期刊名称:American Journal of Industrial and Business Management
印刷版ISSN:2164-5167
电子版ISSN:2164-5175
出版年度:2019
卷号:9
期号:4
页码:1011-1023
DOI:10.4236/ajibm.2019.94069
出版社:Scientific Research Publishing
摘要:A two-stage game is developed with network externalities where, besides pricing decisions, the retailer and manufacturer can determine their advertising investments and advertising participation rates for each stage. In addition to the full cooperation advertising model, three part cooperation advertising models are established. We develop propositions and insights from the comparison of these models. Our main findings are as follows: 1) the equilibrium solutions critically depend on the effects of network externalities; 2) the optimal choice in a two-stage game is to achieve full cooperation; and 3) a second-best choice for the manufacturer is to share the retailer’s advertising in the first stage. Our research results have guiding significance for supply chain member’s decision-making in local advertising practice.