We construct efficient, unconditional non-malleable codes that are secure against tampering functions computed by small-depth circuits. For constant-depth circuits of polynomial size (i.e.~ \mathsf A C 0 tampering functions), our codes have codeword length n = k 1+ o (1) for a k -bit message. This is an exponential improvement of the previous best construction due to Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017), which had codeword length 2 O ( k ) . Our construction remains efficient for circuit depths as large as ( log ( n ) log log ( n )) (indeed, our codeword length remains n k 1+ ) , and extending our result beyond this would require separating \mathsf P from \mathsf N C 1 .

We obtain our codes via a new efficient non-malleable reduction from small-depth tampering to split-state tampering. A novel aspect of our work is the incorporation of techniques from unconditional derandomization into the framework of non-malleable reductions. In particular, a key ingredient in our analysis is a recent pseudorandom switching lemma of Trevisan and Xue (CCC 2013), a derandomization of the influential switching lemma from circuit complexity; the randomness-efficiency of this switching lemma translates into the rate-efficiency of our codes via our non-malleable reduction.