首页    期刊浏览 2024年07月08日 星期一
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Caesarean Section versus Normal Vaginal Delivery: A Game Theory Discussion in Reimbursement Interventions
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Marita MOHAMMADSHAHI ; Hasan HEMATYAR ; Masoumeh NAJAFI
  • 期刊名称:Iranian Journal of Public Health
  • 印刷版ISSN:2251-6085
  • 电子版ISSN:2251-6093
  • 出版年度:2018
  • 卷号:47
  • 期号:11
  • 页码:1709-1716
  • 出版社:Tehran University of Medical Sciences
  • 摘要:Background: The rate of caesarean section (C-section) in Iran is too high, so having a plan to control it is crucial. Since one of the most important reasons for inclination of providers to do C-section is financial issues, the purpose of this study was offering financial solutions for increasing normal vaginal delivery (NVD) and decreasing non-indicated C-section. Methods: This analytical-descriptive research, used game theory for offering financial mechanisms. The game was a dynamic one in which the backward induction was used to obtain a Nash equilibrium. Financial structure and the mean number of NVD and C-section in a certain period of time in comparison with standards were as the main influential factors on financial dimensions and were included in the model. Results: The effect of financial structure was shown through a specified insurance for childbirth, existence of a monitoring department and tariffs. Conclusion: The main solution for controlling C-section in designed game was taxes and fines for physician or hospital in non- indicated cases and giving reward otherwise.
  • 关键词:Caesarian section; Normal vaginal delivery; Game theory; Insurance
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有