruction

                     Process steps           pin is controling correct
                     description in          position (sensor on end
                     Standardize work        stop)
          4          instruction, pin is
                     controling correct
                     position (sensor on
                     end stop)

                     Process steps           visual control, operator
                     description in          has to ensure position
          4          Standardize work        with small equipment
                     instruction

                     Process steps           sensor checking right
          4          description in          position
                     Standardize work
                     instruction

                     Work instruction        install sensor to control
                                             right material thickness
          3                                  before clamping

                     Work instruction        install sensor to control
                                             right material thickness
          3                                  before clamping

                     operator training       sensor checking right
2         4                                  position of clamps

                     operator training       sensors checking right
          4                                  position of clamps

                     operator training       sensors checking right
          4                                  position of clamps

                     operator training       sensor checking right
          4                                  position of clamps

                     operator training       sensors checking right
          4                                  position of clamps

                     Design of the holders   Operator training
3                    allowing easy part
          2          manipulation

                     no control              Operator training,
4         4                                  packaging instruction

                     Operator training,      Discrapancy for next
          4          packaging instruction   station

                     Operator training,      Reading lable on next
          4          automatic printing      process step
                     after last piece
                     inspection
                     No control              100% Touchpoint
          3                                  inspection on another
                                             work station

         Detection   R.P.N
Step
number

1         2          56

          3          96

          5          160

          5          140

          3          63

          3          63

2         4          112

          4          112

          4          112

          4          112

          4          112

3
          8          96

4         8          96

          8          96

          4          64

          7          147

Fig. 10. FMEA analysis--robot [10]

3.2. Automated process

         Process
Step     Function                        Potential Failure
number                  Requirements     Mode

         Operation      Item.

1        Components     components       Wrong part
         loading into   (Stamping)       orientation
         the machine

                                         Insuficient part
                                         position

                                         Insufficient part
                                         position (

                                         missing
                                         component

                                         extra component

2        clamping       clamping parts   clamping quality

3        part           assy             Part damage
         unloading
         from the
         machine

4        packaging      Box              Wrong Container
                                         type

                                         Wrong number of
                                         parts in container

                                         Missing label

                        part condition   skipped operation

Step     Potential Effect(s) of    Severity   Class
number    Failure

1        Improper fit to vehicle
                                   7

         Tooling damage, time
         loss

                                   8

         Tooling damage, time
         loss                      8

         Improper fit to vehicle

                                   7

         Improper fit to vehicle

                                   7

                                   7

2        Part may not meet
         system design             7
         requirements

                                   7

                                   7

         Part may not meet
         system design             7
         requirements

                                   7

3        Improper fit to vehicle
                                   5

4        Time loss, wrong
         number of parts           3

         Inventory discrapency
                                   3

         Lost of tracebility
                                   4

         Improper fit to vehicle
                                   7

Step     Potential Cause(s)/                   Current Process
number    Mechanism(s) of         Occurrence    Controls
          Failure                               Prevention

1        Operator mistake,                     Process steps
         Standardize working      2            description in
         instruction not                       Standardize work
         fo1lowed                              instruction

         Operator mistake,                     Process steps
         Standardize working                   description in
         instruction not                       Standardize work
         followed                 2            instruction, pin is
                                               controling correct
                                               position (sensor on
                                               end stop)

         Operator mistake,                     Process steps
         Standardize working      2            description in
         instruction not                       Standardize work
         followed                              instruction

         Operator mistake,                     Process steps
         Standardize working                   description in
         instruction not          3            Standardize work
         followed                              instruction

         component inserted                    Work instruction
         twice
                                  2

         components sticked                    Work instruction
         with oil
                                  2

2        parts weren't                         operator training
         clamped                  2

         parts weren't                         operator training
         clamped                  3

         parts weren't                         operator training
         clamped                  3

         unsifficient clamping                 operator training
                                  3

         unsifficient clamping                 operator training
                                  3

3        Falling of the part                   Design of the holders
                                  2            allowing easy part
                                               manipulation

4        Material handler                      no control
         mistake                  4

         Operator mistake,                     Operator training,
         packaging instruction    4            packaging instruction
         not followed

         Operator did not print                Operator training,
         label or forget to       4            automatic printing
         place printed label                   after last piece
         on box                                inspection

      operator mistake                         No control
                                  3

Step     Current Process Controls
number    Detection                  Detection   R.P.N

1        sensors control correct
         orientation                 1           14

         pin is controling correct
         position (sensor on end
         stop)
                                     1           16

         visual control, operator
         has to ensure position      2           32
         with small equipment

         sensor checking right
         position
                                     2           42

         install sensor to control
         right material thickness
         before clamping             2           28

         install sensor to control
         right material thickness
         before clamping             2           28

2        sensor checking right
         position of clamps          2           28

         sensors checking right
         position of clamps          2           42

         sensors checking right
         position of clamps          2           42

         sensor checking right
         position of clamps          2           42

         sensors checking right
         position of clamps          2           42

3        Operator training
                                     3           36

4        Operator training,
         packaging instruction       8           96

         Discrapancy for next
         station                     8           96

         Reading lable on next
         process step                4           64

         100% Touchpoint
         inspection on another       7           147
         work station
COPYRIGHT 2018 DAAAM International Vienna
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2018 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

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